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This study examined the extent to which presidential leadership teams in 
institutions of higher education realize their goal of helping college and university 
presidents with decision making. The literatures on leadership teams in higher education 
and in other contexts suggest that these teams have promise for helping presidents 
manage complex internal and external demands. However, empirical research on these 
teams has been limited.  This dissertation addresses that research gap with an in-depth 
qualitative case study of one presidential leadership team. I drew on management and 
organizational behavior literature to conceptualize team members as boundary spanners 
who operated between the president and the rest of the university and the university’s 
external environment. This literature suggested team members would help manage both 
information and political relationships. I then used concepts from the new institutionalism 
in sociology to help me identify those conditions that might help or hinder team 
members’ boundary-spanning activities. My primary data sources were interviews, 
extensive observations, and document analysis.    
  
I found that the university president in this case intended for his team to operate 
as boundary spanners who would manage information and political relationships, but that 
team members’ engagement in these intended activities varied. I found that most team 
members helped with information management only occasionally and focused their 
efforts primarily on political activities outside of the institution. However, a core group 
frequently engaged in these activities. The variation in participation seemed to depend on 
whether individuals came with the capacity and orientation to engage in these roles. The 
team setting itself did not provide basic structures or resources to encourage these forms 
of participation among all members. This study suggests the need to apply additional 
frameworks and methods to illuminate other dimensions of teamwork in presidential 
leadership teams. In practice, this study shows that in order for individuals to fulfill 
boundary-spanning functions, the team setting may need to foster particular dynamics 
and provide certain structures that enable information management. These structures 
range from the provision of basic meeting agendas and facilitation to models of how to 
engage in information and political management activities. 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
The presidency is lodged not in one person but in a team. 
(Bensimon & Neumann, 1993, p. xv) 
 
The “individual leader as hero” has been a powerful myth both in higher 
education and in American culture (Reich, 1987). However in recent years, the concept of 
the “team as hero” (Reich, 1987) has increasingly appeared in the higher education 
leadership literature (e.g., Bensimon, 1991; Bensimon & Neumann, 1993; Green, 1994; 
Neumann, 1991; Weber & Karman, 1989). Conventional ideas that define leaders as 
solitary individuals ignore the context in which leaders must operate (Bolman & Deal, 
1997; House & Aditya, 1997). No longer can the process of leadership be described in 
terms of individuals; instead, leadership involves “collaborative relationships that lead to 
collective action grounded in the shared values of people who work together to effect 
positive change” (Astin & Astin, 1996 in House & Aditya, 1997, p. 457). 
This shift to a team focus in the literature makes sense because presidential 
leadership in higher education has become increasingly complex in ways that have made 
colleges and universities too difficult for any single chief executive to understand 
complexity and to lead alone (Eisenstat & Cohen, 1990; Green, 1994). Even in the late 
1960’s, scholars were stating that  “the time has long passed when a college can be 
administered effectively by the Herculean efforts of one man” (Drewry, 1967, p. 1). In 
the complexity of the 21st century, leaders are faced with economic, demographic, and 
technological changes that require decisions about such issues as new partnerships, 
student and staff diversity, and accountability demands. The complexity of these issues 
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typically pushes the boundaries of a single president’s knowledge and extends well 
beyond the professional training and capacity of a single decision maker. For example, 
serving as an provost for academic affairs is the most well-traveled path to the 
presidency, and very few presidents have any senior level experience in areas such as 
finance, external affairs, development, or student affairs (King, 2007). This career 
pipeline means that presidents are likely under-prepared for the complex issues facing 
them and their institutions. Rather than rely on the talent or traits of a solitary hero, 
organizations must turn to the collective talent and ideas that teams can provide.  
The characteristics of an information society have led many to consider the 
importance, if not the necessity, of leadership teams as a particularly promising to single-
leader models (Weber & Karman, 1989). “In an information society, emphasis changes 
from data gathering to knowledge processing.  Transforming information gathered into 
useful, integrated, decision-making knowledge requires the use of interdisciplinary 
teams” to work together (Gardiner, 1988, p. 138). In a world increasingly saturated with 
information, mechanisms for accessing and using information must take into account the 
essential role of the social system, such as teams (Duguid & Brown, 2000).  
Given these conditions, one approach that leaders in institutions of higher 
education have used to access information to improve decision making is a leadership 
team – a group of top-level administrators who report directly to the president and with 
whom he or she works closely (Bensimon, 1991; Bensimon & Neumann, 1993; 
Bensimon, Neumann, & Birnbaum, 1989; Neumann, 1991). The rationale for the 
popularity of teams in the management literature is that they are “most effective in 
facilitating creativity and innovation among the highly educated, professional personnel 
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found in modern, highly sophisticated . . . companies. For the same reasons, this style is 
particularly appropriate for universities” (Guskin & Bassis, 1985, p. 20). Given the 
complex nature of higher education organizations and their environments, a team 
approach to leadership should improve the presidential-level decision making of a college 
or university by assembling people from across the organization in order to capitalize on 
different knowledge and multiple perspectives they may bring to decisions (Bensimon & 
Neumann, 1993). This type of organizational arrangement is theoretically more 
advantageous than traditional models of leadership that focus solely on the presidency 
because it “enables leaders to see the institution from many different perspectives and 
therefore to use a wider variety of approaches and strategies” (Green, 1994, p. 56). It is 
from these multiple perspectives that access to a wider variety of information and 
interpretations is rooted. When teams engage in these types of bridging activities, they 
are likely to achieve higher performance (Ancona, 1990). Some suggest that these 
multiple perspectives may generate solutions to problems that are more relevant and 
innovative than those possible from a single decision maker.  
The higher education and management literature frequently touts the hypothetical 
value of presidential leadership teams. However, empirical research on leadership teams 
in higher education is limited and under-developed. The existing empirical work takes a 
primarily internal perspective on leadership teams, focusing on team dynamics and roles, 
without consideration of their relationship to their organizational context and the extent to 
which they realize their promise of spanning boundaries, increasing access to 
information, and ultimately improving decision making. 
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Furthermore, we know little about whether presidential leadership teams are up to 
the challenge of helping presidents to access information and improve decision making 
and under what conditions they can accomplish these goals. This is a significant omission 
given the extreme challenges that team face. For example, teams are not isolated and self-
sufficient; rather they are embedded within a broader system that can both help and 
hinder team processes and outcomes (Kozlowski & Bell, 2003). Research suggests that it 
is important for team members to interact with their internal and external environments in 
order to access information and provide representation that reinforce decision-making 
processes (Ancona & Caldwell, 1992). However, doing so is not easy as teams must take 
their context into account and manage complex information and relationships. Literature 
on organizational behavior literature on boundary spanning and group effectiveness also 
suggest that these teams likely face particular liabilities as they interact with their 
environment.  
The purpose of this study is to address these gaps in the literature by examining 
the extent to which presidential leadership teams realize their promise of linking 
presidents to more and better information to improve decision making. My specific 
research questions were: 
 
1. To what extent did the president intend for team members to help manage the 
team’s environment? 
2. What is the actual role of the presidential leadership team? 
3. What were the impacts of the team? 
4. What helps or hinders leadership team members in fulfilling their roles? 
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I turned to the literatures on boundary spanning and the new institutionalism in 
sociology (NIS) to construct a conceptual framework for this inquiry because these 
literatures highlight dimensions not previously explored by scholars in the study of 
presidential leadership teams, particularly the influence of institutional factors and 
relationships with the environment outside of the team. According to these theories, as 
individuals perform boundary-spanning activities, they are likely to face significant 
challenges, including uncertainty, ambiguity, multiple roles, and the social context of the 
team. This framework called my attention to the variety of influences that these 
individuals and teams face, aspects that have not previously explored in the study of 
presidential leadership teams. 
Given the nascent stage of research in this area, I used a qualitative, single case 
study design that involved interviews, observation, and document analysis. I used a 
cyclical approach to data analysis (Miles & Huberman, 1994), involving a recurring 
sequence of data collection, data analysis, and the generation of new and refined 
questions that led to additional data collection. I organized these data into categories 
suggested by my problem statement and conceptual framework, including boundary 
spanning activities, actual and intended roles, decision influences, and conditions that 
might help or hinder boundary spanners. I drew upon decision-making theory to analyze 
individuals’ attempts to simplify their experience, including comments about past 
experience and familiarity, concerns with legitimacy, and identification of rules.  
In Chapters 2, 3, and 4, I elaborate on my framing of the problem, articulate a 
conceptual framework, and describe the methods I used to gather and analyze data. Then, 
in Chapters 5, 6, and 7, I present my findings. In Chapter 5, I show that team members 
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achieved limited information management and political management activities. However, 
they could not be defined as boundary spanners in terms of information management due 
to a lack of evidence of search and use activities. Furthermore, presidential leadership 
teams may be comprised of subgroups that can be differentiated on a variety of 
characteristics that help to explain their behavior and the assets that may be useful in 
successful boundary spanning. In Chapter 6, I describe the team outcomes and show that 
while they achieve some success with political outcomes, they did not engage in 
discussion and debate, leading to limited information management outcomes. 
In Chapter 7, I describe how uncertainty, differing perceptions, diverse identities, 
power, and the president’s role provided significant helps and hindrances to this team’s 
ability to engage in information management activities. Team members were hindered by 
the lack of formal structures to guide their behaviors and processes, the uneven 
distribution of power within the team, as well as by team dynamics that favored affective 
conflict over cognitive conflict. The conceptual framework proved to be a valuable lens 
through which to understand boundary spanning in presidential leadership teams as it 
highlighted institutional factors that influenced their behaviors and explained how team 
members dealt with the organizational conditions they faced in ways that adhered to the 
concepts presented by the new institutionalism in sociology. 
The contributions of this study are first and foremost that it extends the research 
on the use of leadership teams in higher education, both methodologically and 
conceptually. This study differs from previous empirical work by using a qualitative case 
study to study a single team over an extended period of time and to conceptualize team 
members as boundary spanners. This research contributes a new perspective on 
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presidential leadership team by applying concepts from the new institutionalism in 
sociology. This is a significant departure from previous work on leadership teams in 
higher education because it locates them in an institutional context and sheds light on 
dimensions not previously explored by other scholars. The findings provide support for 
this conceptual framework by showing that team members can be understood as 
boundary spanners who relied on familiar routines in order to perform their roles and 
relied on notions of legitimacy, even when these behaviors did not always support 
boundary spanning. These findings also support the critical role that affective and 
cognitive conflict can play in developing effective teams, as well as the importance of the 
team leader (Ancona, 1990; Guzzo & Dickson, 1996; Hackman & Walton, 1986). Future 
research should further explore the political management function of leadership teams, as 
well as which tools, strategies, and mechanisms help individuals and team to achieve 
their goals. 
The results of this study may also provide valuable assistance to presidents and 
cabinet members in structuring and managing their teams to support decision making. 
This case suggests that presidents and their team should implement several practices or 
strategies in order to create a solid base for the team’s work. Presidents and their team 
should take steps to ensure that both the formal meeting structures and informal processes 
are designed to support the organization’s goals. Specifically, presidents and their team 
must address affective conflict, generate cognitive conflict, develop wider sources of 
power, and use formal meeting structures. Presidents must build their teams’ capacity to 
achieve the benefit of teams as a strategy, rather than just a meeting. In other words, 
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teams must build a solid base for their bridges in order to reap the benefits of boundary 
spanning. 
This study shows that, in order for individuals to effectively fulfill the functions 
that boundary-spanning literature suggests, they need a foundation from which to base 
these activities. Team members’ abilities to search for and deliver relevant information, 
to engage in discussion and debate about that information, and to promote the 
university’s goals would by helped by the existence of formal structures to counter 
uncertainty and ambiguity, as well as attention to the informal dynamics of the team that 
hinder interaction and cognitive conflict. 
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CHAPTER 2: THE PROMISE OF PRESIDENTIAL LEADERSHIP TEAMS 
It is unrealistic to expect everyone to be a leader for all times and seasons.  Wise leaders 
understand their own strengths, work to expand them, and build teams that can provide 
leadership . . . (Bolman & Deal, 1997, p. 317). 
 
In this chapter, I examined what research already teaches about what presidential 
leadership teams do and their potential for improved organizational decision making. I 
reviewed literature on presidential leadership teams in higher education and top 
management teams in the corporate sector, as well as literature on group effectiveness. 
This review revealed that leadership teams can help organizations address a wide range 
of issues through increased access to information and an expanded ability to process 
information from multiple perspectives. Teams seem particularly useful in this regard 
because they can draw on their diverse composition and by engaging in effective group 
processes. 
Research suggests that presidential leadership teams exist in colleges and 
universities, but the literature in this area is limited to a handful of studies that focus 
primarily on the internal, cognitive dynamics of these teams. (Bensimon & Neumann, 
1993; Dewey, 1998; Knudson, 1997). The literature on similar teams in the corporate 
sector highlights the importance of functional diversity and group process in team 
functioning, as well as the importance of the organizational environment’s influence 
(Cohen & Bailey, 1997; Edmondson, Roberto, & Watkins, 2003; Hambrick, 1994). This 
literature emphasizes that organizational teams must reach beyond their boundaries to 
engage and influence their environment. In the context of higher education, there is still 
much to learn about how presidential leadership teams in higher education function 
within their environment. 
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Real presidential leadership teams 
In the literature on higher education, many authors have advocated for a team 
approach to presidential leadership in institutions of higher education (Bensimon & 
Neumann, 1993; Gardiner, 1988; Green, 1994). The limited research on presidential 
leadership teams suggests that real teams exist (Bensimon & Neumann, 1993; Knudson, 
1997) and that they can have a positive influence on the organization (Dewey, 1998). For 
example, Dewey (1998) showed that leadership teams with the capacity to engage in 
cognitive interaction can predict organizational health. In this section, I rely heavily on 
the work of Bensimon and Neumann to describe presidential leadership teams in part 
because theirs is the seminal work in this area, but also because nearly every subsequent 
study has relied on their framework.  
According to Bensimon and Neumann, in higher education, the presidential 
leadership team is the president’s cabinet – the group of top-level campus administrators 
formally convened to advise the president in his or her decision making (Bensimon & 
Neumann, 1993). This is typically a functionally diverse group, with each team member 
representing an organizational subunit such as student affairs, academic affairs, 
enrollment, alumni relations, advancement, government relations, legal affairs, finance, 
or administrative affairs. While leadership teams exist in name on practically every 
college and university campus, these entities do not necessarily all function as “real” 
teams as they are defined in the literature. In the higher education literature, Bensimon 
and Neumann (1993) provide a definition of a “real” team based on a framework that 
focuses on three functional domains: utilitarian, expressive, and cognitive. The utilitarian 
function focuses on the task dimension, encompassing activities that are needed to keep 
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the institution running and to get things done, such as delivering information, 
coordinating and planning, and making decisions. A team’s expressive function focuses 
on the social aspects that reinforce connections among members, such as providing 
mutual support or providing counsel to the president. Finally, the cognitive function 
enables a team to perform as a sensemaking unit through activities such as viewing 
problems from multiple perspectives, engaging in questioning and arguing, and acting as 
a monitoring system. 
According to Bensimon and Neumann, a real team is one in which the cognitive 
function is the central task, rather than primarily or exclusively utilitarian or expressive. 
In other words, a real team is one that thinks together and has achieved a level of 
cognitive complexity, or the ability to view an issue, idea, or organization from multiple 
perspectives. A team, rather than an individual, increases the likelihood of achieving 
cognitive complexity because it “takes a complex sensing system to register and regulate 
a complex object” such as a university (Weick, 1995, p. 34-35). By viewing the 
organization’s reality from different perspectives and working together, real teams can 
“use a wider variety of approaches and strategies” (Green, 1994, p. 56) and “address a 
diverse range of institutional issues” (Bensimon & Neumann, 1993, p. 44).  
Because presidential leadership team members typically represent a variety of 
university divisions, they can provide access to a wider variety of information than a 
single individual, such as a president alone, might be able to easily obtain. Such a team, 
using its strength of diversity, should be better able to “discern the changing needs, 
positions, aspirations, and particular points of view of diverse members of the campus 
community” than a president acting alone (Bensimon & Neumann, 1993, p. 132). Having 
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access to information is important because “knowing more usually leads to better 
decisions that knowing less” (Davenport & Prusak, 1998, p. 9) when addressing complex 
problems such as those faced by senior executives. 
In Bensimon and Neumann’s framework, team members can provide access to 
information from two perspectives: by delivering and by sharing. This is an important 
distinction in the definition of a real team. First, from a utilitarian view, information can 
be delivered from one individual to another, such as a vice president to the president. An 
alternative is the sharing of information among team members, in other words sharing 
information on a broader scale. Sharing implies that information is distributed to the team 
as a whole and therefore able to be acted upon by a variety of individuals. In contrast, 
information delivery means that information is handled as a resource to for individuals to 
control, rather than as a resource to share among colleagues, potentially creating an 
unequal power dynamic. Information then becomes a means to establish a “common 
ground for decision making” by the team (Bensimon and Neumann, 1993, p. 35). Teams 
whose “dominant function is the delivery of information to the president for the 
president’s own benefit cannot be regarded as real teams because they just provide 
information” without facilitating the opportunity for consideration or input from all team 
members (Bensimon and Neumann, 1993, p. 35). 
The activities included in both the utilitarian and cognitive functions lead to the 
characterization of a real team as a collaborative effort in which these functions inform 
one another (Bensimon and Neumann, 1993). When team members share information 
within the team, rather than deliver it solely to the president, there is an opportunity to 
hear from the multiple perspectives that team members bring to the table. When this 
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occurs in an atmosphere that supports debate, information sharing can lead to information 
processing. Bensimon and Neumann (1993) place particular emphasis on the processing 
activity of teams by focusing on the pivotal role of the cognitive function in their 
framework. 
Fulfilling a cognitive function means that team members engage in activities such 
as sharing their multiple perspectives, debating, and providing feedback. Teams that 
function in this way examine issues from multiple points of view and bring unconsidered 
alternatives to light, as well as possible options to solve problems (Bensimon & 
Neumann, 1993). The existence of teams that process information from multiple 
perspectives has been shown to have a positive impact on organizational effectiveness 
(Dewey, 1998). While the complexity that such a structure with a diversity of views and 
values may seem problematic, the benefit is that “multiple solutions to a complex 
problem can make the problem less daunting and easier to handle” (Bensimon & 
Neumann, 1993, p. 42). With a cognitively complex team, decisions should improve 
because drawing on multiple perspectives will result in a more complete picture of a 
given situation and therefore should lead to better actions (Neumann, 1991). In fact, a 
team’s ability to consider different perspectives “may be the difference between effective 
and ineffective leadership for an institution” (Dewey, 1998, p. 10).  
The literature on presidential leadership teams in higher education also highlights 
some factors that shape whether or not teams realize these functions. The ability to share 
and process information may be dependent on the affective abilities of a team, a third 
dimension in the Bensimon and Neumann (1993) framework. When a team is able to 
carry out expressive functions by serving as a source for counsel and advice, as well as to 
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“act as a mirror” for how others might perceive actions and decisions, it provides a sense 
of connectedness for its members who have isolated roles and few peers on campus 
(Bensimon & Neumann, 1993). Studies of presidential leadership teams have found 
support for the importance of the expressive function, particularly emphasizing the role 
of trust, mutual respect, effective communication, and time for interaction in effective 
teams (Dee, 2001; Knudson, 1997). Frequent team meetings and informal social 
interaction can enable trust and collaboration by creating opportunities to learn about one 
another and to test out ideas (Dee, 2001).  
The expressive function supports information processing by helping teams to 
avoid oversimplifying issues and coming to premature closure on decisions by 
considering a variety of alternative explanations and solutions. A real team requires a 
culture of collegiality; a mutually respectful atmosphere provides freedom for team 
members to provide honest feedback and to consider new courses of action that deviate 
from what is comfortable. While presidents may value the cognitive contributions of a 
team, research suggests that team members place higher value on the collegial function of 
a team (Knudson, 1997). Fulfilling this function compels team members to build 
relationships that go beyond political alliances and to consider both the personal and 
professional needs of each member. Adhering to functional roles and relying on our 
human tendency to connect with similar others can hinder the development of trust and 
collaboration in presidential leadership teams (Dee, 2001). Furthermore, if interactions 
occur among a limited number of individuals, rather than all members of the team, this 
can create a “backdoor negotiation” situation that impedes information sharing and open 
discussion, and creates cognitive conflict among all team members (Dee, 2001). 
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Teams with a strong sense of internal cohesion and common identity may also 
isolate themselves from the rest of the university (Bensimon & Neumann, 1993). If a 
leadership team is working closely together, there is a chance that they will become a 
“cognitive clique” (Bensimon & Neumann, 1993), meaning that they become so 
associative with one another that they exclude outsiders and outside information, thereby 
isolating or distancing themselves from the rest of the organization. For example, in their 
case studies of fifteen leadership teams, Bensimon and Neumann observed that some 
teams were so internally cohesive that they were unlikely to be effective leaders because 
they were only aware of their own “vision of reality” (1993, p.160). Both of these 
situations can limit a team’s access to information and potentially hinder their ability to 
process that information in a cognitively complex way. 
This literature on leadership teams in higher education also addresses the role of 
the president in building and maintaining real teams (Bensimon & Neumann, 1993; 
Gardiner, 1988; Green, 1994; Knudson, 1997; Neumann, 1991). Echoing the groups and 
teams literature, higher education scholars suggest that the effectiveness of leadership 
teams is dependent on the choices and abilities of the team leader to both select team 
members and facilitate their interactions (Eisenstat & Cohen, 1990; Neumann, 1991). For 
example, when selecting a team, “a president may want to focus on unique institutional 
needs in selecting and orchestrating the administrative team” (Neumann, 1991, p.505) in 
order to have the skills and information necessary to address current organizational 
issues. But, going beyond design, once a team is convened the president must play a role 
in establishing and sustaining group norms, engendering trust, and defining clear 
boundaries of the team’s work (Eisenstat and Cohen, 1990). These leadership tasks 
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require skills that are associated more with post-heroic leaders, such as the ability to 
listen, giving up control, and being prepared for unexpected outcomes (Chieffo, 1991; 
Green, 1994). 
In order to function as a real team, all members – and the president in particular – 
must be able to convey tolerance, respect, and appreciation for others’ differences 
(Neumann, 1991). The need for a collegial atmosphere, particularly on the part of the 
president, is vital for team members to feel that their contributions are not construed as 
challenging authority but welcomed as valuable input. Furthermore, the president must 
articulate norms that support thinking outside of functional areas and that clarify the team 
role as one that is intended to further institutional goals, not advocate for local interests 
(Dee, 2001). A lack of congruence among team members with regard to motivation, 
structure, and interpretation can affect their willingness to trust and collaborate with other 
team members (Dee, 2001). In other words, the president must attend to a balance 
between the cognitive and affective needs of the team. As shown in the literature on top 
management teams, both elements are important to achieving the promise of leadership 
teams. This task may be difficult as research has suggested that while leadership team 
members value the affective aspects of team work, presidents value the cognitive 
characteristics (Knudson, 1997).  
The few studies that have explored presidential leadership teams have focused on 
understanding the internal dynamics of these teams (e.g., Bell, 2001; Bensimon, 1991; 
Bensimon & Neumann, 1993; Dee, 2001; Dewey, 1998; Knudson, 1997; Neumann, 
1991). For example, Dee (2001) considered the importance of trust and collaboration 
with leadership teams. Knudson (1997) relied on the Bensimon and Neumann (1993) 
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framework to determine the extent to which such teams exist in the community college 
environment. While the limited research on presidential leadership teams in colleges and 
universities has primarily focused on these cognitive and expressive functions, there is a 
substantial body of literature addressing a variety of other factors in similar corporate 
teams.  
Evidence from outside of higher education suggests that these teams have promise 
for addressing the complexity faced by higher education organizations. While it is 
challenging to make these comparisons due to the distinct differences in the values and 
structures of universities and corporations, I turned to the management literature because 
it helped to elaborate the importance of the organizational environment to the success of 
such teams, a dimension that is currently lacking in the higher education literature. In the 
next section, I review literature on top management teams, as they are commonly called 
in the management literature, to highlight evidence that there is more to learn about their 
counterparts in institutions of higher education. 
 
Top management teams 
Nearly a quarter century ago, Hambrick and Mason (1984) encouraged research 
on the “upper echelons” of organizations, based on the concept of the “dominant 
coalition” (Cyert & March, 1963). They advocated that top management teams or the 
senior executives of an organization, rather than individual executives or the CEO, are 
the key decision makers in organizations. These clusters of top executives are identified 
by several terms in the organizational behavior and management literature: executive 
teams (Ancona & Nadler, 1989; Nadler & Spencer, 1998), senior executive teams (Berg, 
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2005), the “team at the top” or senior leadership group (Katzenbach, 1998), and most 
commonly, top management teams (Finkelstein & Hambrick, 1996; Hambrick & Mason, 
1984). Top management team membership is typically based on members’ formal 
position in the organization, they are generally comprised of those executives at the top 
of the organization who report directly to the CEO (Finkelstein & Hambrick, 1996; 
Hambrick & Mason, 1984; Katzenbach, 1998; Nadler & Spencer, 1998). They represent a 
variety of organizational functions, such as marketing, sales, human resources, or 
engineering and have likely spent a significant part of their career in one of these areas 
(Finkelstein & Hambrick, 1996). The term “functional diversity” serves as a proxy for the 
information and expertise that individual team members bring to a group (Williams & 
O'Reilly, 1998) that likely arise from differences in education and experience. 
An array of empirical evidence has supported the suggestion that organizational 
outcomes are at least partially predicted by the background characteristics of top 
management team members (e.g., function, values, experience, education, age, tenure), 
therefore making this group an important unit for study (Carpenter, Geletkanycz, & 
Sanders, 2004; Edmondson et al., 2003; Finkelstein & Hambrick, 1996; Geletkanycz & 
Hambrick, 1997; Hambrick, Geletkanycz, & Fredrickson, 1993; Hambrick & Mason, 
1984; Knight et al., 1996; Pitcher & Smith, 2001; Simons, Pelled, & Smith, 1999; Smith, 
Houghton, Hoode, & Rymand, 2006). In this subsection I review the literature on top 
management teams to show that certain characteristics and processes are important to 
understanding these types of organizational teams.  
The top management team literature identifies several functions of these teams. 
The overarching challenge for top management teams is the complex task of 
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simultaneously managing both internal and external operations and relationships, and 
engaging in strategic decision making (Ancona & Nadler, 1989; Finkelstein & Hambrick, 
1996). Top management teams function at the boundary between the organization and the 
external environment by gathering and conveying information and impressions 
(Finkelstein & Hambrick, 1996; Thompson, 1967) while also managing diverse and 
interdependent units internally (Ancona & Nadler, 1989). Their activities include 
gathering and transmitting information across these boundaries, as well as adapting to or 
attempting to align the organization to the environment (Finkelstein & Hambrick, 1996). 
Top management teams also engage in strategic decision making, defined as those 
choices that are important, set precedents, define long-range directions, are non-routine, 
or involve significant commitment of resources (Eisenhardt & Zbaracki, 1992; 
Mintzberg, Raisinghani, & Theoret, 1976). The role of top executives on these teams 
include the formulation and implementation of strategy that aligns the organization with 
the environment (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978). These responsibilities include decisions 
about which products and markets to emphasize, as well as how to allocate resources, 
develop policies, and create an organizational context to support those strategies 
(Finkelstein & Hambrick, 1996).  
Particular characteristics of top executives can help or hinder them as they work 
to achieve these functions. Top management teams are different from other types of 
organizational teams because of the socialization and power of the individuals that tend 
to comprise these teams. First, top executives are likely to have had prolonged experience 
in, and expertise with, their functional areas as they rise to the top of an organization. 
This means that they are more likely to be socially entrenched in certain ways of thinking 
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because they have been successful using what has worked for them in the past 
(Geletkanycz & Black, 2001). Yet, while they have sufficiently adhered to norms in order 
to be accepted within their functional areas, these are individuals who have succeeded in 
rising to the top of an organization by differentiating themselves from others through the 
use of influence and power (March, 1994).  
Top executives’ power shapes their ability to exert influence over other 
individuals or groups (Pfeffer, 1981). Two sources of power common to top executives 
are a result of structure and expertise (Finkelstein, 1992). They have structural power by 
virtue of their location at the top of the organization and their particular areas of authority 
(Morgan, 1997). By virtue of formal positions in the organizational hierarchies, few 
individuals have gained the formal or expert power that has been attained by members of 
top management teams. Furthermore, top executives are also viewed as having expert 
power, based on their level of accumulated experience in their functional area. Their 
elevated position, their access to information, and their network centrality, or control of 
resources, all provide sources of power. An executive’s rise to power is at least partially 
due to their functional expertise and its fit with the organization’s critical needs 
(Hambrick, 1981).  
Studies of leadership teams in private firms offer a perspective that attends to the 
strategic role of these teams and focuses on the saliency of top management team 
composition. This composition can positively impact organizational outcomes, but there 
are both costs and benefits to team diversity (Williams & O'Reilly, 1998). In the 
remainder of this chapter, I discuss selected top management and team effectiveness 
research to show that functional diversity can provide access to information and multiple 
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viewpoints, but that this heterogeneity can also lead to conflict. This research highlights 
the tension that leadership teams in institutions of higher education are likely to face. 
This literature also highlights how specifics dimensions of the organizational 




While top management teams are presumed to have generalist’s view of the 
organization, each individual member brings an orientation based on their experience in a 
functional area and background. Although top executives share some common 
characteristics, top management teams are generally composed of a relatively diverse 
group of individuals and can be viewed as a form of a cross-functional or representational 
group (Berg, 2005). Top management team diversity is defined as the variation among 
team member characteristics (Hambrick, Cho, & Chen, 1996), or the extent to which a 
top management team is heterogeneous with respect to members’ attributes (Lau & 
Murnighan, 1998; Simons et al., 1999) such as functional track, career experiences, age, 
tenure, and education. These attributes are assumed to have an influence on 
organizational outcomes (Hambrick & Mason, 1984), so a focus on team composition 
represents a substantial portion of the top management team literature (e.g., Carpenter et 
al., 2004; Finkelstein & Hambrick, 1996; Hambrick, 1994). 
The diversity of top management teams has generally been considered to be an 
asset for the ambiguous, non-routine problem solving faced by such teams (Hambrick & 
Mason, 1984). Studies of top management team composition have suggested that these 
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differences can impact teams’ choices, as well as the processes that lead to them, in 
positive ways. For example, top executives’ prior experiences can positively influence 
firm performance (Carpenter, Sanders, & Gregersen, 2001), as well as strategic choices, 
such as alliance formation (Eisenhardt & Schoonhoven, 1996) and internationalization 
(Carpenter, Pollock, & Leary, 2003), as well as their propensity for action (Hambrick et 
al., 1996). Functional and educational experience can impact the extent to which 
executives are willing to consider alternatives (Geletkanycz & Black, 2001). However, 
differences in team member characteristics, such as background, tenure, and age can also 
negatively impact decision making by introducing conflict (Amason, 1996; Amason & 
Sapienza, 1997; Knight et al., 1996), influencing team processes (Papadakis & Barwise, 
2002), and highlighting power (Pitcher & Smith, 2001).  
Researchers have found that functional diversity is a team asset because it can 
provide access to more information, create productive conflict, incorporate more 
perspectives, and can help teams to manage greater complexity. Team heterogeneity is 
valuable because top management team composition can influence what information is 
accessible and/or accessed. For example, functional diversity can increase 
communication (Williams & O'Reilly, 1998) and create better linkages to information 
(Milliken, 1996). Information exchange with the external environment is enhanced by 
functional diversity because of the increased linkages from the team to rest of the 
organization (Sapsed, Bessant, Partington, Tranfield, & Young, 2002).  
While composition is one important factor in improving decision making and 
group effectiveness (Guzzo & Dickson, 1996), it is also important to consider that 
bringing together representatives from the various units of an organization can improve a 
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team’s decision making by providing a forum to share information and engage in 
discussion (Simons et al., 1999). Teams should include members with diverse 
backgrounds and abilities who can provide multiple perspectives in helping to understand 
the organization as a whole (Morgan, 1997). As a type of cross-functional team, top 
management teams can provide multiple sources of information and perspectives (Ford & 
Randolph, 1992; Keller, 2001) that should translate into an ability to improve decision 
making. Generating options often leads to more innovative choices and more choices 
overall. A multiple perspectives approach to understanding organizations assumes that 
individuals with diverse viewpoints perceive different elements of a situation, thereby 
highlighting and diminishing various features. “People with different values ‘see’ 
different things in the same situation” (Davenport & Prusak, 1998, p. 12). 
The functional diversity found in top management teams is a key source of 
productive, cognitive conflict. Cognitive, or task, conflict refers to differences among 
team members about how to achieve organizational objectives (Amason, 1996). 
Cognitive conflict is beneficial precisely because it generates multiple perspectives, 
particularly when teams are faced with non-routine tasks (Jehn, 1995). Cognitive conflict 
fosters the exchange of information (processing) that facilitates problem solving, the 
generation of ideas, and decision making (Pelled, Eisenhardt, & Xin, 1999). 
Despite the promise of such behavior, many top management teams exist in a 
state of fragmentation characterized by team members who “operate in relatively 
independent spheres, with minimal interaction” (Hambrick, 1995, p. 115), thereby 
hindering access to information and the ability to process that information. To take 
advantage of their composition, top management teams should engage in useful practices 
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such as fact-finding, analyzing, and complex decision making, rather than rely on a 
routine of reviewing and ratifying (Katzenbach & Smith, 1993). Many teams do not 
engage in the cognitive activity of “mutual and collective interaction” (Hambrick, 1994, 
p. 188), such as exchanging information, employing collaborative behavior, and engaging 
in joint decision making (Li and Hambrick, 2005). Behaviorally-integrated top 
management team make better use of alternatives because their cognitive complexity 
creates opportunities for debate and discussion (Siegel & Hambrick, 1996) because 
people draw on the belief structures associated with their experiences (Pelled et al., 1999) 
which results in differences in opinions, viewpoint, and ideas (Hambrick & Li, 2005). 
With the benefits of functional diversity and multiple perspectives comes the 
potential for conflicts that stem from the value differences among subcultures in 
organizations (Martin, 1992). Functional diversity can also be a liability because it can 
create unproductive, affective conflict (Pelled et al., 1999). Affective conflict, also known 
as emotional or relationship conflict, refers to interpersonal differences among team 
members (Amason, 1996). Affective conflict often results from demographic or social 
class differences (Milliken & Martins, 1996; Pelled et al., 1999; Tsui & O’Reilly, 1989) 
because people tend to trust and like others who are more like themselves, and distrust 
and dislike those who are dissimilar, especially when differences are easily discernable 
(e.g., race, gender) (Jackson, 1992; Pelled, 1996).  
Less obvious differences, such as functional backgrounds, can also create 
affective conflict if individuals personalize value differences (Pelled & Adler, 1994). For 
example, while one vice president might want to increase enrollment in order to boost 
revenues or to fulfill a public good mission, another might argue that doing so would 
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decrease selectivity and increase class size. If these differences of opinion create an 
inability to consider alternatives, the team will not benefit from their different 
perspectives. Top executives, in particular, with their longer tenure and increased 
expertise in a particular functional area, may have come to rely on familiar practices or 
rationale. This can hinder problem solving, the generation of new alternatives and 
solutions, and a willingness to change practices and policies (Katz, 1982; March and 
Simon, 1958).  
Research suggests that conflict related to value diversity seems to be a greater 
deterrent to performance than social category diversity (Jehn, Northcraft, & Neale, 1999), 
perhaps because team members must have some common ground in terms of values in 
order to engage in the group processes that can lead to improved performance (Jehn et al., 
1999). Affective conflict has a particular tendency to arise when factions, or subgroups 
that form around differences, are present within a top management team because the 
groups are inherently divided and in-group/out-group categorization is likely to occur 
(Hambrick & Li, 2005).  
While cognitive conflict is considered beneficial, affective conflict tends to foster 
dysfunctional behaviors such as distrust, dislike, and avoidance that can weaken decision 
quality and decision acceptance (Amason, 1996). A key issue in groups such as top 
management teams is the tension between team goals and functional priorities (Holland, 
Gaston, & Gomes, 2000) which can create ambiguity over resources and increase conflict 
(Ford & Randolph, 1992). Because of their place in the organizational hierarchy, top 
management team members typically serve on the leadership team while simultaneously 
serving as the leader of an organizational subunit, such as finance or marketing. This 
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situation can create tensions about individuals’ group identities as a part of an 
organizational team or their organizational subunit. 
The dynamics of groups such as top management teams, who are composed of 
representatives from a variety of areas, are different than those of simple task groups 
because they have more in common with intergroup processes given their functional and 
value differences (Berg, 2005). If team members believe that some will benefit at the 
expense of others, rather than focusing on the betterment of the organization as a whole, 
both affective conflict and cognitive conflict are likely to increase (Shook et al 2005). 
Alternatively, teams who feel that they can safely take risks, such as asking for help and 
speaking up, are more likely to share information and learn through processing than those 
who feel that they must suppress ideas or signs of weakness (Edmonson, 1999).  
Some research suggests that the findings related to affective conflict are still 
equivocal. Jehn (1994) found a negative relationship between affective conflict and 
performance, but later research (Jehn, 1995; Pelled et al., 1999) found no evidence that 
affective conflict hinders performance. It may be that affective conflict causes 
dissatisfaction, but is moderated by avoidance or other coping strategies (Jehn, 1995; 
Pelled et al., 1999). However, the evidence as a whole seems to suggest that functional 
diversity is likely to stimulate cognitive conflict and improve performance (Eisenhardt, 
Kahwajy, & Bourgeous, 1997; Pelled et al., 1999; Williams & O'Reilly, 1998), but that 
affective conflict must be managed because it can be detrimental to decision quality 
(Amason, 1996; Amason & Mooney, 1999; Amason & Sapienza, 1997; Amason, 1995; 
Jehn, 1995; Simons & Peterson, 2000). Cognitive conflict appears to improve the quality 
of top management team decisions because it results in a synthesis of divergent 
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perspectives (Amason, 1996; Amason & Sapienza, 1997) through discussion and debate, 
particularly for non-routine tasks (Jehn, 1995). This is more likely to occur in an 
environment of intragroup trust that can moderate the relationship between task conflict 
and relationship conflict in top management teams (Simons & Peterson, 2000). 
The paradox of conflict is that while more differences among group members can 
lead to a greater ability to provide a variety of perspectives on complex organizational 
issues, thereby improving decision quality, it may also weaken the ability of the group to 
work together (Northcraft, Polzer, Neale, & Kramer, 1995; Schweiger, Sandberg, & 
Ragan, 1986). While functionally diverse groups can manage greater complexity, 
differences in background, values, goals, and information can hinder top management 
teams. Heterogeneous groups are generally slower and less cohesive than homogeneous 
groups (Ancona & Caldwell, 1992; Smith et al., 1994; Wiersema & Bantel, 1992; 
Williams & O'Reilly, 1998) and their diversity may also lead to negative outcomes such 
as dissatisfaction and dissensus (Priem, 1990; Schweiger, Sandberg, & Rechner, 
1989).The goal of a team should be to generate cognitive conflict and reduce affective 
conflict in order to reap the benefits of interaction among the multiple perspectives that 
top management team members bring to the table. 
 
Team leadership 
The literature on groups and teams suggests that there are three points of leverage 
for an effective team: design, process, and context (Guzzo & Dickson, 1996). As 
discussed above, designing a team to take advantage of functional diversity must be 
coupled with efforts to manage the team’s interpersonal and task processes.  In both of 
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these areas, the president or CEO, as team leader, holds a special position that may allow 
him or her to have a significant influence in selecting team members, defining agendas, 
and managing meeting interactions. A critical role for team leaders as an element of the 
team context has been suggested in the literature on team effectiveness (Ancona, 1990; 
Guzzo & Dickson, 1996; Hackman & Walton, 1986). 
While several models of team leadership have been proposed (e.g., Hackman & 
Walton, 1986; Kozlowski, Gully, Salas, & Cannon-Bowers, 1996; Zacarro, Rittman, & 
Marks, 2001), little is known about the leaders of organizational groups, despite the 
extensive literature both on leadership and of group development and effectiveness. 
Existing models in the groups and teams literature include a range of ideas that include 
the leader’s role in providing direction for task development and team actions (Kozlowski 
et al., 1996; Zacarro et al., 2001), developing cohesion and skills (Kozlowski et al., 
1996), and monitoring team conditions and taking action to remedy them if they are not 
contributing to effective teamwork (Hackman & Walton, 1986) 
A common theme throughout these group and team models is the role of the team 
leader in managing or facilitating team processes and conditions. The team leader can be 
pivotal in developing a team climate of trust (Webber, 2002) and managing conflict by 
fostering group norms that encourages both debate and trust within the team (Hackman, 
Brousseau, & Weiss, 1976). Previous research has suggested that in order to understand 
leadership teams, it is important to be aware of the norms that guide decision making 
(Bensimon & Neumann, 1993). Similarly, the limited research in this area suggests that 
top management team effectiveness may depend not just on team composition, but also 
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on the team leader’s choices about process (Edmondson et al., 2003) and conflict 
management (De Cremer & van Knippenberg, 2002). 
 
Organizational environment 
While both the higher education and corporate literature concentrate on internal 
processes and dynamics (Cohen & Bailey, 1997), teams do not exist in isolation. Other 
group and team research provides evidence that the organizational environment can 
impact a team’s effectiveness (Ancona, 1987; Ancona, 1990; Ancona & Caldwell, 1992). 
Teams are nested within organizations where contextual characteristics can influence 
their effectiveness. “One of the key distinguishing characteristics of the organization 
perspective on work groups and teams is appreciation that they are embedded in a 
broader system that sets constraints and influences team processes and outcomes” 
(Kozlowski & Bell, 2003). Teams must take their context into account and engage in 
processes to manage their organizational environment through boundary management 
strategies. 
Much early research on groups stopped at the team boundary and focused on 
internal behaviors. However, as scholars began to step back and include consideration of 
the environment beyond the team’s boundary, the organizational environment was seen to 
influence internal behaviors by providing opportunities and constraints (Ilgen, 1999). 
Scholars have shown that the external activity of teams is a better predictor of 
performance for teams that are not self-reliant for resources such as information (Ancona, 
1990; Ancona & Caldwell, 1992). Research suggests that it is important for teams to 
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maintain a balance between effective internal processes and valuable external 
management in order to be successful (Ancona & Caldwell, 1992). 
Leadership teams in higher education exist in a different context than those in the 
corporate sector (Berquist, 1992; Birnbaum, 2000; Kezar, 2001). In higher education, the 
importance of managing the environment is particularly important because there are 
multiple power and authority structures at work: the duality of professional values 
defined by collegiality and shared power and those of the administration, which are 
informed by hierarchy and autonomy (Birnbaum, 2000). Institutions of higher education 
are an example of professional bureaucracies which are characterized by a flatter 
organizational structure with greater autonomy for staff who are indirectly controlled 
through norms and socialization (Morgan, 1997). The decision making processes within 
higher education have been described as resembling an “organized anarchy” (Cohen & 
March, 1986) in which there are no strict lines of decision making. In this environment, 
power tends to appear through networks of influence. Finally, while there is a common 
“bottom line” in for-profit organizations, the goals of the academy are multiple and 
conflicting. 
While environmental management does not ensure organizational effectiveness, it 
is rare for organizations to be effective without managing their environments. It has been 
noted that top management teams serve as boundary spanners for both internal and 
external actors, given their responsibilities for gathering and transmitting information 
across boundaries (Ancona & Caldwell, 1992; Ancona & Nadler, 1989; Finkelstein & 
Hambrick, 1996), but consideration of this role has not been pursued in relation to 
presidential leadership teams in higher education. 
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Despite the knowledge available in other sectors, our understanding of leadership 
teams in institutions of higher education is generally limited to internal perspectives. The 
line of research on presidential leadership teams in higher education has fallen silent 
without exploring what a variety of literatures has suggested is important to understand: 
both boundary-spanning and internal processes. Conceptualizing team members as 
boundary-spanning individuals who provide information and representation for the 
president may help us to better understand and explain their role in information 
management and may add to our knowledge about how they contribute to decision 
making. In other words, leadership teams can and should use their diverse composition as 
an asset to both access and process information for the benefit of improved decision 
making. This is their promise. 
 
Conclusion 
Organization and management scholars have studied top management teams for 
over two decades, yet little of this research has been considered within the context of 
similar teams in higher education. The current work on presidential leadership teams 
relies overwhelmingly on the strong foundation that Bensimon and Neumann (1993) have 
provided, but there is much room for additional research on college and university 
campuses. The scholarship on leadership teams in higher education has remained limited 
in scope, but knowledge acquired in other contexts can illuminate further avenues for 
exploration. 
Both the higher education and management literature illuminate that the team 
environment, with effective team leadership, can lead to an improved ability to process 
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information through the variety of perspectives that individual team members bring with 
them. However, little research exists within the higher education context to show how 
individual team members can operate to connect the team to its external environment to 
improve decision making in support of team goals. I found no research to date that has 
explored how presidents and teams in higher education can build on the diversity that 
individuals bring to the team as a means to access information and other resources across 
the team boundary. 
In order to address these gaps in the research on presidential leadership teams in 
higher education, in the next chapter, I show how team members can be conceptualized 
as boundary spanners and highlight the organizational conditions that might help or 
hinder them. In order to explore how team members operate as boundary spanners, this 
research will apply concepts from the new institutionalism in sociology and decision-
making theory to highlight the variety of influences that these team members face and 
how individuals manage these conditions by using cognitive and normative strategies.  
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CHAPTER 3: CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK – ELABORATING HOW 
PRESIDENTIAL LEADERSHIP TEAMS MANAGE THEIR ENVIRONMENTS 
The allocation of attention affects the information available and thus the decision 
(March, 1994, p. 23). 
 
As I showed in the previous chapter, research on management units outside of 
higher education suggests that, in order for leadership teams to realize their goal of 
supporting presidential decision making, it is important for team members to interact with 
their internal and external organizational environments to access information and provide 
particular forms of representation that reinforce decision-making processes (Ancona & 
Caldwell, 1992). Teams that show evidence of external contact, and that avoid isolation 
from their internal and external environments, achieve higher performance (Ancona, 
1990). These activities are sometimes referred to as boundary spanning (Aldrich & 
Herker, 1977; Ancona & Caldwell, 1992). The current literature on presidential 
leadership teams in higher education leaves unanswered questions about how teams 
operate to connect with their environments.  
In this chapter, I first draw on the management and organizational behavior 
literature to define boundary spanning and suggest how members of presidential 
leadership teams can be understood as having a boundary-spanning role. Based on this 
conceptualization, I then argue that team members are likely to face certain conditions 
that are likely to help or hinder these activities. Finally, I use concepts from the new 
institutionalism in sociology (NIS) to highlight how past experience and concerns with 
legitimacy can help to explain the boundary-spanning behavior of leadership team 
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members. This framework illuminates conditions under which individuals and 
organizations scan their environments and manage complexity to accomplish their goals. 
 
Leadership teams as boundary spanners 
A distinct subset of literature on organization-environment relationships from the 
management and organizational behavior literature reveals more specifically what 
boundary spanners do in information and representation processes. In this literature, 
boundary spanning is defined as individual behaviors that connect an organization such 
as a team to its environments in order to meet team goals (Ancona, 1990; Ancona & 
Caldwell, 1992). Broadly, these behaviors include the transfer of information, ideas, and 
resources across intra-organizational or inter-organizational boundaries (Pruitt & 
Schwartz, 1999). Within teams, boundary-spanners are not confined to particular 
positions (Tushman & Scanlan, 1981b), but are any "persons who operate at the 
periphery or boundary of an organization, performing organizationally relevant tasks, 
relating the organization with elements outside it" (Leifer & Delbecq, 1978, p. 40-41).  
Drawing on this literature, I define presidential leadership team members as 
boundary spanners who: 1) connect the president and other team members to the different 
parts of the organization, or the internal environment, and 2) who link the team to its 
external environment as part of their efforts to meet team goals (see Figure 1).  
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For example, team members can span the hierarchical boundary between the 
leadership team and constituents within the organization such as faculty, staff, and 
current students, as well as committees and governing bodies such as the faculty senate. 
Similarly, team members may help link the leadership team to external groups such as 
prospective students, legislators, alumni, other organizations, and the general public. In 
both their intra-organizational and inter-organizational roles, individual boundary 
spanners engage in two core activities: accessing and managing information as well as 
providing representation for the team and the organization (Aldrich & Herker, 1977; 
Tushman, 1977). In other words, boundary spanners serve as bridges between their base, 




                PLT 
 
Faculty   Staff   Students 
External environment 
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Information management 
Information management involves searching for and using, or intentionally not 
using, information in decision making (Aldrich & Herker, 1977; Friedman & Podolny, 
1992; Jemison, 1984). In this way, boundary spanners serve as a mechanism for 
information management in organizations (Gladstein & Caldwell, 1985; Huber, 1991). 
Studies of boundary spanning often draw on theories of organizational learning to define 
and elaborate these information management activities (Ancona, 1990; Ancona & 
Caldwell, 1992; Leifer & Delbecq, 1978; Tushman & Scanlan, 1981a). Organizational 
learning is a process of searching for, interpreting, and using information to guide action 
(Huber, 1991). It is, at its heart, a theory of how organizational actors manage 
information from both internal and external environments to guide individual and 
organizational practice (Fiol & Lyles, 1985; Honig, 2004; Huber, 1991; Levitt & March, 
1988). 
Boundary spanners engage in an ongoing process of searching the environment 
for information. Search, or exploration (Levitt & March, 1988) and knowledge 
acquisition (Huber, 1991) are the means by which information enters an organization. 
The purpose of search is to acquire knowledge that may be useful to the organization 
(Ancona & Caldwell, 1992). Search involves specific activities such as gathering 
information about internal events, experiences, and needs that might be useful in decision 
making. This information might originate from inside the organization as a result of 
meetings in team members’ functional areas, membership on organization-wide 
committees, or informal interactions with individuals. Additionally, team members might 
also search for information outside the organization through interactions with external 
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actors in board meetings, alumni events, or legislative sessions, for example that can 
inform the teams’ decision-making process. 
Because of the amount of information to which boundary spanners have access 
and are exposed, they will filter that information by selecting a smaller amount to deliver 
to the team (Adams, 1976). Not all information in the environment is of consequence, so 
boundary spanners will select the information that they consider to be important, relevant, 
and timely based on the team’s goals (Aldrich & Herker, 1977; Tushman & Romanelli, 
1983). Part of a boundary spanner’s role is to struggle with a multitude of information 
and with competing goals on behalf of the organization. Boundary spanners may absorb 
uncertainty by “drawing on inferences from perceived facts and passing on only the 
inferences" (Aldrich & Herker, 1977, p. 219) so that the team can take action. In this 
way, boundary-spanning individuals serve as information gatekeepers (Friedman & 
Podolny, 1992) who defend the team against information overload (Aldrich & Herker, 
1977) and influence the direction of the team through the information that they select and 
deliver. 
Once information is selected, boundary spanners transmit it to the organization 
and facilitate its use. Information use refers to the utilization or integration of information 
into organizational routines. To help others use the information, as part of the 
transmission process, boundary spanners render information useful for the team by 
simplifying it and making the implications clear (Aldrich & Herker, 1977). For example, 
a vice president in a boundary-spanning role might gather information related to falling 
enrollment and retention rates, such levels of student satisfaction, the availability of 
services, and an overview of advising processes. Instead of sharing a large amount of 
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complex information, a boundary spanner will translate it into a more manageable and 




In addition to bringing in information, boundary spanners also serve a function 
characterized as representation or political management (Honig, 2006). In their political 
management roles, team members help to access the power structure of the organization 
and its environment. When boundary spanners engage in political management, they may 
perform one of several specific activities, including promoting and protecting the 
organization. 
Promotion is a role that helps to create a favorable image of the organization 
(Aldrich & Herker, 1977; Jemison, 1984), to provide political or social legitimacy for the 
organization (Aldrich & Herker, 1977; Friedman & Podolny, 1992), and to garner 
resources and support for organizational goals (Aldrich & Herker, 1977; Ancona & 
Caldwell, 1992). To accomplish these objectives, boundary spanners establish and 
maintain relationships with important actors in the environment who may be vital to the 
organization’s image and legitimacy, or who control resources. For example, a public 
university must create relationships in the state government because this represents a 
group of actors who can significantly impact the organization’s goals through policies 
and budget. Boundary spanners convey information and ideas to these external actors in 
order to shape their opinions and behaviors in ways that support their team’s goals 
(Aldrich & Herker, 1977). 
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Boundary spanners also protect the organization by controlling information 
delivery to and interactions with external actors. Boundary-spanning actors might keep 
information from reaching the outside as a means to maintain legitimacy or to preserve 
the organization’s power. For example, a legal counsel might avoid sharing information 
about an internal investigation in order to avoid attracting attention from the media, 
legislators, or potential contributors. This buffering role might also include limiting 
contact or access (Honig, 2004) between the team and external actors in order to protect 
the team from interference (Ancona & Caldwell, 1992) or from disturbances in the 
environment (Adams, 1976; Yan & Louis, 1999). This protective function serves to 
regulate or insulate processes, functions, or people from the effects of environmental 
uncertainty (Lynn, 2005). 
 
Helps and Hindrances 
The literature on boundary spanning suggests that information and political 
management may be helped or hindered by several conditions. In complex educational 
environments, boundary-spanning members of presidential leadership teams are likely to 
face uncertainty and ambiguity, and the need to manage multiple roles, which can either 
aid or impede their efforts. In addition, the social context of the team itself can help or 
hinder. 
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Uncertainty 
Uncertainty is a condition that results from the absence of information to inform a 
decision, namely to predict an outcome. In other words, it is a gap between the 
information one has and the information one needs in order to act. When faced with 
uncertainty, individuals or organizations need more information that can provide cues 
about direction in order increase their confidence to act (Weick, 1995). Individuals are 
more likely to perceive uncertainty when the tasks or environments they face are complex 
rather than simple, routine, or straightforward.  For example, non-routine tasks might lead 
to uncertainty because individuals have incomplete information with which to work 
(Leifer & Delbecq, 1978). Complex environments with many interdependent 
components, such as institutions of higher education, may also create uncertainty because 
it is difficult for individuals to understand each of the parts of the whole. 
Boundary spanners’ roles in connecting the organization to the environment can 
lead to uncertainty at different points in the process of obtaining information and 
delivering a response because of the complexity of organizational life (Milliken, 1990). 
Individuals may understand their part of the organization, but may be uncertain about 
what information is available in other areas, what information the team or other actors 
need, or where to obtain information. 
Furthermore, in their roles as environmental managers, boundary spanners 
function to absorb uncertainty (Aldrich & Herker, 1977), but are likely to lack 
information about actions that others might take, changes in the state of the environment, 
the effect of others’ actions or changes, or appropriate responses (Milliken, 1987). 
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In such situations, uncertainty may help boundary spanning by helping 
individuals to avoid a “commitment to the status quo” (Geletkanycz & Black, 2001) and 
an ineffective reliance on past knowledge and experience (Honig, 2006). If more 
information is not accessed or considered, it can lead to a dependence on unproductive 
routines. A state of uncertainty may support the development of flexibility and the 
creation of new alternatives by compelling individuals to scan for and access information 
or to connect with other actors.  
However, uncertainty can also hinder boundary spanners because more 
information may or may not be relevant or accessible (Leifer & Delbecq, 1978). When 
boundary spanners are faced with incomplete information about non-routine tasks, they 
may gather irrelevant information as they attempt to manage their uncertainty about the 
task. Uncertainty can also hinder boundary spanning if individuals are unable or 
unwilling to access information from unfamiliar sources. For example, in a university 
setting, a boundary spanner may lack the confidence to access information outside his or 




Ambiguity is the existence of multiple alternatives which are imprecisely defined 
or that have opposing interpretations (March, 1994). When ambiguity is present, 
organizational decision makers may be faced with multiple alternatives regarding how to 
interpret situations, vague or contradictory or goals, or unclear strategies (Cohen & 
March, 1974; McCaskey, 1982). In other words, no clear answers exist. In contrast to a 
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lack of information to act when faced with uncertainty, when faced with ambiguity 
decision makers are faced with too much information. 
In institutions of higher education, ambiguity may be more prevalent than in other 
types of organizations because the complex structure and multiple “bottom lines” are 
likely to result in competing views among organizational units regarding goals and how 
to reach them (Martin, 1992). Distinctive values and priorities of functional subunits may 
not necessarily be compatible with larger organizational concerns or with those of other 
functional units. This means that team members are likely to struggle with making 
decisions that introduce conflicting priorities because “members of different parts of 
universities and colleges may experience the culture in strikingly various and complex 
ways” (Frost & Gillespie, 1998, p. 9). For example, an academic vice president might 
frame a university’s budget problem as an enrollment issue, while the chief enrollment 
officer defines the same problem as a state policy issue. Because information and its 
interpretations are “subjectively perceived, interpreted and felt” (Weick, 1995), more 
information may only further ambiguity by adding more possible interpretations. These 
multiple interpretations create a situation in which decision makers are likely to face 
difficulty as they try to determine what actions might help them meet their goals. 
Boundary-spanning individuals are particularly likely to face ambiguous roles, 
situations, purposes, and outcomes as a result of straddling two contexts. Boundary 
spanners are connected to a variety of actors, so they are likely to face differing 
perspectives and multiple goals as they work to manage information and politics in a 
complex environment. They will struggle to create clarity around what their role is in 
relation to a variety of actors, what information to look for, how to use information, 
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which actors to seek out, and how best to promote organizational goals. Ambiguity 
creates questions about which course is the right one when both are plausible, even if 
they are conflicting. 
Ambiguity in the organizational environment may help boundary spanners by 
creating choices. In their information management role, a lack of clarity creates options 
in terms of how information might be interpreted. When boundary spanners scan the 
environment and find several interpretations, they are not forced accept a single 
interpretation, but rather have a variety from which to choose and transmit. Similarly, 
ambiguity can also help political management because having multiple interpretations 
may become a source of power. Ambiguity provides flexibility for team members to 
control outgoing messages by selecting from among several possible interpretations in 
order to choose one that supports the team’s goals. Alternatively, team members might 
opt to leave messages intentionally unspecific. This lack of specificity can help to 
appease various constituencies and avoid alienation by leaving an interpretation up to 
others.  
However, ambiguity can also hinder boundary spanners’ effort. Because of the 
large amount of information on both sides of a boundary, multiple interpretations may 
lead to information overload. While having more information has been shown to improve 
the quality of decisions and team performance, it does so only up to a point (Eppler & 
Mengis, 2004). When the amount of information available exceeds the ability to integrate 
or process that information (Galbraith, 1974; Tushman & Nadler, 1978), information 
overload occurs and information goes unused (O'Reilly, 1980). They may also struggle 
with discerning what level of authority they have to access information, how to identify 
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or prioritize goals, or how to divide their time among roles (Rizzo, House, & Lirtzman, 
1970). 
Given the multiple and conflicting goals within institutions of higher education, 
ambiguity may also hinder a boundary spanner’s efforts to understand and translate 
information and expectations. Whether boundary spanners are managing information for 
the team’s use or using information to promote the team’s goals, they may be unsure 
about which interpretation is most appropriate because communication across boundaries 
is inherently ambiguous and prone to bias. The greater the differences in context, the 
greater the difficulty of communicating, which means that boundary spanners in 
presidential leadership teams are likely to find that translating information for the team’s 
use and using information to promote goals are both difficult activities (Tushman & 
Scanlan, 1981a). This information may be interpreted differently, depending on the 
audience. For example, a boundary spanner might encounter different interpretations of 
the same information when talking to someone in his or her division, the team, or an 
external actor. Role ambiguity may further hinder boundary spanners’ abilities to clearly 
interpret others’ expectations, the methods to achieve these expectations, or role-
appropriate behaviors because they may not have specific information about tasks or 
responsibilities (Rizzo et al., 1970). 
 
Multiple roles 
Particularly at higher hierarchical levels in organizations, individuals are typically 
involved in multiple activities and subsystems (Katz & Kahn, 1978). Leadership team 
members, for example, participate as part of a team while simultaneously serving as a 
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leader of their functional area. In one role, they are a member of a high-level team 
charged with thinking about the institution as whole, rather than from the narrower 
perspective of their functional area; as the leader for a functional unit – such as student 
affairs, academic affairs, or government relations – they are responsible for managing 
their particular part of the organization. 
Having multiple roles can help boundary spanners by creating multiple 
connections to information and actors (Tushman, 1977). Informational boundary 
spanning is accomplished by individuals who are well connected to other legitimate 
actors internally and externally (Tushman & Scanlan, 1981a). An individual’s 
membership in multiple domains and involvement in multiple relationships can help 
boundary spanning by creating multiple opportunities to access information as well as 
multiple outlets to promote the organization. 
While multiple roles can provide access to resources and multiple sources of 
support (Sieber, 1974), they can also generate multiple sources of stress. While 
boundary-spanning activity can help team members to access knowledge and combat 
isolation, this ability to "reduce organizational uncertainty and ambiguity by crossing 
organizational boundaries to link, transact, and protect the organization from internal and 
external disruptions" (Pruitt, 1999, p. 82) can lead to role conflict. Multiple roles can 
hinder boundary spanning because they can create situations in which individuals are 
faced with multiple and competing expectations, values, and interests that may stifle any 
action. Defined as the “the simultaneous occurrence of two or more role expectations 
such that compliance with one would make compliance with the other more difficult” 
(Katz & Kahn, 1978, p. 204), role conflict is common among people whose position 
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includes liaison or linkage functions (Kahn, Wolfe, Quinn, Snoek, & Rosenthal, 
1964).Boundary spanning has also been empirically associated with role conflict 
(Lysonski, Singer, & Wilemon, 1988) and role ambiguity (Lysonski et al., 1988; Pruitt & 
Schwartz, 1999; Singh, Verbeke, & Rhoads, 1996), which can frustrate boundary-
spanning activities.  
Much of the research on role conflict emanates from scholars of organizational 
behavior focused on corporate entities. As in the organizational behavior literature, a 
handful of studies on role conflict in higher education suggest that role conflict has also 
been shown to be a stressor within academia that can significantly negatively affect job 
satisfaction, work-related stress, and perceptions of effectiveness (Wolverton, Wolverton, 
& Gmelch, 1999). Sources of role conflict identified by academic deans include working 
with two or more differently operating groups and doing things that are accepted by one 
person and not by others (Montez, Wolverton, & Gmelch, 2002). This is not surprising 
given that deans sit “within a complex web of faculty, students, and administration; it is 
here that needs, disputes, and demands between faculty and administrators get arbitrated” 
(Montez et al., 2002, p. 254). 
Similarly, members of leadership teams are enmeshed in a role set that includes 
their peers, the president, as well as their functional unit and external constituencies. In 
order to fulfill their information management and representation roles, boundary spanners 
must establish and maintain relationships with actors outside of the team (Lysonski et al., 
1988; Pruitt & Schwartz, 1999). Boundary spanners must be able to relate to and have 
legitimacy with actors on both sides of a boundary (Levina & Vaast, 2005). However, the 
expectations of these two groups may be in conflict. For example, while serving as a 
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member of the presidential leadership team, each individual team member also 
“continues as a member of the constituency (e.g., the faculty) even thought he or she now 
holds membership as well within a very different constituency (e.g., top-level 
administration)” (Bensimon & Neumann, 1993, p. 67). This structural dynamic may 
create conflict or tension because of multiple group identities and differing expectations 
for behavior (Kahn et al., 1964). For members of a team at the top of an organizational 
hierarchy, their ability to cooperate is vulnerable to their obligations to their subunit 
identity (March, 1994).   
 
Social context of the team 
When individual boundary spanners in presidential leadership teams struggle with 
uncertainty, ambiguity, and multiple roles, they do so within a social context of the team. 
The team is an important social setting dominated by diverse identities and power 
dynamics that influence individual behavior and team outcomes. This situation may 
provide an opportunity for interaction among team members and can serve as a locus for 
grappling with the meaning of information. However, the team context can also create 
additional uncertainty and ambiguity for individuals due to the diversity of views and 
interests represented in the team.  
 
Diverse identities 
As I described in Chapter 2, leadership teams are comprised of a diverse mix of 
individuals by design. While a team theoretically behaves as the equivalent of a single 
actor, in reality teams are comprised of individuals with inconsistent identities 
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(Hambrick, 1994; March, 1994). One of the core assumptions of multiple-actor decision 
making is that identities differ among participants as a result of socialization and 
hierarchical processes in the organization. At the top of an organization, boundary-
spanning members of a senior leadership team represent a “dynamic distribution of 
information and interests” that varies depending on the situation, members' current 
activities, and functional expertise (Edmondson et al., 2003). Individuals with diverse 
identities bring different perspectives to the table and are likely to see and frame 
information and situations differently. As described in Chapter 2, such diversity can serve 
as both a benefit and a barrier to achieving team goals. 
Team diversity can help information management because it allows the team to 
access a wide variety of information from across the university. Furthermore, the social 
context of team meetings provides an opportunity for interaction among individuals who 
can share and discuss that information. This can beneficial if teams can then engage in 
positive cognitive conflict based on the multiple perspectives they bring to the table. 
When this does happen, information processing becomes a collective, rather than an 
individual, process. This diversity can also help political management because boundary 
spanners from various parts of the organization can more easily access constituents and 
interpret outgoing messages in order to promote organizational goals across the various 
subunits of colleges and universities. 
The team context can also hinder boundary spanning by creating communication 
difficulties and negative, affective conflict. The cognitive and affective difficulties faced 
by heterogeneous teams is often a result of the difficulty in understanding one another 
(Lovelace, Shapiro, & Weingart, 2001). Different organizational subcultures sustain 
  49  
differing interpretations of reality (Martin, 1992). For the boundary-spanning team 
member, these differences may make communication difficult and information 
unavailable, incomprehensible, or mistrusted. Each team member may be able to perceive 
(and understand) only a part of the environment (Birnbaum, 1992). Because boundaries 
create differences in language and values, information that travels across boundaries is 
prone to bias and distortion, thereby increasing ambiguity and uncertainty (Dearborn and 
Simon, 1958; March and Simon, 1958; Wilensky, 1967). The greater the difference in 
values or language on either side of the boundary, the greater the impediment will be to 
clear and trusted communication (Miles, 1976). If information does bridge the boundary, 
the recipient may either not understand it or not trust it, depending on the source. If an 
individual does not trust information or its source, they are unlikely to pass it on to actors 
on the other side of a boundary.  
 
Network centrality as power 
When faced with the interpersonal inconsistencies that exist in a team 
environment, decision makers must consider the role of power: who wants what, who has 
power or not, and who will or will not act in the decision making process (March, 1994). 
Power is domain-specific, so who has power, and how much, depends on the situation 
and the relevant resources (March, 1994). “Power influences who gets what, when, and 
how” (Morgan, 1997, p. 170). If power is the ability to get what one wants, then being 
able to do so should lessen the hindrances of complexity by providing access and control.  
A source of power particularly relevant to a discussion of boundary spanners is 
network centrality. Network centrality as a source of power can be either formal or 
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informal. Formal network centrality results from individuals’ membership in subunits 
that control resources highly valued across the organization (Astley & Sachdeva, 1984; 
Pfeffer, 1981; Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978). This is power that is based on formal authority 
in the structure of the organization (French & Raven, 1959). These formal positions 
endow individuals with power and discretion over resources (Tushman & Romanelli, 
1983) and with the authority or the ability to set the ground rules for decision making, 
such as what issues will be discussed, when decisions are made, and who is allowed to 
participate (March, 1994). The ability to influence decision making is associated with the 
ability to translate information so that it is useful to the organization, so the locus of 
influence will shift as the organization’s needs change (Tushman & Romanelli, 1983). 
Access to and control of financial resources are perhaps the most common source of 
power (Hackman, 1985; Pfeffer & Salancik, 1974a, 1974b), but  information, control of 
technology or other structures, and expertise, particularly if these are central or vital to 
the decision making process, are also sources of power from a network centrality 
perspective. 
Similar to the formal basis of network centrality, another significant source of 
power in organizations is informal network centrality (Krackhardt, 1990; Tushman & 
Romanelli, 1983). This informal source of power refers to an individual actor’s position 
in a network of relationships (Astley & Sachdeva, 1984). While structural centrality 
provides formal control over resources, informal centrality provides access to and control 
over resources through relationships or patterns of interaction with other actors (Monge 
& Eisenberg, 1987). A wide range of connections to other professionals may endow an 
individual with the ability to access resources and to control uncertainty by accessing 
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information (Hinings, Hickson, Pennings, & Schneck, 1974; Morgan, 1997). This 
informal access has been shown to mediate the impact of other sources of power, such as 
position or expertise, suggesting that informal structures may be more critical than formal 
structures when the use of power requires boundary spanning (Blau & Scott, 1962; 
Ibarra, 1993). 
These formal and informal sources of power can help boundary-spanning 
members of leadership teams because they are likely to create avenues of access to 
information and actors, the ability to translate information in both directions, and a sense 
of legitimacy with several groups. As gatekeepers, there is power in the boundary-
spanning role, as these individuals have a measure of control regarding to whom, when, 
what, and how information should be given to others (Jemison, 1984; Tushman & 
Scanlan, 1981a). Furthermore, team-based boundary spanners with connections to 
external actors have been shown to create the perception of having valuable information 
(Marrone, 2004). This perception can lead to a consistent reliance on such individuals 
and to a central role in team structure, thereby reinforcing their power and influence. 
Finally, expert power in particular may help boundary spanners because information from 
every arena may not be relevant and some areas may be more critical to attend to than 
others. The ability both to search for relevant external information and to effectively 
communicate it to other users or audiences helps boundary spanners in both their 
information management and political management functions (Tushman & Scanlan, 
1981a).  
Power can also hinder boundary spanners. Formal leaders may lack access to 
honest or candid information because of their structural power within the organization. 
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Other individuals within the organization may be unwilling to share negative information, 
even is it is relevant and potentially useful. Formal or informal network centrality may 
create similar problems if other organizational constituents suspect that an individual is 
duplicitous. Even if individuals can access information across organizational boundaries, 
this can be a source of uncertainty because other actors may have other goals, so 
boundary spanners are compelled to assess the validity of information that is shared 
(March, 1994). Furthermore, both formal and informal leaders may be able to access too 
much information, thereby leading to information overload. 
 
Managing hindrances 
Research suggests that boundary-spanning behavior is beneficial to a team’s 
ability to achieve its goals because it helps them to access information and to provide 
promotion and protection in support of organizational goals. However, leadership team 
members are likely to struggle with how to achieve these functions due to the complexity 
of organizational environments. As boundary spanners, they are likely to experience all 
of the stresses of uncertainty, ambiguity, and role conflict. Furthermore, boundary 
spanner members of presidential leadership teams must manage these hindrances within a 
social context of difference and power.  
Cognitive and normative strategies from institutional theory may help to explain 
how individuals manage uncertainty, ambiguity, multiple roles, and the team’s social 
context. The new institutionalism in sociology (NIS) is an approach to understanding 
behavior within organizations that assumes “actors and their interests are institutionally 
constructed” (DiMaggio & Powell, 1991, p. 28). In other words, individuals are 
  53  
embedded within environments that influence their behavior both by guiding and by 
controlling individuals through obligations that define appropriate and legitimate 
behavior (Jepperson & Meyer, 1991; Stinchcombe, 1986). NIS can help to explain how 
limiting both the amount of information and the direction of their attention to relevant 
aspects of the environment might guide boundary spanners’ decisions. 
 
Bounded Rationality 
As boundary spanners face a multitude of information, multiple interpretations, 
and multiple roles, they are limited in their ability to grasp complexity and to access all of 
the information that may be available to them in order to act rationally in the process of 
decision making (March, 1994). The limitations of bounded rationality influence decision 
making by constraining the information that individuals will use, and their ability to 
interpret that information. These cognitive constraints impact what an individual can 
understand by virtue of limits in attention, memory, comprehension, and communication 
(March, 1994; Simon, 1982). As a result of these constraints, individuals can only 
explore a partial number of alternatives among the multitude available to them (Morgan, 
1997), limiting the ability to pursue truly rational decisions. 
Decision makers will compensate for these limitations by using processes that 
constrict their view of reality and help them to allocate their attention (March, 1994). 
Specifically, individuals use cognitive and normative strategies that help them to make 
sense of their experience by selectively noticing cues in the ongoing flow of 
organizational life (Weick, 1995) and placing them into a framework in order to 
comprehend and explain them (Starbuck & Milliken, 1988). Limiting strategies, such as 
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simplifying experience and following logics of appropriateness, allow individuals to 
direct their attention and interpret information in manageable, potentially productive, and 
confidence-building directions. However, by attending to some choices, other will be 
excluded; decisions will result from where attention is given (March, 1994). Over time, 
these tendencies become habits that lead decision makers to rely on familiar behaviors 
and repertoires (March & Simon, 1958).  
 
Cognitive strategy: Simplifying experience 
Given the complexity of organizational life and the constraints that decision 
makers face in terms of limited attention, memory, comprehension, and ability to 
communicate, individuals must negotiate these limitations by using simplification as an 
information processing strategy, or a means to make sense of the information that is 
noticed, accessed, and understood. When faced with uncertainty, ambiguity, multiple 
roles, and power dynamics, decision makers will aim to decrease the amount of 
information to which they have to attend. 
Individuals can reduce information to which they attend in several ways, 
including editing or decomposing it into its component parts. They can also accomplish 
simplification through processes such as framing or the use of heuristics (Tversky & 
Kahneman, 1974). Other strategies include bracketing or imposing categories upon 
information, thereby focusing their limited attention in a narrow range, or looking for 
patterns and familiar situations in order to cope with the plethora of information available 
to them (March, 1994). Whatever the means, decision makers will frame information in 
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ways that makes sense to them in order to avoid being overwhelmed, and by doing so 
disregard other signals. 
Once decision makers attend to information, they will only remember or store 
some information.  Information and experiences that are recent, personal, familiar, 
positive, or concrete typically “make sense” to decision makers and are likely to be 
utilized in decision making processes. Information or experiences that are more recent, 
more frequently observed, or more concrete and vivid tend to be more easily recalled and 
therefore favored and used in the decision making process. Individuals are also likely to 
attribute information or events to temporally and spatially local causes. When decision 
makers have a limited capability to store and retrieve information in their memories, 
individuals also tend to favor more positive, comfortable and familiar experiences and to 
deny negative or uncomfortable information. These types of information are more 
available in an individual’s memory than are older, uncommon, or abstract examples.  
These choices further limit potential outcomes because once decision makers have 
focused on such experiences and information, they tend to interpret them in particular 
ways. First, because individuals use filters to avoid being overwhelmed, there is a 
tendency to augment the available information and over-interpret their experience 
towards positive and familiar interpretations. When individuals interpret their experience, 
they are likely to understand information in ways that support their prior understanding 
(March, 1994). When evaluating their experiences, “people seem to learn to like what 
they get” (March, 1994, p. 87). Decision makers tend to interpret it in a positive light and 
adjust or frame their aspirations to fit the available cues. This leaves information that 
does not fit with one’s experience to be discarded or left unnoticed, and is not used. This 
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results in a reliance on small pieces of data or experience to provide more information 
than might be probable to expect. 
 
Normative strategy: Logic of appropriateness 
The limits of bounded rationality, and the cognitive strategies for managing it, 
provide the basis for the logic of appropriateness as another simplifying strategy. When 
theorists say that a decision maker follows a logic of appropriateness, in broad terms they 
mean that individuals make decisions based on their sense of how they should behave in 
a given context. People are not driven mainly by preference, interests, and rational 
calculation, but by their sense of what is appropriate or right. Individuals make decisions 
based on what is considered to be appropriate and legitimate (March, 1994). Decision 
makers use normative strategies to manage the complexity of organizational life. 
Normative factors influence the interpretation of cues by emphasizing the 
obligatory and moral dimension of social life (Scott, 1995) or what individuals ought to 
do. This approach to decision making suggests that individual decision-making is framed 
by questions such as “Who am I?  What type of situation is this?  What do people like me 
do in such situations?” (March, 1994). In other words, the rules associated with an 
identity suggest appropriate behavior in a given situation. Ultimately, it is the answers to 
these questions that guide individual decisions.  
The interpretation of identity, or how one sees oneself, is at the heart of the logic 
of appropriateness. From an appropriateness perspective, identity is a social concept that 
suggests that individuals derive a sense of identity, at least in part, from the groups to 
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which they belong (Hogg & Vaughan, 1998; Tajfel & Turner, 1985). This identity results 
in expectations and obligations that help to characterize an identity.  
Within an organization, each subculture is a collection of rules, norms, and values 
that defines what is or is not appropriate. “Part of what makes the appropriateness 
framework more ‘social’ than rational choice models is the assumption that the rules 
applied to choices will often be a consequence of perceived social norms” (Weber, 
Kopelman, & Messick, 2004, p. 284). Actions are based on group characteristics and 
relationships as the result of “learned obligations, responsibilities, or commitments to 
others” (March, 1994, p. 63). These social norms are an example of informal, but real, 
“guidelines for socially appropriate behavior” that predict behavioral choices (Cialdini et 
al 1999, p. 195).  
However, reality is more complex than simply choosing rules based on a single 
identity because people have multiple identities or roles within organizations. Decision 
makers face multiple influences regarding what is legitimate because “most decisions call 
up a number of relevant identities and rules” (March, 1994, p. 68). Boundary-spanning 
members of a leadership team are a particular example of individuals likely to find 
themselves straddling two social identity groups: that of their functional area and that of 
the leadership team. Being a member of a team adds an identity to each team member’s 
repertoire of identities, so boundary-spanning individuals must now consider how their 
choices impact more than one group. So, while logics of appropriateness might help with 
decision making, multiple identity structures may create new complexities. More 
identities mean more rules regarding what is appropriate, as well as an increasingly 
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complicated process of interpretation. Every additional identity comes with its pertinent 
rules, adding even more complexity to the process of identity choice and interpretation.  
Individual actors’ decisions about which identity structure to use depends on the 
situation in which they find themselves. Because decision making is a process of 
matching identities to situations in order to determine “what someone like me does in a 
situation like this,” the definition of a situation constrains identity and rule choices. How 
the situation is construed structurally, socially, and politically depends on the available 
cues and how decision makers interpret them. Situation can be defined by many 
contextual characteristics, including but not limited to meeting type, participants, leader, 
agenda, task, topic, and location. The situation may provide cues about appropriate 
identities, such as the agenda or who is or is not present, that can help a decision maker to 
understand what identity is appropriate for a situation.  
Choosing an identity helps decision makers to simplify complexity by directing 
their attention and confirming their sense that they are behaving legitimately and 
successfully. Given constraints on information and the process of sensemaking, certain 
identities are likely to be chosen, situations are likely to be construed in certain ways, and 
particular rules for behavior are more apt to be used. When decision-making processes 
proceed in this way, particular biases tend to result. When faced with uncertainty, 
ambiguity, role conflict, and social context, decision makers will use their prior 
knowledge to choose appropriate identities and rules. These identities will guide their 
attention to information.  
These cognitive and normative limitations suggest that identity choices are 
constrained by what decision makers notice, which leads them to choose identities with 
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which they have recent, positive experience, and that fits with their conceptions of what 
legitimate and successful people do. Individuals’ experiences in prior, similar situations 
shape their understanding of what identity and rules are appropriate for a current or new 
situation (Bettenhausen & Murnighan, 1985). Furthermore, choices about identity are 
likely to be based on positive experiences with more recently evoked and familiar 
identities (March, 1994) that have been supported by legitimate authorities, leading that 
identity to be selected repeatedly. 
Decision makers will continue to rely on these identity choices. Knowing which 
identity is relevant is a result of learning from experience, which leads to conformity to 
social expectations (March, 1994). Because cues and identities are likely to be interpreted 
in the same ways that decision makers have done previously, this increased experience 
leads to increased reliance on past experience (and past interpretations) with less 
likelihood of considering alternatives. This identity isomorphism, or lack of adaptation, 
stems from concerns with legitimacy and experience. 
 
Implications for boundary spanning in presidential leadership teams 
Top-level decision makers, such as those on presidential leadership teams, may be 
particularly prone to these cyclical identity choices because their rise through the 
hierarchy is socially defined as successful which “tends to confirm beliefs and make them 
less vulnerable to contradictory evidence” (March, 1994, p. 183), especially if they have 
received rewards, such as promotions, for operating within a limited set of behaviors. For 
decision makers, identities are shaped by their desire to move up the hierarchy. Their 
performance is judged using normative standards to which they must conform in order to 
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gain legitimacy. Given these circumstances, organizational decision makers are likely to 
repeatedly choose identities that were perceived to work well in a given situation, or that 
were rewarded, in order to progress in their careers. 
Furthermore, as boundary spanners, team members will deal with uncertainty, 
ambiguity, role conflict, and the social context through the use of rules or routines 
(Morgan, 1997) based on normative influences from authorities, rather than creating 
novel or innovative approaches. Acting appropriately enhances legitimacy (Meyer & 
Rowan, 1977), which should in turn increase an individual’s access to resources such as 
information and actors and thereby increasing their chance for survival (DiMaggio & 
Powell, 1983). 
A reliance on an appropriateness framework helps boundary spanners to reduce 
uncertainty, ambiguity, and role conflict by accumulating information related to situation 
and identity in order to determine appropriate rules (March, 1994). But it also suggests 
that boundary spanners will repeatedly seek information in the same places and 
continually connect with the same actors. Uncertainty about appropriate behavior leads 
individuals to look to other people or models of practice for clues about how to act 
(Festinger, 1954), regardless of whether following those models is likely to improve 
outcomes (Honig, 2006). 
When faced with ambiguity, simplification processes allow boundary spanners to 
attend to certain cues and narrow the potential options for identity and rule choices. 
Individuals are likely to associate “information honesty with particular roles and 
identities” (March, 1994, p. 126), such as those with whom they share an identity or with 
whom they have had a recent, positive experience. However, because individuals 
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typically place more value on the quality of data over the quantity available, these 
choices may lead them to rely on a small number of cues from certain sources that they 
consider legitimate, regardless of whether the information is in fact useful.  
Finally, the logic of appropriateness can help individuals to choose an identity in 
order to minimize role conflict. Boundary-spanning members of a presidential leadership 
team face many sources of legitimacy, including the president, their peers, and the 
functional area that they represent. Determining what is plausible and legitimate can be 
particularly difficult for the boundary spanner because legitimacy is negatively affected 
by the number and diversity of authorities who can confer it (Scott, 1991). What is 
credible for one identity group, such as the leadership team, may be considered 
unreasonable by another identity group, such as one’s functional area or other 
constituents (Weick, Sutcliffe, & Obstfeld, 2005, p. 415). By choosing one identity over 




Boundary spanning encompasses a range of activities in which individuals 
connect with important external actors in order to meet team goals and manage the 
environment (Ancona & Caldwell, 1992). However, as boundary spanners, individual 
team members face certain conditions that can help or hinder their activities. In 
particular, uncertainty, ambiguity, and role conflict create complexity. Cognitive and 
normative strategies can help to limit complexity. Such strategies can reduce uncertainty 
by helping individuals to determine what information is needed, lessen ambiguity by 
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highlighting appropriate interpretations, and manage role conflict by helping the decision 
maker to choose an identity appropriate to the situation. In doing so, decision makers will 
make these choices based on what has worked for them in the past and what they 
consider to be legitimate. 
Choosing an identity constrains rule choices in the context of bounded rationality, 
thereby minimizing uncertainty, ambiguity, and role conflict and making decisions 
possible even in highly complex social settings. Understanding how individuals use 
identity and rules to know what is appropriate and legitimate (March, 1994) is a useful 
approach to the study of presidential leadership teams in higher education because of its 
emphasis on considering the social and normative context of the organization in an 
environment often described as both collegial and political. I used this framework to 
ground my case study of a presidential leadership team in a single institution of higher 
education by using the concepts of boundary spanning, organizational conditions, and the 
logic of appropriateness to guide both data collection and analysis.  
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 CHAPTER 4: METHODOLOGY 
  
In this chapter, I provide an overview of the methodology of this study. First I 
discuss the rationale for choosing a case study approach and describe the selected 
research site and participants. I then explain the data collection and analyses procedures I 
used to address my research questions. Finally, I describe the methods I used to ensure 
the quality and trustworthiness of this research while protecting the confidentiality of the 
research site and participants. 
 
Case study 
The design of this study focused on boundary spanning by presidential leadership 
team members in a single university. To explore this activity, I chose to use a theoretical 
and criterion-based qualitative case study design. A case study is “an exploration of a 
‘bounded system’ or a case . . . over time through detailed, in-depth data collection 
involving multiple sources of information rich in context” (Creswell, 1998). I chose to 
conduct this research using a case study approach because of the importance of 
understanding the organizational context when studying organizational teams. Context is 
an important element in qualitative research in general, and case study research in 
particular, because it situates the case within its setting – physical, social, historical, or 
economic (Creswell, 1998). Both the literature review and conceptual framework for this 
research emphasized the importance of setting, context, or environment as an influence 
on individual and organizational processes such as boundary spanning. A case study 
occurs in a natural setting (Bogdan & Biklen, 1992; Creswell, 1998, 2003; Merriam, 
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1998), thereby allowing the individual context of the university to play an important role 
in observing how information moves through the organization to the top decision makers.  
I chose to approach this study from a qualitative perspective for two reasons. 
First, a qualitative method is well-suited to topics in which little exploration of variables 
or theories has occurred. The literature on presidential leadership teams in higher 
education is sparse, much of it conceptual or focused on internal team dynamics, and 
much of the research on role conflict and boundary spanning is based on survey data. For 
this research, a qualitative case study was a valuable approach to studying a topic that 
needs to be explored further (Creswell, 1998; Strauss & Corbin, 1990).  
Second, a qualitative approach can illustrate the complexities inherent within 
organizations and situations (Creswell, 2003; Rossman & Rallis, 1998). Ontologically, 
studying context qualitatively is valuable because reality is “subjective and multiple” 
(Creswell, 1998, p. 75), a necessary perspective when undertaking a study of teams, 
collaboration, and human relationships. Exploring individuals’ experiences and behaviors 
unfold and develop over the course of time and cannot be limited to a single instance.  
I chose to use a theoretical criterion approach to select my site because it guided 
my understanding of who to study and what issues were important to examine (Creswell, 
2003). A criterion-based case is one in which the selected case meets some criteria for 
inclusion and can serve to “elaborate and examine” a theoretical construct, such as the 
boundary-spanning activity of a presidential leadership teams (Miles & Huberman, 1994, 
p. 28). Using an expert nomination process, I used theoretical and purposeful criteria 
prompted by the literature on leadership teams to select a site in which I could observe 
boundary spanning constructs.  
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Research site 
To answer my research questions, I selected a presidential leadership team at a 
single institution of higher education to allow for in-depth data collection during a single 
academic year. I chose a single year as a means to bound the study while allowing time to 
observe processes and patterns in the team’s activities. I based my site selection on 
primarily on accessibility, but the site also offered some important opportunities that my 
literature review and conceptual framework suggested would be important, such as the 
team’s design. 
The selected site had to allow regular and ongoing access to the presidential team 
meetings and members. The criteria also required that the team meet regularly (Bensimon 
& Neumann, 1993) and the selected site met each week with few exceptions. Finally, I 
considered certain team characteristics for selecting an appropriate site. Based on the 
literature, I looked for a team whose design included the president as convener, as 
opposed to an assistant or vice president, and whose team members reported directly to 
the president. These characteristics were important because I was interested in how 
leadership teams might help presidential level decision making. In this case, all but one 
team member reported directly to the president, and team meetings were arranged 
according to the president’s availability.  
Through my academic and professional network, I identified expert individuals 
likely to know teams or team members that met my selection criteria. I informed site 
nominators of these criteria by means of a letter outlining my project. My use of this 
approach introduced an additional criterion to my selection process; potential sites were 
limited to those known to one of my selected nominators. I considered several 
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recommended sites and explored three possibilities by discussing my project and criteria 
with additional individuals, beyond my expert nominators, who were most likely to be in 
a position to speak about the appropriateness of the team for consideration. Based on this 
information, I contacted the institution meeting the most criteria to discuss the project. I 
met with the president and, after describing my project and answering his questions, he 
informed me that the team had consented to participate and invited me to begin observing 
the team’s weekly meeting. As agreed upon with the president and his leadership team, 
all information collected in this study was confidential. Neither the university nor any 
study participants have been identified as part of this project.  
The site I selected for this case study was a public, urban, doctoral-granting 
NCAA Division I university employing over 500 faculty members and over 1,000 staff 
members. The university served about 16,000 students in eight colleges, including 
business, education, engineering, and law, with 200 fields of study. About one-third of 
these students were enrolled in the graduate or professional schools. The student 
population was almost 60 percent female and over one-quarter minority, and the 
university served a significant part-time and transfer student population. The physical 
campus comprised 40 buildings on less than one hundred acres.  
The study participants included the president, ten members of the leadership team, 
and other key campus figures, such as deans and university-wide committee chairs who 
were not members of the team. 
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Data collection 
Data for this project came from three sources: observations, interviews, and 
documents. Using three sources of data helped to answer my research questions and to 
triangulate processes and issues (Creswell, 1998). The time frame for data collection was 
nine months, from September to June of an academic year. Data collection dates and 
times were arranged to correspond with weekly team meetings and to accommodate the 
schedules of team members for interview sessions. 
 
Observations 
Observation is a valuable component of case study data collection for several 
reasons (Merriam, 1998).  First, observation can help a researcher to notice routines and 
actual behavior in progress rather than relying on the secondhand perceptions (Creswell, 
2003). Observation can also help to provide context for the case and information for 
subsequent interviews. In this study, I relied on observations to gather data on individual 
behaviors and team processes related to boundary spanning, as well as to understand the 
team and organizational contexts. 
Prior to my first observation, I obtained the written consent of the president on 
behalf of the team to attend their weekly meetings. Over the course of nine months, I 
attended 23 team meetings and one off-site retreat as a non-participant observer 
(Creswell, 2003). In total, I observed approximately 50 meeting hours. Each meeting 
lasted approximately two hours, and a single off-site retreat lasted about five hours. 
During this time, I sat on the perimeter of the room while the team gathered around a 
conference table. During observation of the team’s weekly meetings, I typed verbatim 
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notes to capture the main topics and discussion patterns at each meeting. After each 
meeting, I edited my notes for clarity and spelling, and wrote reflective notes about 
events, behaviors, patterns, or questions that arose over the course of the meeting and that 
seemed relevant to my research questions. 
  
Interviews   
In addition to observations, I conducted interviews to highlight how individual 
team members viewed the team and interpreted their own roles.. Because much of the 
work of team members occurred outside of meetings, I used this approach to data 
collection to capture how they thought about meetings and their roles on the team. 
Interviews are a major source of data in qualitative research on decision making 
(Merriam, 1998) because they help the researcher “to enter into the other person’s 
perspective” (Patton, 1990, p. 196) in a situation in which the researcher cannot observe a 
person’s feelings or interpretations of past events.  
I developed the interview questions using my research questions and concepts 
from my theoretical framework as a guide. In order to understand the team from the 
perspectives of participants, the team leader, and campus constituents, I wrote separate 
interview protocols for leadership team members, the president, and other campus figures 
(see Appendices A, B, and C). As is typical of qualitative research, additional questions 
emerged from my conversations with team members throughout the duration of the case. 
This semi-structured interview format allowed me “to respond to the situation at hand, to 
the emerging worldview of the respondent, and to new ideas on the topic” (Merriam, 
1998, p. 74). Furthermore, using a semi-structured format allowed me to focus on the 
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topics of interest while selectively moving off the protocol, as warranted, to probe 
potentially valuable lines of discussion, and adjust questions based on the individual 
interviewee’s role. 
At the start of the first interview with each participant, I explained the general 
purpose of my research and discussed the issue of confidentiality. This included 
concealing the identity of each individual for both data storage and reporting purposes. 
Each interview lasted from one to one-and-a-half hours. All interviews were digitally 
recorded and then sent to an outsourced company for transcription. After receiving the 
interview transcripts, I reviewed them for accuracy by listening to the recording of each 
interview.  
Overall, I conducted interviews with 11 team members, the president, and nine 
key campus figures. I used these interview sessions to gather data relevant to the research 
questions, as well as to collect contextual information such as current issues and events, 
divisional activities, and team history. The questions were open-ended and focused on 
individual and team goals, behaviors, and activities. Often, one individuals’ response 
would suggest a different way of asking a question or my observation of a meeting would 
highlight an issue to discuss with individuals in an interview. Therefore, throughout the 
data collection process, I refined the interview protocol through the addition, deletion, 
and revision of questions.  
The main purpose of the first part of each interview with team members was to 
introduce myself and to gain a preliminary understanding of his or her background, 
organizational role(s) and responsibilities, priorities, and relationships with others on the 
team and on campus. I used the second and third sections of the interview protocol to 
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explore participants’ perspectives, reflections, and ideas about specific campus issues and 
team discussions. Similarly, I used the president’s protocol to explore his professional 
background and current role, his formation and expectations of the leadership team, and 
team activities and goals. The interview protocol for other key campus figures focused on 
the respondent’s role on campus, perceptions of current campus issues, and interaction 
with the leadership team.  
I conducted semi-structured interviews with each individual over the course of the 
academic year, depending on the time necessary to complete the interview protocol. In 
addition to the president and other team members, I identified several key campus figures 
for interviews prior to data collection, based on their formal positions in the university. I 
also used “snowball sampling” (Miles & Huberman, 1994) to identify additional 
secondary interviews based on the issues that arose in team meetings as a means of better 
understanding the context of the institution. I became aware of others as their names were 
repeatedly raised during team meetings and other interviews. For these interviews, I 
selected individuals such as college deans, the student body president, the faculty senate 
president, the staff council president, the chief enrollment officer, and the chair of the 
strategic planning committee, who were likely to contribute additional information about 
campus issues, their interaction with team members, and the organizational context.  
 
Document analysis 
I also analyzed several different university documents, including the university 
vision statement, the campus master plan, organizational charts, and presidential 
speeches. Throughout the length of the case, I gathered documents both from individuals 
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as well as from publicly-available sources such as campus publications and the university 
web site. I also gathered biographic and demographic data for team members who were 
willing to provide written information in addition to the interview questions addressing 
these areas in order to further document their backgrounds and organizational roles. 
There are several benefits of documents in qualitative research (Creswell, 2003). 
Documents can serve as a source for understanding the broader organizational context, 
including goals and current events that may have shaped team members’ roles and 
decisions. Second, using documents allowed me to gather background information and 
contextual data without scheduling additional interview time from team members. In this 
case, this benefit was particularly helpful given that the participants were executive-level 
administrators with scheduling constraints. Finally, documents provided a third source of 
data that helped to support my efforts at triangulation for verification of my findings.  
 
Data analysis 
I used a cyclical approach to data analysis for this research project (Miles & 
Huberman, 1994), involving a recurring sequence of data collection, data analysis, and 
the generation of new and refined questions that led to additional data collection. For 
example, observation data drew my attention to patterns in the team meetings, which I 
then asked individuals about during interviews. Similarly, interview data contributed to 
the development and refinement of the interview protocols, as I found more powerful or 
articulate means to ask questions. 
In order to organize and prepare the data for analysis (Creswell, 2003), I used an 
independent transcription service to transcribe each interview as it was completed. I then 
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reviewed each interview for accuracy by reading the transcript while listening to the 
original audio version. I then entered interview transcripts, documents, and observational 
data into NVivo 7, a qualitative data management software package from QSR 
International. I used this software to aid in organizing, coding, and analyzing the case 
study data for themes. 
I analyzed the data for this case by first reading through transcripts, observational 
notes, and document remarks for general ideas and themes. I then coded units of data 
ranging in size from phrases, sentences and paragraphs to entire passages of discussion. I 
organized these data into categories, starting with those initially suggested by my 
problem statement and conceptual framework, including boundary spanning activities 
such as searching and promoting, actual and intended roles, and decision influences 
(Creswell, 2003). Specifically, I separated boundary-spanning activities into distinct 
codes reflecting evidence of information management (scanning, selecting, interpreting, 
transmitting) and political management (promoting and protecting). I also coded for 
evidence of the conditions my conceptual framework suggests might help or hinder 
boundary spanners: uncertainty, ambiguity, multiple roles, and elements of the social 
context. Finally, I drew upon decision-making theory to analyze individuals’ attempts to 
simplify their experience, including comments about past experience and familiarity, 
concerns with legitimacy, and identification of rules. I also developed additional codes to 
describe situations and activities that emerged as I read transcripts and observation notes. 
At first, I analyzed data from the team as a whole to understand what boundary-spanning 
activities were present. As individual or subgroup variations became clear, I further 
analyzed my data using differentiating characteristics to better understand these 
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differences. Throughout this process, I began to write preliminary findings around broad 




Whether a study is qualitative or quantitative in design, it remains important to 
consider the accuracy of the findings. Creswell (1998) emphasizes that qualitative 
researchers view verifying the accuracy of findings both “as a process that occurs 
throughout the data collection, analysis, and report writing of a study and standards as 
criteria imposed by the researcher and others after a study is completed [emphases 
original]” (p. 194). I used Howe and Eisenhardt’s five standards to assure that the process 
I used to conduct this research and the results of this study are “believable, accurate, and 
‘right’” (Creswell, 1998, p. 193).  
First, accuracy can be judged in part by the congruence between the research 
questions and the research process. In this case, my research questions and conceptual 
framework guided both my data collection and analysis processes. The design of this 
study focused on exploring boundary spanning in a presidential leadership teams in a 
single university, so I based my data collection on interview protocols designed to access 
information about team members’ activities and perceptions related to these areas, as well 
as observations of the leadership team in action. As I proceeded to analyze the data I 
collected from interviews, observations, and documents, I again relied on the conceptual 
framework for this study to develop and interpret the findings. 
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  Second, researchers must clarify their assumptions related to a project as another 
means of ensuring accuracy. In this case, I believe that presidential leadership teams are a 
valuable tool for managing complex organizations and that “real” teams, as defined in the 
literature, can exist. However, they exist in a particular context that influences their 
effectiveness and their behaviors, which led me to assume that observing them in action 
and understanding their context in depth would provide important insights. 
A third means of ensuring accuracy, according to Howe and Eisenhardt, is the 
technical competence with which research is conducted. I met this standard through my 
competence with the data collection and analysis. In addition to doctoral coursework in 
qualitative methods, throughout this study I continued to consult respected texts in the 
field of qualitative research related to interviewing techniques, observation, and 
document review. Furthermore, I conducted this research under the guidance of faculty 
members experienced in the fields of qualitative research, leadership, and organizational 
theory.  
A fourth standard of accuracy considers the overall merit of the study, including 
whether the researcher used respected theoretical explanations. As stated previously, the 
study is loosely based on the prior leadership team research of Bensimon and Neumann 
(1993). The current study builds on existing scholarship on top management teams in the 
corporate sector, focusing specifically on the boundary spanning roles and decision 
making processes of leadership teams in higher education. Through this study’s literature 
review and conceptual framework, I relied on several bodies of literature to support both 
the need for this research and to suggest a model for extending the research on leadership 
teams in higher education. 
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Finally, research should have the value to inform practice while protecting the 
confidentiality, privacy, and truth of participants. This study adds to the literature both by 
providing a new conceptual and theoretical perspective on leadership teams and by taking 
an in-depth, qualitative approach to studying a single leadership team over an extended 
period of time. Furthermore, this study informs policy and practice by providing an 
analysis of decision making and boundary spanning to assist presidents and their 
leadership teams to improve their usefulness and effectiveness in addressing the 
complexity faced by institutions of higher education. Furthermore, the published results 
of this study protect the confidentiality and privacy of its subjects through the use of 
anonymity and masked quotations. I have also made every effort to assure that the truth 
has been accurately represented both by utilizing transcribed or verbatim data; by 




Creswell (1998) views trustworthiness, or verification, “as a distinct strength of 
qualitative research [when] the account [provided is] made through extensive time spent 
in the field, detailed thick description, and the closeness to participants in the study all 
add to the value of the study” (p. 201). The intent of verification is to assure the accuracy 
of findings by engaging in one or more common procedures (Creswell, 2003). I used four 
specific strategies to ensure the trustworthiness and credibility of this research. 
First, I used triangulation of my multiple data sources to provide strong evidence 
of issues and factors (Creswell, 2003). The confluence of data from semi-structured in-
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depth interviews, observations, and document analysis served to pinpoint the major 
themes in this study and to create an accurate picture of the university context, individual 
behaviors, and team goals, activities, and dynamics. Furthermore, I triangulated interview 
and observation data obtained from individual team members as well as document 
analysis, to confirm my interpretation of findings. For example, I am confident that 
enrollment was the most important issue facing this team based on its prevalence in 
documents, the frequency with which it was raised in team meetings, and its stated 
importance by team members and the president. 
Second, I spent prolonged time in the field (Creswell, 2003). I invested significant 
time in observing and interviewing this team to learn about its activities and culture and 
to build trust with individual participants. This strategy of using prolonged and firsthand 
experience with the team was aided by the intentional use of a single research site, which 
allowed me to focus more time and effort in one location. For this case study, I spent nine 
months attending weekly team meetings and interviewing individual team members as 
well as other members of the campus community. My sustained engagement with the 
leadership team allowed me to build trust with the team members, learn the culture of 
both the team and the university, and provided opportunities to check for misinformation. 
While I was a passive observer, the team became accustomed to my presence in the 
room. One participant noted that, after the first few weeks, for the most part the team 
forgot that I was in attendance and was able to proceed with the meeting in their typical 
fashion. Several weeks after the observation process was underway, I began to conduct 
interviews with the president and other team members. This delay in beginning the 
interview process was a helpful mechanism for developing rapport and credibility with 
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team members (Creswell, 2003). Furthermore, spending this extended time allowed me to 
develop and refine interview questions and attend to various aspects of the team’s 
meeting behaviors.  
Finally, as is typical of the presentation of qualitative findings, I have provided 
rich, thick description (Creswell, 2003) that goes beyond facts to comprehensively 
describe context and meaning in order to convey the depth of the case. I have also given 
voice to the study participants through the use of direct and effective quotations in 
support of themes and assertions throughout this report. 
 
Limitations 
Like all research, there are limitations to the design of this study. First, while a 
qualitative case study approach provided more in-depth, contextual data than is possible 
with a quantitative study, this was balanced by the challenges that inhered with selecting 
an appropriate case and gaining access. Furthermore, a case study approach meant that I 
had limited control over both what happened, such as when and how frequently the team 
met, and what information participants provided. In particular, interviews provide 
indirect information filtered through participants’ lenses (Creswell, 2003).  
This design must also account for the human error and bias inherent in qualitative 
research, although this quality is balanced by the intrinsic value of qualitative data. In this 
case, the accuracy of observational data was dependent upon my note taking and 
attending skills and the information I gathered and discussed was filtered through my 
personal lens (Creswell, 2003). In addition, my presence in meetings may have 
influenced team members to control or limit the information that was revealed during 
  78  
these sessions (Merriam, 1998). For example, one team member suggested that all but 
generic legal information was not discussed due to my attendance at meetings.  
Given the conditions of confidentiality and anonymity to which I adhered in this 
case, I was unable to utilize some information gathered in this case. Several interview 
quotations that might have been used to provide further support for my findings were 
related to specific, identifiable personnel. Therefore, I omitted these statements and relied 
only on information that could not be connected to any specific participant. Furthermore, 
I have shared only a brief description of the institution in order to protect its identity.   
Additionally, while I spent nine months collecting data for this case, time was a 
limiting factor. Conducting a case study required a considerable amount of time to collect 
data, perform analysis, and draw conclusions. While the predetermined timeline provided 
a boundary for the case, it also limited the amount of information that could be collected 
and analyzed.  
Finally, the results of this study encompass and are limited to one team’s 
experience and cannot be generalized to all colleges and universities. However, the 
findings have generated hypotheses that may contribute to our knowledge of leadership 
teams as a strategy for decision making (Honig, 2003). During site selection, I looked for 
a team in which the president, as the team builder, encouraged discussion, debate, 
collaboration, and information sharing (Bensimon & Neumann, 1993) and in which team 
meetings are characterized by substantive discussion of issues, rather than information 
delivery (Bensimon & Neumann, 1993). These criteria were an attempt to identify a real 
team, as defined by the literature. However, while initial conversations with various 
contacts at the university, as well as data I collected about the president’s expectations of 
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the team, indicated that this team was the kind of team I wanted to study, my analysis 
suggests that these criteria were not met. Despite these limitations, this case study will 
advance the research agenda on presidential leadership teams by highlighting an 
important process in context. 
 
Ethical considerations 
Due to the essential personal interaction in qualitative research, it is vital to 
consider the ethical implications of this study.  The reliance of this study on senior 
administrators mandated important consideration in the maintenance of confidentiality 
and anonymity both for ethical reasons and in order to gain the team’s trust.  Several 
steps have been taken in order to maintain appropriate ethics in this study through 
informed consent, confidentiality, and anonymity.   
First, each president and leadership team member was informed about the purpose 
of the study, the use of any information he or she shared, and any risks associated with 
his or her participation.  Signed permission was obtained from the president and each 
individual member of the leadership teams to use the qualitative data obtained from 
interviews and observations throughout the study. Furthermore, the president consulted 
with the team prior to granting permission for access to the weekly meeting as well as to 
the retreat held approximately midway through data collection. 
Second, I assured individual participants and the team as a whole, that I would 
maintain confidentiality by adhering to several procedures. The names of individuals and 
their institution have not been used in any identifiable way in this report. Instead, quoted 
material has been cited using a notation to reflect their role. For example, except for the 
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president, team members’ statements are indicated by the code “TM1” through “TM10” 
throughout this document; I indicate contributions from other campus members with the 
same notation scheme but substitute a “CM” prefix. In addition, interview transcripts 
were not identified using interviewee’s names, but rather coded only for data analysis 
purposes. A record of these codes is accessible only to the researcher and will be 
destroyed promptly at the conclusion of the study. 
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CHAPTER 5: PRESIDENTIAL LEADERSHIP TEAM MEMBERS AS BOUNDARY 
SPANNERS 
A president must view the institution as a complex system in which the team is the sense 
maker – that is, its members are collectively involved in perceiving, analyzing, learning, 
and thinking (Bensimon & Neumann, 1993, p. 41). 
 
The framework for this study, presented in Chapter Three, suggests that members 
of presidential leadership teams can be conceptualized as boundary spanners who 
perform information and political management functions. In this chapter, I draw on 
observations of team meetings, interviews with individual team members, and 
organizational documents to articulate findings related to the boundary-spanning 
activities in this case. I start by describing the case in order to provide an understanding 
of the setting for these activities. I then present descriptions of the president’s and team 
members’ role expectations, my understanding of the university’s goals as the context for 
their activities, and finally the actual information management and political functions of 
boundary spanning that I observed in this case.  
While this study aimed to shed light on the team’s external activities, I found that 
team members’ activities to manage the environment outside of the team were limited. 
They did deliver a multitude of information to the team each week, but I did not observe 
them participating in information activities such as search and use.  Team members did 
engage in political management activities, but mostly limited to the external environment. 
These findings provide limited support for the conceptualization of presidential 
leadership team members as boundary spanners. 
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Description of the Case 
The team 
As stated in Chapter 4, the case for this project was the presidential leadership 
team of a single, public, urban, doctoral-granting university over a nine-month period. 
The leadership team was composed of eleven members, including the president, 
university officers, and other senior executives. At the start of the case, the university 
president had been in office for almost five years, including six months as an interim 
from outside of the university. He had previous experience as a president, provost, vice 
president, dean, department chair, and faculty member at several other universities. 
During the span of the case, the board of trustees extended the president’s contract for 
four years. 
The team members represented a variety of functional areas across the university, 
including academic affairs, alumni affairs, community relations, economic development, 
financial and administrative services, government relations, information technology, legal 
affairs, public affairs, and student affairs (see Appendix E) . Notably, half of the team 
was focused almost exclusively on external constituencies, such as the local community, 
state government, and alumni. These individuals had a variety of experiences in 
academic, corporate, legal, government, and community organizations. Of the eleven 
team members, five held the title of vice president and were considered officers of the 
university. Four team members had experience as faculty members, five held doctorates, 
two had earned legal degrees, and two held other graduate degrees, including one from 
the university. 
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Of the eleven team members, all but two were male. Both female members as 
well as two men were people of color. While three team members had already been on 
the team when the president took office, he had hired, promoted, or placed the remaining 
individuals on this team. The most recent member joined the team only a month before 
the start of the case. During the second half of the case, one team member submitted his 
resignation and several weeks later the interim replacement for this member joined the 
team’s weekly meetings. 
The team met each week for about two hours in the president’s conference room, 
as the president’s schedule allowed. If the president was not available, or if the board was 
meeting, the team did not convene. There was no formal, written agenda for these 
meetings. Rather, each meeting proceeded in a “round robin” format, with the president 
directing each team member in turn to share whatever information they had brought. 
While this case included the team’s Friday morning meeting, the president also met with 
the members of this team plus several other senior university officials at another weekly 
meeting on Monday afternoons. 
 
Role Expectations 
As I described in Chapter 3, the conceptual framework for this study suggests that 
members of leadership teams such as this one will scan or search the environment for 
information related to organizational goals, deliver selected information to the team, and 
translate or interpret that information in the team environment in order to facilitate its 
use. These activities are similar, but not identical, to the expectations held by the 
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president and team members, who generally viewed their responsibilities as providing 
information and advice.  
 
President’s expectations 
The president reported that he expected that the team would contribute to these 
goals in specific ways. In interviews, the president reported that he expected team 
members to share information with him and the team, as well as serve as his 
representatives. These expectations generally correspond to the information management 
and political management functions that the literature on boundary spanning suggests is 
useful for a team’s success.  
 
Share information 
The president intended for team members to share certain types of information at 
team meetings. First, he wanted individuals to share information with him and the team 
regarding their own activities and contributions to organizational goals. For example, he 
expected team members to keep him and the team informed about “what they’ve done all 
week . . . especially with regard to the fundamental goals of the institution . . . and how 
they’ve been focusing on the issues as we’ve defined them.” Second, he wanted them to 
be alert to threats and opportunities related to those goals. Specifically, he expected them 
to scan the environment by “looking inwards [at the university] to see not just those 
trouble spots, but [to] be sure we know what our strengths are as well as weaknesses.”  
He also expected team members to deliver information about these “problems they’ve 
discovered.” Their job was “to identify the problems: what the hell are they, and how do 
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we solve them?” These statements illustrate the president’s expectation that the team 
should be focused on certain goals, as suggested by theories of boundary spanning.  
Beyond delivering information, the president held expectations for the team to 
participate in processing information about the university’s fundamental goals, issues, 
and problems. He intended for the team to provide advice, ideas, and expertise “about 
how we ought to be doing things here” (President). His goal was to “…force every damn 
idea I can out of everyone in terms of directionality” (President) in his meetings with 
them. Throughout his interview comments, the president repeatedly mentioned the 
importance of the group setting, noting “everybody’s got to pitch in and see ‘what are the 
big issues?’” In particular, the president expected team members to work together, “avoid 
silos,” and talk about “ways that they might help each other.” These comments imply that 
the team meeting was a prime opportunity for team members to share information and 
generate ideas in support of university-wide goals.  
 
Serve as representatives  
The president also expressed expectations that reflected some attention to political 
management. The president’s goal was essentially for team members to serve as his 
representatives for shared goals: 
You could start with what do the words ‘vice president’ mean? Essentially 
those words mean acting on behalf of. That’s what vice presidents do; they 
act on behalf of the president with regard to [their responsibilities] because 
I can’t do it…I can’t be everywhere. 
 
In particular, he called attention to team members’ roles in promoting organizational 
goals. In his words, he stated that vice presidents needed to “understand that the reason 
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that all those people who report to [them] do what they do is in furtherance of the 
institutional goals that we have and not to build a great empire that’s independent of the 
rest of the place.” In other words, team members were expected to act on behalf of the 
president for the good of the university. While the president did not specify any 
intentions regarding team members’ roles in protecting the university, he clearly 
indicated that as vice presidents and team members, they were to advocate for the 
university’s overarching goals and use their resources in the service of these goals.  
This set of information management and political management expectations from 
the president provide a useful benchmark for understanding how team members viewed 
their role. As I discuss in the next section, while their understanding of their role 
expectations were similar to the president’s, their descriptions did differ slightly in a few 
specific ways. 
 
Team members’ expectations 
In order to understand team members’ interpretations of the president’s 
expectations for the team, I asked each of them in interviews to describe the team’s 
intended function and their roles on the team. I noted that most team members echoed the 
president’s comments that the team, and they as team members, was supposed to provide 
information and advice to the president and serve as representatives. Notably, most 
individuals’ perspectives on the focus of their information delivery differed from the 
president’s. Furthermore, most team members generally spoke about a single type of 
activity, such providing expertise or serving as a representative, rather than describing 
their roles in terms of a range of multiple boundary-spanning activities. This apparent 
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discrepancy regarding the team’s function likely contributed to the differences between 
the president’s intentions and the actual role of the team. 
 
Provide information to the president 
While the president indicated that the team meeting was an opportunity for 
individuals to share information with one another, most team members emphasized the 
president as the recipient of their information delivery during the weekly meeting. 
Several team members indicated during their interviews that the point of the team 
meeting was to deliver information to the president. In the words of some of these 
individuals, the purpose of the meeting was so that “the president can hear ideas that 
we’ve picked up since the last meeting” because “he wants to be kept current.” Another 
individual further emphasized this focus on the president when he described the purpose 
of the meeting as an opportunity “for the president to meet with his vice-presidents.” One 
individual described the meeting as a forum in which to receive information from the 
president. He viewed it as a chance “for [the president] to identify crisis or potential crisis 
situations that maybe we all need to be thinking about…. I believe he chairs it to inform 
us – kind of top down.” Each of these comments highlights the team’s central view of the 
president on the team, both as the recipient and the conveyer of information, in contrast 
to the president’s stated expectation that the team meeting was an opportunity for team 
members to talk to and help one another. 
Similar to the president’s expectations of providing advice and ideas, several team 
members said that they had a role in providing advice to the president, particularly from 
an expert perspective. Some saw themselves as advisors or “internal consultant[s]” who 
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could provide information in particular areas of expertise. For example, one team 
member said, “I’m not really involved in [a certain project] other than to give advice on 
the soundness of the things that they propose…. So when new things are being discussed, 
I think he [the president] expects me to, and I see it as my job, to raise the pros and cons 
… of anything that’s being proposed or discussed.” Similarly, some team members 
viewed their roles as expert information providers regarding their particular 
constituencies. For example, one team member viewed her role as “bringing a perspective 
that represents the students and their welfare…. I think they count on me for providing 
them with a student perspective.” Another team member saw a relatively limited role for 
himself when he said, “The big things for me though, would be to report on anything 
pending in the media, and what are we doing in role of advertising, which I don’t talk 
about a whole lot.” Most of these examples highlight a group of individuals who saw 
their roles on the team specifically to contribute expertise from their functional area. 
Only two individuals suggested that the team meeting was an important forum for 
sharing information among their colleagues. For example, one team member described 
the meeting as an opportunity to share: 
anything related to keeping the president and the other staff members 
informed with major issues…. If the President’s staff doesn’t understand 
the issues we have to deal with . . . you got to at least give them 
understanding of what the issues are, and that’s a big part of my role. 
 
Likewise, the other individual shared a similar view of the meeting as a forum for 
engaging his colleagues in larger issues: 
sift up to the presidential level problems that need to be dealt with in a 
basis broader than just my division…. Sometimes I want to solve 
[problems in my division] in coordination with other people’s needs, 
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which is the smart thing to do, so that you would throw it up for their 
discussion at senior staff. 
 
Compared to other team members, these two individuals held an institutional, versus 
divisional, view of the team and its function as evidenced by their emphasis on the team’s 
potential for collaboration and coordination and their concern with larger organizational 
issues. This pattern of distinction continued throughout my observations and interviews, 
leading me to classify these two individuals as part of a “core” subgroup of the team. 
 
Serve as representatives 
My interviews with team members suggested that some individuals viewed their 
roles as having a political management component. When I asked them about their roles 
and the purpose of the team, some mentioned activities that could be broadly described as 
accessing resources, promoting the organization’s image and goals, and advocating for 
the organization. For example, one team member described his role as “giving [the 
president] an extra voice and some connections in the community.” This understanding of 
their roles as representatives was more specific than the president’s stated expectations, 
and team members’ descriptions were differentiated by the internal or external emphasis 
of each individual’s role. 
Despite the prominence of the external environment in the university’s four 
primary goals, very few team members talked about any form of representation as an 
important part of their role on the team. For example, those individuals whose basic job 
responsibilities included working with constituents such as alumni, legislators, or the 
media, spoke almost exclusively about providing representation outside of the 
organization, but not internally. Specifically, several vice presidents’ comments reflected 
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a role in promoting the university. For example, one externally-focused team member 
said that part of his role was to “get the image of the university either recognized or 
enhanced,” while another said that he viewed his role as providing “an extra voice and 
some connections in the community.” Only two individuals described their role in terms 
of securing resources for the university. One team member stated that he thinks “the more 
money I could show [the president] that I’ve brought here that we wouldn’t have gotten 
anyway, the better he likes it.” The other team member highlighted his role in advancing 
the university through fundraising and donor relations. Each of these examples highlights 
the emphasis on promoting the university, which is the focus of one of the university’s 
primary goals. However, no team members described themselves, or the purpose of the 
team, as serving a protective function. 
Team members whose roles were focused on internal aspects of the university 
were less likely to view themselves as representatives. Only a few mentioned that they 
served a role in promoting goals to members of the university community. In the words 
of one of these vice presidents, “I’m the connection with the vision for the University. 
And it is my responsibility to assure that we’re all working in concert and so that staff 
understand that they have individually and collectively a very, very, very important role 
in moving the institution forward.” None of the internally-focused team members 
described finding resources or serving a protective function as a part of their roles. 
The distinction I observed in representation activities between internally- and 
externally-focused team members led me to distinguish another distinct subgroup within 
the team. Based on patterns that persisted throughout my observations and interviews, I 
defined a discrete cluster of team members as the “external” subgroup. As a result of this 
  91  
observation, throughout my interviews and observations, I continued to look for patterns 
of evidence that might support the existence of distinct subgroups within the team. I 
noticed that I could classify team members into four discrete subgroups based on their 
understanding of their roles (see Table 1). The core subgroup understood their roles in 
ways very similar to the president’s expectations, especially in terms of the type of 
information they should deliver and the importance of discussion. The external experts 
focused on their roles in connecting the university to the external environment, primarily 
through representation. The task specialists’ understanding of their roles centered on the 
expertise they could provide to the president, based on their professional and functional 
backgrounds. 
 
Table 1. Leadership team subgroups’ expectations of their roles 













Finally, members of the periphery described their roles in ways that emphasized the 




Understanding the university’s goals provides an important focal point for 
analyzing the boundary-spanning functions in this case. Boundary-spanning activities, as 
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identified in other research, generally aim to assist an organization in meeting its goals 
(Ancona & Caldwell, 1992). In this case, I have defined the leadership team’s goals as 
the organization’s goals because they served as the senior leadership for the university. I 
developed a picture of organizational goals by analyzing relevant organizational 
documents, including presidential speeches, the campus master plan, and the university’s 
vision statement, and by using supporting evidence from team discussions and individual 
interviews. This analysis suggested that the university had four formal goals: increasing 
enrollment, updating the infrastructure of the university, improving the university’s 
image, and developing partnerships in the region.  
In interviews, individual team members reported that the university’s primary 
goal was to increase enrollment. The primacy of this goal was also evident in my 
observations of team meetings and analyses of organizational documents. In the 
president’s words, “everything we’re doing has some relationship to this miserable 
problem with enrollment competition,” referring to the region’s decreasing population 
and the university’s competition for students with other local colleges and universities. 
Additionally, every person I interviewed, including members of the leadership team, as 
well as other key campus figures, mentioned without hesitation that the primary goal of 
the university was to increase enrollment at the university. As one campus member stated 
clearly: 
The number one issue is enrollment. We are in a region of decreasing 
population, increasing competitiveness, and it’s been an institution that 
has not been an actively recruiting institution…and now with five, I guess, 
successive cuts from the state on our budget, and decreasing enrollment, 
enrollment is the number one issue on campus. Retention, I believe is 
number two. 
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Related to the issue of enrollment, but identified separately in many documents, 
was the improvement of the campus’s physical infrastructure. While enrollment was 
intended to play the lead role among this university’s goals, infrastructure also appeared 
to play a significant role. As one vice president described: 
[The goal was] to create a climate both from a physical facility and a 
functional facility and a safe facility standpoint that is conducive to 
student learning . . .. So when we said we wanted to build the college up to 
[the enrollment goal], we wanted to double the number of freshman. We 
wanted to increase the number of residential students. Those are all things 
that are in there. Now we took it back to--okay, where we going to put [all 
of those] students? Where are we going to put 1,500 students living on 
campus? How are we going to accomplish the facilities for doubling the 
number of freshman? Somebody else’s job … is to find them and get them 
here. Our job is what we do with them when we get them here, and our 
piece is also attracting them by building a rec center and a student center 
and spiffy new housing and stuff. 
  
 In addition to improving the university’s facilities, a third organizational goal was 
to improve the university’s image. As the president said in one speech, this goal was 
focused specifically on efforts “make our programs more visible to the public and to our 
students….” The president characterized this goal as a response to the university’s stance 
when he arrived, which he described as “totally turned in on itself, and nobody knew it 
was here.”  Another team member portrayed this goal in similar terms: 
I do think that an important issue, an important challenge, for this 
university is that for a long time people didn’t really know what this 
university was about. Let’s focus particularly on opinion leaders [who] 
would have a very narrow sense of what the university was or was about. 
And, I will tell you that I was an opinion leader who was responsible for 
making public many major decisions about what happened at [the 
university] or what happened in parts of [the university], to be more 
accurate. With the exception of one significant project . . . I would tell you 
that [the university’s former presidents] were not very effective persons, in 
terms of knowing how to engage in informing the community about what 
this university was up to. 
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As with the campus infrastructure, the focus on improving the university’s image was 
also an opportunity to attract and retain students at the institution. 
 Finally, a fourth major goal for this university was to develop partnerships in the 
region, particularly as they related to economic development. As the president 
highlighted in a speech, “our work is to be an important part of [the region] in such a way 
that we are indistinguishable from it. Our work is to make this region better in every way 
that we can ….” For example, in the context of describing the university as being 
historically inward-looking, the president emphasized that “facing outward, finding new 
collaborations and so on, that’s very, very important ….” To accomplish this goal, the 
president saw the university as a partner in not only educating students for the workforce, 
but in developing an economy to support them: 
While our mission includes the preparation of our students for 
participation in the economy, we also know that there has to be an 
economy in which they are able to participate. Our mission, therefore, 
includes research and organization that translates into economic 
development for the region. 
 
The campus master plan also reflected the importance of partnering with both public and 
private groups by including “locations for new [university] facilities and … a 
development zone at the periphery of campus where private sector residential and 
commercial development can occur, in partnership with [the university]” while 
improving the quality of life for the local community and creating connections to 
neighboring institutions. The underlying message was that the university needed to 
become and be recognized as a contributing member of its community, socially and 
economically. 
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Actual role: Information management 
In terms of how team members actually operated, I observed that individuals 
served as information managers to varying degrees. Their varying search, delivery, and 
transmission behaviors allowed me to distinguish distinct subgroups within the team.  
 
Scanning/searching 
As a dimension of information management, scanning is an important boundary-
spanning activity because it is a means to identify information from outside of the team 
that may be useful to decision making. Based both on the president’s expectations for the 
team and the literature on boundary spanning, team members should have searched for 
information related to the organization’s four primary goals. However, I found that the 
extent to which they looked for information related to these goals was minimal. Team 
members did not generally engage in search activities beyond their daily operational roles 
and job responsibilities. Furthermore, while sometimes this information and their sources 
were related to organizational goals, their search processes were limited and 
unintentional.  
In order to understand team members’ search behaviors, during interviews I asked 
team members to talk about how much time they generally spent preparing for meetings 
and what types of activities they engaged in both to prepare for meetings and to follow up 
after meetings. I also prompted team members to report whether they consulted with 
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anyone or checked on information before meetings. In other words, I used preparation as 
a proxy for search. 
What I heard was that most individuals did not spend much, if any, time actively 
preparing for meetings, nor did they typically follow up on issues or information after the 
weekly meeting. For example, one team member said that he started “thinking about [his 
report for the meeting] a couple days [before the meeting]. It kind of kicks around 
somewhat subliminally. I keep stacks of paper there where stuff gets jotted down....” Yet 
another team member reported spending as much as “Fifteen minutes probably…. I think 
I just reported on stuff…I probably gave 15 minutes of thought.” Another reported 
spending even less time: “Five minutes. Really, I mean I usually put it together—like for 
the Friday meeting, on Thursday, I’ll try and figure out what the major issues are.” The 
most extreme routine arose from one team member who reported that he spent “little to 
none” in terms of time preparing for the meeting and decided what to report while in the 
meeting itself: 
[My] preparation is more . . . top-of-mind, I guess. So I typically come in 
with a blank agenda, and will find a piece of paper, and, because I’m not 
in the first chair, unless he happens to go out of order, I will make some 
notes for myself--two or three parts of the page. 
 
Not surprisingly, team members reported that they spent more time preparing for the 
weekly meeting if they had something to present. However most of this preparation 
seemed to involve preparing documents using information that they already had, rather 
than searching for new information. As one team member stated, “If I have a certain item 
I want to present, yes, I will prepare it, prepare the handout or whatever.” As another 
team member shared: 
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Usually I don’t have anything to present at those meetings. Occasionally, I 
will, if there’s something to report on on the legal front that I feel that 
everyone should know. And then I might prepare then, assemble the 
materials, if I’m going to pass something out, or look over whatever it is 
I’m going to talk about. But typically I don’t have much to report to them. 
He does go around the table, as you know, and asks everyone what’s up. 
Typically, I can just say what’s up without preparing. Off the top of my 
head I know what’s up, what’s happened since the last time I’ve met 
everyone, which typically is that Monday. Because the same group, as you 
know, plus a few others, meet on that Monday.  
 
Only one team member, a member of the core subgroup, seemed to indicate that he spent 
a significant amount of time preparing for team meetings: 
Most times, if I’m bringing something in to that table, that’s an important 
time for me. Because there’s a lot of decisions made. I have the ability to 
influence a lot of things. So I probably spend as much time preparing for 
the meeting as I do at the meeting, is a fair statement. 
 
This particular response suggested a level of intentionality that was not evident in 
comments from other team members. This same team member said that he would look 
for “anything I need. Whether I’m going for an initiative, trying to solve a problem, 
understand an issue better. [I] do a lot of that.” In contrast, another team member seemed 
to be less focused on particular types of information, stating that he “tried to pick five or 
six things that I could talk about, and I go in with a list.” Overall, most team members’ 
examples of how they prepare for meetings suggest that they did so casually and 
unintentionally.  
Team members’ post-meeting activity also did not suggest that they left team 
meetings with intentions to search for information related to organizational goals. When I 
asked team members about their activities after meetings, many individual reported that 
they spent very little time following up on meeting activity. As one team member 
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described: “In many cases, I’d say ‘nothing.’ Ten minutes, maybe, on a typical day just to 
sort through ‘Do I have any actions? Something I got to follow-up on from this?’ And 
usually, in my case, it’s not.” One stated that “I usually do lunch after meetings” and then 
the meeting is forgotten. Yet another vice president reported “Not a lot. If I’ve got some 
things I got to do, I go out and do them. Well, no, that’s not completely right. I’m mostly 
reporting items.” 
Only a few team members’ responses suggested that they engaged in some 
follow-up activity after meetings. One team member reported that “A lot of times 
assignments, for me at least, come from that meeting.” Another indicated that, during a 
meeting, he might generate a list of “five to ten actionable things that I need to do … 
[that require] probably under an hour … it may even be under 30 minutes.” Another 
alluded to setting up meetings or requesting materials, activities that “could take just that 
day or a week, or it could take several months.” One individual admitted that he did not 
usually feel responsible to follow-up on any action items after meetings, but does tend to 
connect with other team members: 
Nearly every meeting that I attend, there’s some comment I make or 
something that takes place or something where I think that it would 
behoove me to do a follow-up or suggest that they might like to talk to this 
person or something like that. So yes, I’d say I’m not coming back having 
to move, “I better get these people to do this, or I better do that,” but I 
often come back and will call [another team member] and, maybe three 
days later, we might have lunch, or react to something that [a particular 
team member] sends me in a mailing. I have quite a bit of stuff which I 
have kept and follow up on and comment on. I probably about half the 
time might send an email to the President or see him and talk with him, or 
he’ll see me and talk with me about it and so forth…. 
 
While several of these individuals clearly did engage in search behaviors after meetings it 
is unclear whether or not they were searching for goal-related information. For most team 
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members, team meetings did not provide direction for how they should have spent time in 
service of the team and the organization’s goals. Their routines depict their search as a 
process of amassing or picking up, rather than deliberately searching for, information on 
a week-to-week basis. 
To create a clearer picture of their scanning behavior, I looked at interviews and 
observation data for evidence of individual team members’ interactions with other actors. 
In the management and organizational behavior literature, boundary spanning is defined 
as an intergroup activity that occurs in relation to other social systems or actors in the 
environment (Ancona & Caldwell, 1992; Friedman & Podolny, 1992; Leifer & Huber, 
1977; Pruitt & Schwartz, 1999). While most team members suggested that they did not 
spend much time preparing for team meetings, scanning is an activity that would likely 
occur through other organizational meetings and informal interactions with constituents 
such as staff members, students, faculty, legislators, professional colleagues, and other 
actors outside of the team. When I asked team members if they consulted with anyone in 
order to prepare for the team’s weekly meetings, most said that they did not consult with 
anyone beyond other team members or their own staff members.  
My interviews and observations suggested that many team members relied 
primarily on formal interactions as an opportunity to scan the environment for 
information. In particular, every team member mentioned that they attended regular, 
scheduled meetings with their divisional staff members during which they could learn, in 
the words of one team member, “what’s going on in each unit, what they have done and 
is there any problem encountered” in order to speak on their behalf or to gather 
information about decisions that need senior staff attention. Most team members also 
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mentioned that they attended a variety of other meetings both within and outside the 
university, as members of committees or as a normal part of their job responsibilities. For 
example, one individual noted that he gathered information from “tons of meetings in 
[the state capital], with the legislature and in Congress” that he attended on a regular 
basis. Overall, I heard that many team members’ interactions outside of team were 
limited to meetings and contacts that appeared to be a part of their typical job 
responsibilities rather than an intentional effort to search for information related to 
organizational goals. 
I found that this team also often scanned for information from non-interactive 
sources. For example, team members used surveys to gather information from a broad-
range of constituents such as faculty, students, and alumni. As one team member 
announced at a meeting, “we are currently conducting a survey [at a local community 
college]; [our] colleges would like to know what kind of program the students want.” 
Another survey was administered by a marketing consultant to seek information about 
“admitted but not enrolled students. This first one was a web survey… of the most recent 
group of students who are doing well but leaving.” Yet another survey was, “looking to 
tap [alumni who are] already engaged and those who are not.” While certain individuals 
did not appear to rely on surveys, this mechanism did seem to be used primarily as a 
strategy for gathering information from external actors. 
My observations of team meetings also yielded evidence that many team 
members scanned or “mined” institutional data related to the team’s goals to share at 
meetings. For example, one vice president had looked for enrollment data related to the 
incoming class’s adherence to admissions standards: 
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I’m concerned about the quality of students we have. This is based on 708 
students, still missing data. Class is over 1000. 17.2% had lower than 16 
ACT. This year it’s 21%, last year 16+ was 72.3%, 66.8% this year.  I 
want to know the range, because we’ve got honors students on one end.  
 
Another team member shared information related to the infrastructure goal: “[We] 
discovered when we did our research that we have 499 students in [certain] zip codes and 
only 333 have parking passes, so there’s at least 700 [students in a certain area]. We’re 
going to propose that [as an opportunity] to [a regional transportation agency].” These 
examples suggest that this source of information was the closest that this team came to 
intentionally searching for information related to organizational goals. 
Team members also scanned sources outside the university, particularly the news 
media and other universities, for information related to team goals. My observation of 
team meetings and conversations with team members highlighted that the local and state 
news media was an important source of information frequently scanned by team 
members. Perhaps due to their concern with the image and outgoing messages of the 
university, and as a public institution, team members seemed particularly attentive to the 
news, particularly the editorials. As the president explained to me, “more at urban 
institutions than at other places…urban schools are really press-sensitive.” While team 
members often mentioned information that they had read in that morning’s edition of a 
newspaper, I did not perceive that they were strategically using the media as a source of 
information.  Nonetheless, this activity did provide valuable information about the 
university’s image in the local media. 
A few team members also looked at other universities for comparative 
information related to organizational goals. As a state institution, the focus of these 
benchmarking efforts was typically directed towards other public universities in the same 
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region. For example, one team member who regularly used this as a strategy had “just 
read [a nearby state university’s] write-up and they say that 80% of their courses are 
represented on Blackboard” in order to understand how the university might approach e-
learning as an enrollment strategy. In some instances, the team used consultants, or expert 
scanners, as a source to obtain comparative information. During this case, the team relied 
on two separate consultants to provide benchmarking information related to enrollment 
marketing and to donor development.  
A rather limited means of using other universities as a source of information was 
through professional sources such as conferences and research. For example, the 
president and one vice president relayed information from a retention conference, in 
support of the enrollment goal. However, attendance at conferences or reading 
professional literature as a mechanism for scanning the environment seemed to be an 
infrequent source of information. Only one team member indicated that he had explored 
the research on a topic: 
I’ve been doing a lot of reading as I try to find out about retention from 
[the university’s] point of view.  I’m trying to understand whether my 
perception is off. I’m struck by how many people have papers, and 
memos, and opinions, but by how many people don’t seem to be doing 
anything about it…also trying to figure out when it’s academic, when it’s 
administration, and when is it a combination. 
 
Overall, I found that this team’s search activities, as defined by my conceptual 
framework, were limited in time, scope, and source. Team members did not purposefully 
search for particular types of information between team meetings. When they did search 
for information, they tended to rely on surveys and benchmarking data, particularly 
focused on the external environment. The team itself and other regular meetings, as well 
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as their daily job responsibilities, were their primary sources of information. I concluded 
that team members used their weekly meeting as a primary opportunity to seek 
information. In other words, the team meeting was just a meeting, not an intentional 
opportunity to share and discuss information or to determine how to proceed with 
achieving the organization’s goals.  
 
President’s search activities 
While routine formal meetings served as opportunities for team members to 
gather information, they did not indicate that they used informal interactions with other 
individuals, either inside or outside the university, as a source of information. However, 
my interviews with the president suggested that he emphasized this type of activity in his 
own behaviors as a means to scan for information. Similar to other team members, the 
president was involved in formal meetings, such as with faculty senate and a deans’ 
council. As one vice president described, the president attended “monthly meetings with 
student leaders. It’s kind of open, what’s working, what’s not, what are you upset about.” 
However, unlike other team members, the president also reported being very active in 
scanning in very informal ways, particularly with regard to students, faculty, and deans, 
in order to understand their experiences and ideas. For example, during an interview he 
talked about connecting with faculty in order to get information he needed. As he put it, 
I know a lot of people here who have different skill-sets, and been here a 
long time, and know things that I need to know. I do drive everybody nuts 
because I think nothing of calling up a faculty member; I think nothing of 
calling up a department chairman; I think nothing of calling up an 
associate dean. [I also talk] to a lot of professors every chance I get, 
whether it’s in the elevator or the cafeteria or one thing and another.  
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The president also talked about search activities involving informal and unplanned 
interactions with students. He mentioned that he would “[pick] out some random student 
over there, poor kids, and I just walk over and sit down and say, ‘Can I have lunch with 
you today?’ Yeah, just walking around, and watching email.” The president may have 
viewed these interactions as part of his role to be visible and engaged with these two 
particular populations. However, my interviews with him president suggested that his 
attention to scanning for information related to these internal constituents was more likely 
to have been due to less confidence about the leadership and the information he was 
receiving from these areas through his team. Through the president’s and other team 
members’ comments, as well as my own observations of individual behavior, I was able 
to create a third discrete subgroup, which I named “periphery.”  
My interviews and observations did not shed light on the president’s external 
scanning activity. While he regularly indicated that he had attended a variety of meetings 
or events, my interviews did not pick up on what type of information he may have 
gathered from these meetings. In team meetings, the president’s comments most 
frequently mentioned his interactions with the board of trustees, such as reports of their 
activities or announcements of membership changes. 
 
Information delivery 
While team members did not appear to engage in intentional scanning for specific 
information related to the team’s goals, as a whole they were able to provide a substantial 
amount of information to the team each week as a result of their formal interactions with 
others and through their regular, weekly routines. From the information that team 
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members searched for, they selected information to deliver that related to a wide variety 
of purposes. The team heard information related to a diverse array of topics each week, 
ranging from event announcements to goal-related information. Of all the information 
that team members delivered, certain individuals limited their delivery to operational or 
informational topics mainly related to their organizational subunits, while other team 
members focused on delivering information related to the university’s primary goals. 
Furthermore, how team members delivered this information varied. Some individuals just 
announced information, others translated information for the team, and others delivered 
information to the president outside of team meetings. 
To elaborate, each week, the team spent at least some of their meeting time 
hearing about information that was not related to their strategic goals. For example, one 
vice president admitted, “sometimes all I do is kind of an elegant form of gossip.” 
Specifically, much of the information that team members presented was operational in 
nature. Team members delivered information primarily related to the work of their 
functional units, apparently in order to educate others about their activities. But, these 
items tended to relate to basic operations as opposed to the broader goals of the 
university. For example, at a typical meeting one vice president reported that he had 
“cancelled the remaining three years on the food service contract” and another announced 
that they were “adding some information on the health site about the avian flu, with a link 
to the CDC.” Other individuals would regularly provide updates on their recent activities, 
whether they were related to strategic goals or not, deliver news items such as new hires 
or job openings, or announce upcoming events.  
My observations were supported by comments from several team members who 
also noticed these patterns. They commented that some of the information that team 
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members brought to the meeting table was not related to the university’s goals. As one 
team member shared during an interview: 
I could care less what somebody did last week in their own personal 
schedule. That’s just not--I would never endure anybody to learn what I 
did last week at a meeting, and that happens once in a while. It just sends 
me to sailing.... And I don’t like a lot of history reports. I want to know 
where we’re headed, not where we’ve been. 
 
Another team member shared a similar perspective: 
Well I think that some of them still tend to think in silos, in terms of, ‘I see 
my role very narrowly.’ And I think [two particular team members] would 
fit into those categories. They see their little scope as being “what I do 
here,” and so they’re sort of confused about how do we go to the next step. 
 
These two individuals, both members of the core subgroup seemed to indicate that their 
colleagues needed to shift their focus to the university’s goals and provide forward-
looking contributions that would inform strategy. These distinctions among the type of 
information that individuals delivered reinforced differences among the team’s subgroups 
(see Table 2). Some subgroups generally behaved as university citizens whose attention 
was focused on organizational information and goals, while the periphery primarily 
focused on information and activities that emphasized their own divisions. 
 
Table 2. Leadership team subgroup citizenship 













University University University Divisional 
 
Team members’ comments about these differences often suggested that they were a 
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source of conflict: 
Well I think that some of them still tend to think in silos, in terms of, ‘I see 
my role very narrowly.’ And I think [the two peripheral members] would 
fit into those categories. They see their little scope as being ‘what I do 
here,’ and so they’re sort of confused about how do we go to the next step. 
 
Those individuals with more of an organizational or university-wide, rather than a “silo” 
or divisional, mentality were more likely to present information related to organizational 
goals, rather than divisional information.  
In my interviews with team members and my observations of their weekly 
meetings, I noticed that the structure of meetings seemed to reinforce this pattern of 
people presenting any information, even if it was not directed at organizational goals. 
When I asked team members about a hypothetical “rulebook” for the team, one team 
member replied that one rule he was sure would be included would be that individuals 
should always have something to say: 
Always have something to report on, even if you have to make it up. Don’t 
ever say, ‘I pass,’ which some do . . . I think you just don’t notice those 
who pass get kind of a raised eyebrow from the president…. 
  
An important dimension of information delivery is boundary spanners’ ability to 
translate information for the team. This means that team members should facilitate the 
use of information by interpreting information rather than merely passing information on 
in the form in which they received it. During team meetings, I observed several instances 
in which team members delivered and then translated information related to team goals. 
For example, one core subgroup member shared that he had gathered some benchmarking 
information and proceeded to explain what the information might mean in terms an 
opportunity related to the enrollment effort: 
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My department went back and looked at how we are positioned with 
competition – for-profits [and other state universities]. All data points to 
four curriculums – health, education and business, and some technology 
training.  Those degrees are strongest and two of the four major privates 
have [local] offices. Begs the question why only two. We could offer for 
half the tuition…we could be losing students if we don’t get into this. 
We’ve got to get in the space and play.  Many started as auxiliary, but 
most have been pulled into the central academic area.  
 
In another example, a member of the external experts subgroups announced that the 
university had received a “very nice mention in [a major state newspaper] last week.  
There were references made to [a team member’s] study.” He also provided a brief 
statement regarding the implications of this information for the team, to help them 
understand why the information was important. In his words, “this kind of attention is 
helpful because these things are widely read” and therefore would help the image of the 
university. 
During the retreat, another member of the external expert subgroup helped the 
team to step back and consider their discussion of developing a new market from a 
different perspective. Instead of allowing the group to go forward, he asked them to 
consider the implications of the project with regard to the university’s resources and 
capacity: 
Do we really have sufficient resources and talent to take on a College 3? 
I’m concerned about all of the other things being taken on – 4,000 
residential students, an ACT of 18, capital construction…Should we focus 
more effort on Colleges 1 and 2? [He is expressing concern about capacity 
and human resources]. The second point is that we need to know a lot 
more about this population. We’re in a region where house prices are 
stagnant; some schools are up, some are down…is [our] enrollment too 
high a goal? 
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In another example, a core team member announced a new university partnership during 
a meeting. Rather that leaving the announcement to stand on its own, he clearly outlined 
the positive implications of the project for the university: 
What’s in it for each of us?  Increased enrollment and branding via the 
web, redundant ISP, shared services, non-competitive partnership, positive 
legislative impact, and increased grant opportunities. There are also 
benefits to [our partner organization]. There’s a lot of political visibility 
out of this. This is eons above and beyond what we were talking about 
with [two other universities]. Other benefits include a similar geographic 
footprint, where [our partner organization] is where we want students.  
Non-competitive partnership is huge.  No overlap in where revenue comes 
from. 
 
These two subgroups of the team seemed to recognize the importance of going 
beyond mere information delivery to helping the team to engage with the information in 
order to consider what the information might mean, by providing different perspectives, 
possible interpretations, and additional information. This translating activity seemed to 
serve an educational purpose. In other words, team members who translated information 
seemed to help. In contrast, I observed no examples of this behavior from other team 
members that I viewed as being on the periphery of the group. One peripheral team 
member admitted in an interview: 
When I report something, more or less, it’s more information sharing . . . 
[there is] not really a whole lot [that] needs their [the team’s] input…. The 
only person I can see can help make decision is the president…. 
 
This tendency to interpret or translate information rather than just deliver it to the team 
provided further support to my finding that distinct subgroups existed in this team. 
While a great deal of information was delivered to the team each week, I heard in 
interviews that team members did not necessarily deliver all of the information they had 
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available to them. As one core subgroup member indicated: 
I’m going to send the President about some stuff that happened today that 
I didn’t want to throw out in the meeting. But there’s two or three items 
I’d like to put back into the mix, where I had some feelings about how 
maybe we could do some stuff. But I’d like to use him as a sounding 
board, rather than just shouting it out and maybe distracting the group, 
because maybe that isn’t where he thinks it ought to go. 
 
Other team members also indicated that they withheld information that they did not 
believe was relevant for everyone to hear. One team member admitted, “I hold back on 
things that only the president, I feel, needs to know about, and I don’t want to waste 
everybody else’s time… I guess I feel like some around the table are using it as their 
update with him.” This comment reinforced what I heard in interviews and observations 
regarding those individuals more likely to deliver relevant information and to withhold 
any type of information from the team were more likely to have regular access to the 
president. These individuals also were likely to be members of the core subgroup or the 
external expert subgroup, further strengthening the differentiation among team members. 
 
Transmitting 
In addition to information management activities I looked for based on the 
conceptual framework for this study, I noticed that team members not only brought 
information into the team, but they also managed information coming out of the team by 
sharing it with a variety of audiences. In other words, they transmitted information 
between the team and its environment. 
The two main recipients of information generated by the team appeared to be their 
own staff members and the college deans. Team members delivered information such as 
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student data, budget updates, and general announcements to internal actors. For example, 
during interviews, I asked each team member what types of information from team 
meetings they shared with their staffs or anyone else. Several team members identified 
the importance of transmitting information internally, particularly to the members of their 
divisions, to keep them informed about university goals and decisions. In one instance, 
one vice president stated that he had a responsibility to his staff to keep them current 
about organization goals: 
I’ve got quarterly meetings with them. I call them all-hands meetings. It's, 
again, simple. It comes out of manufacturing. And we bring in speakers. I 
typically talk about issues, but a portion of every one of those meetings is 
dedicated to what the University’s doing, where we’re at relative to that. 
… I can tell them this is the University’s goals and objectives, but if they 
don’t think at the University level, I think we’re kind of naïve to expect 
them to instantly transform just because I gave them that in writing or 
something…. If my staff doesn’t understand at the top what the issues are, 
they’re going to not produce the results desired… I typically talk about 
issues, but a portion of every one of those meetings is dedicated to what 
the university’s doing, where we’re at relative to that. 
 
However, in some cases this information was limited, as another vice president stated that 
he only transmitted information that impacted his part of the university, and 
acknowledged that there was usually little information to share: 
Clearly, anything that has an impact on our division, I talk about. But 
where it really has an impact only on another unit I hear about this or that, 
I tend not to share. If it has any with human resources I try to remember to 
share it; although, that area does a decent job of kind of getting stuff out. 
But there’s usually not a lot, actually. 
 
In another example, during a weekly meeting, one team member reported that he had 
shared “information [about admitted student quality] with the deans” presented at the 
previous week’s meeting “and they asked if the data was correct.” 
  112  
The team members also provided information to a wide variety of constituents 
outside of the university, including legislators and politicians, community organizations, 
consultants, the media, and trustees. One team member mentioned that he listened for 
things in team meetings that he could “report, on behalf of the institution, to public 
officials.”  For example, this same individual had  
sent a pretty extensive memo last week on the hiring of [a senior 
administrator] telling them what she was going to be doing here and how 
much she was going to make, which would be a huge issue for them. 
Before that, I sent them a memo about remediation, in December, about 
the fact that we’re having to do more remediation here than we did last 
year. Just nuts and bolts about the campus. 
 
These examples suggest that team members did transmit information to actors 
outside the team, although the design of this study prohibited a clear view of all the 
information that was received by the broad array of actors with whom team members 
likely interacted. However, their activities also suggest that they were transmitting 
information for the specific political purposes of promoting and protecting the 
organization in addition to merely providing information. 
 
Actual role: Political management  
Boundary spanners serve as bridges or buffers between the team and its 
environment (Adams, 1976; Aldrich & Herker, 1977; Honig, 2004; Lynn, 2005; 
Tushman, 1977). Consistent with my conceptual framework, team members engaged in 
activities that included promoting the organization and its goals, and providing protection 
to the team and the university from environmental influences. They used information as a 
means to promote and protect by serving as members of committees, managing the 
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university’s image, obtaining resources, developing relationships with non-team actors, 
and advocating for the university. However, the team appeared to focus almost solely on 
external constituents, rather than managing politics within the university. 
I heard in interviews and observations that team members did provide regular 
representation of the team, sometimes in leadership roles, to a variety of ad hoc 
university committees, most notably on topics such as strategic planning, e-learning, a 
management consulting project, the provost search, and retention. These committee 
assignments may indicate where the president wanted his voice and ears present. 
Additionally, in my interviews, team members spoke about activities that suggested that 
they provided representation to specific constituency groups such as their divisions, the 
academic deans, and the faculty senate. However, little was said about regular 
representation to the general student population.  
Certain team members also provided representation to legislators and political 
candidates, the media, business and community organizations, funding organizations, 
consultants, unions, higher education organizations, alumni and donors, governing bodies 
(i.e., trustees and regents), and service providers. The president provided substantial 
representation himself, mostly to external constituents such as governing boards and 
higher education groups, but also to internal constituents in areas in which he did not feel 
as well connected through the team.  
I heard in interviews and observed in meetings that all of the team members 
engaged in representation, although some to a greater extent than others. This 
differentiation was often linked to their roles. In other words, their representation 
activities reflected their formal job responsibilities. For example, there was significant 
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external representation activity from members of the external experts subgroup. 
However, my observations of the team’s activities suggested that there was a particular 
emphasis by team members providing representation to individuals and organizations 
outside of the university. My observations and interviews indicated that team members’ 
efforts to promote and protect the organizational goals within the university were not as 
prevalent. This may have been a result of the team’s structure, in which over one-third of 
the team’s roles were almost completely dedicated to the external environment. But the 
prevalence of activity focused outside of the organization may also be explained by my 
interpretation that the so-called peripheral members of this team were those who 
connected the team to the two primarily internal constituencies of students and faculty. 
 
Promoting 
 Promoting, or advocating for, the organization was a large part of team members’ 
representation activity, particularly to external actors. As the president noted, under 
previous administrations: 
the place was totally turned in on itself, and nobody knew it was here. And 
people would take cheap shots at it in the press and one thing and another. 
Had to put a stop to that. Had to turn the focus outward instead of inward. 
It’s the most inward-looking institution I’ve ever seen, and it didn’t 
partner up with anybody much, and nobody knew it was here. 
 
I heard throughout my interviews with team members and I also observed in their 
meetings that individuals helped to promote the university to a broad group of external 
audiences, including politicians, alumni, donors, prospective students, potential partners, 
and consultants. Sometimes, this advocacy was a means to secure resources, other times 
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it served to present a positive image of the university. Government officials were a 
frequent audience for team members’ promotional efforts. For example, one team 
member described his efforts to secure resources for the university by promoting it to 
legislators: 
We have five projects that last year we tried to get funded, earmarks in the 
federal budget. So I work with members of the Congress and the two U.S. 
Senators ... to try to get money for [the university] in that regard…. We 
tried to match up what the President considers to be the University’s 
priorities, with who we think in Congress has the most clout to get the 
money for us. 
 
Legislative promotion was not always directly related to financial resources. In 
some instances, it was also a means to increase legitimacy for the university. For 
example, one team member shared a significant university publication that highlighted 
new initiatives and significant accomplishments. “[I gave a copy of the university 
magazine] to each legislator. I sent a note that we use this extensively in fundraising so 
that they don’t think we spend too much on money on publications.” During an interview 
he added,  “There’s some really interesting things going on here that I try to feed a steady 
stream of to the governor and the lieutenant governor and the state budget director and 
the legislative leaders” in order to help them understand the university’s activities. 
Another team member recounted an informal meeting with the city mayor as an 
opportunity to promote the enrollment goals of the university: 
I talked with [the mayor] about under-prepared students. He’s really high 
on community colleges and he believes that there are some students who 
are appropriate for community college. I’m concerned about steering high 
school students who are talented enough for four year. He asked me to 
send him some information. Of course, then [I talked to him about] the 
good things about [the university]. 
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The local media also served as a means for the university to promote itself. As 
one vice president stated during his interview, the media was important because: 
[W]e’re a public university. That means that the legislature is hugely 
important to us, at a time the legislature really doesn’t hear about higher 
ed, and the only way you communicate to the legislature is through the 
newspapers. The second is we’re the public’s university and so that is, 
again, how you communicate to the public. Also realizing that the radio 
and TV stations don’t do anything independently in this town. 
 
I observed during team meetings that the media was a significant mechanism for 
promoting the organization and that team members were often concerned with how the 
university was portrayed in local and state newspapers. As one team member stated, “I 
spend most of my time in personally dealing with media in helping create and promote 
messages.” However, my interviews suggested that many team members were attentive 
to the role that the media played in impacting their organization. 
On several occasions, the team as a whole spent time discussing and editing 
information that would be released to the press, including an “image ad” in the words of 
one team member, and the wording of a press release about a significant personnel hire. 
Almost every issue included some discussion about how to present it to the media or how 
it would be received by the press. For example, when the team was discussing a 
particular partnership, one individual reminded them that they would “want to make sure 
there are things that a reporter can write, decrease costs, increase access, protect networks 
and that inviting the “governor also guarantees you a reporter,” as an external expert 
member stated. The media seemed to impact every organizational goal. In addition to 
image and partnerships, the team even understood the media’s role as a mechanism for 
their enrollment strategy. As one team member told the team, “we’re going to be on radio 
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in places we’ve never been before; seems to be the best way to get to younger people; see 
if we can work with auxiliary services to see where it’s being heard.”  
Another group of actors on whom team members focused promotional efforts 
were alumni, donors, and foundations from which the university could acquire resources. 
One vice president explained this focus: 
What that means is money resources, as well as other types but, basically, 
financial resources. “Connections” [means] hitting on the alumni function 
to connect and re-connect the alumni with each other and with the 
institution. And then image is self-explanatory, but it basically is internal 
image as well as external image. It’s across all different sorts of audiences. 
 
Despite the importance of creating a positive image and the importance of financial 
resources for public institutions in particular, only a few team members were involved in 
these activities to “[develop] relationships that lead to resources, connections and image,” 
in the words of one team member. However, some team members were intentional about 
getting others involved in promotional efforts. 
In addition to using information to promote the university and its goals, team 
members also worked with other actors to assist them in these efforts. While they would 
often serve as direct advocates, they would also work with or through others to promote 
the university’s goals. For example, one team member frequently reported facilitating 
visits for students, board members, deans, or team members to meet legislators. As he 
described during one meeting: “I’m working with [the student government president] on 
a trip to [the state capital] with some of her colleagues in student government…I’ll help 
them get some appointments.” On another occasion, the same team member shared that 
during a recent trip: 
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[A dean] learned really quickly that if you’re talking to a Democrat, you 
don’t talk about the governor’s plan. It was great to have him [in the state 
capital]. He did a great job of explaining what’s going on in his college. 
The deans are great representatives.  
 
For some team members, promoting the organization meant that they coordinated 
efforts “behind the scenes” so that the university was sending a consistent and positive 
message to all of its constituents. During an interview, one team member stated that he 
spent “time writing speeches for the president, and trying to make sure that the word 
getting out that he’s saying the same thing we’re kind of conveying in print and kind of 
conveying on the website.” For example, he said that part of his job is “to make 
[university departments] sure that their pieces look good and are saying things in 
consonance with what the university’s trying to say, the key messages… It’s like we just 
want to make sure we’re all singing off the same page.”  
Further highlighting the importance of their roles in promoting the organization as 
a part of their work on the team, I observed team members frequently discussing their 
representation activities during meetings. For example, at one meeting the team talked 
about ideas for how to put a university publication to better use by sharing it more 
broadly. One team member suggested,  
Once you have these done this way, it’s easy to put a section into a smaller 
publication with a letter from the president to appropriate people. It calls it 
to their attention. You’ve got the raw material. There’s probably 150-200 
people that this ought to be going to and stimulating theory thinking.  
 
At another meeting, a team member suggested parking “the mobile van near [a 
competitor]. I’m just thinking about visibility. How aggressively are we using that? Just 
thinking about ways to gain exposure.” 
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Throughout my interviews with team members and my observations of their 
meeting, I did not collect much evidence to suggest that the team spent a great deal time 
promoting the university to its governing board. For the most part, team members did not 
serve as links to the board, but rather this responsibility seemed to rest with the 
university’s legal counsel and the president. Only one other vice president, a member of 
the core subgroup, seemed to have regular opportunities to interact with the board, 
primarily related to the university budget to infrastructure issues. The president described 
one such instance: 
[A team member] was able to do quick presentation of [the] student union 
building. I think it was very well received. My feeling is that they were 
starting to come to a point of view that this building has got to go. When 
[he] showed them how to pay for it they felt better too. 
 
Again, perhaps reflecting the importance of external audiences to the university’s primary 
goals, my observations and interviews suggested that team members served a less 
extensive promotional role within the university than they did outside the university. 
When internal promotion occurred, it appeared to be limited to individual team members’ 
divisions. As one team member described:  
[Internal promotion is] especially critical within my division because I’m 
the connection with the vision for the University. And it is my 
responsibility to assure that we’re all working in concert and so that staff 
understand that they have individually and collectively a very, very, very 
important role in moving the institution forward. 
 
Another vice president echoed this idea of being responsible for promoting goals within 
the university, stating that “[team members] understand what the university’s doing and 
trying to accomplish its strategies and directions. We have to also identify opportunities 
for those others, in the organization, that they might not see themselves. So it's a shared 
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responsibility.”  
As I had noticed in other areas, certain team members were more intentional 
about engaging in promotional activities. For example, in relation to the enrollment and 
retention goal, an expert subgroup team member reported that a committee that he 
chaired would “discuss [mandatory advising for first-year students] at our meeting on 
Wednesday. That is something that should be instituted and maintained, that we have 
sufficient staff to be able to do that.” A core subgroup team member who had been 
assigned responsibility for an e-learning initiative reported that he would “work to get 
these [two proposal] documents aligned and then organize a meeting of all the people 
who have a vested interest. Yet another team member volunteered to take on a program 
because  
Under [another vice president] it was clear it was frustrating the president. 
It was clear that he wasn’t getting the type of ownership of the issue . . . 
that he had spent quite a bit of time expressing his displeasure over the 
fact that no one seemed to own it…and I thought, ‘Wow, I just have to 
step forward here.’ And so I told him … ‘Listen, why don’t you let me 
take [the project]?’ He looked at me and said, ‘Are you sure?’ I said, 
‘Well, no one else is stepping up.’ 
 
This pattern of differentiation provided additional evidence that I could continue to 
understand the team as being comprised of distinct subgroups. These subgroups were 
based not only on the role expectations I heard from team members, but also on actual 
boundary-spanning behaviors that I observed during meetings and heard about during 
interviews (see Table 3). 
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Table 3. Leadership team subgroups’ behaviors 
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Promotion and protection 
While promotion seemed to be the primary political management activity in this 
case, the members of this team did engage in some protective activities as well. Like their 
promotion activities, efforts at protection were more frequently directed towards the 
external, rather than the internal, environment of the university. My observations of team 
meetings and my interviews with individuals suggested that, at times, promotion and 
protection were simultaneous activities. 
I noticed several instances when team members had to both share information that 
promoted the university while protecting the team from certain external actors. In other 
words, these activities were not always discrete. For example, on one occasion the team 
decided to withhold information in the short term, with the intention that the same 
information would provide better promotion in the long-term if it were released at a later 
date. Based on the team’s recommendation, the president decided that the university 
should “sign the MOU [memorandum of understanding] on Tuesday and keep our 
mouths shut [internally]…[inform] my and their direct reports next week. Hold off on a 
general announcement [for a press conference in a few weeks]. In this example, the 
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president did not want to delay the start of a partnership, but given the logistics of a joint 
press conference, wanted to delay announcing the venture so that legislators and the 
media present would attend the event. 
The team’s concern with their image in the media seemed an area in which 
promotion and protection were simultaneously important. In one instance, an individual 
team member stated that he was often faced with trying to be “a resource to some of the 
media, sometimes keeping them at a distance, other times passing along information.” 
This example suggests that this team member managed a particularly complex 
relationship with the media that required a balance between both promoting and 
protecting. 
While these examples reflect the emphasis on the environment outside of the 
university, on one occasion the need to engage in both promotion and protection was 
evident with respect to the internal environment as well. When a team member informed 
his colleagues that there had been a request from the college deans to see a marketing 
consultant’s report, his recommendation was to withhold the information in order to 
protect it, but to invite them to the consultant’s presentation. However, the president re-
framed the situation as an opportunity to promote the team’s goals, while protecting 
certain information. The eventual decision, after a lengthy discussion, was to both 
promote the deans’ involvement by giving “[a limited section of the report] to 
them…with all kinds of [confidentiality] stamps on it” (President) in order to gain their 
confidence and help them to feel included in the process. In this instance, the team was 
able to both protect sensitive information while promoting the deans’ involvement in the 
enrollment goal by sharing some information. 
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In other cases, individuals also worked to protect the image of the university 
through promotion activities. For example, one team member suggested that “from a 
protocol standpoint, it might be good for you to get [a copy of a manuscript] in the hands 
of the chancellor. They’ll probably see it anyway.” In this case, sharing the document 
would help to promote the ideas in it to specific people as well as protect the university 
from criticism if the manuscript were to have been received indirectly. In another case, 
the same team member used the same dualistic tactic. He informed the team that he had 
given “[a copy of the university magazine] to each legislator. I sent a note that we use this 
extensively in fundraising so that they don’t think we spend too much on money on 
publications.” His actions suggest that he was both promoting the work of the university 
by sharing the publication, while protecting it from criticism of over-spending from an 
important constituency. 
These examples reflect how the team was trying to both promote its ideas to 
important actors, while simultaneously protecting themselves against criticism. These 
activities were not always distinct. As with much of this team’s other boundary spanning, 
these two activities tended to overlap when the external environment was the focus of 
their attention, particularly the media and state legislators. 
 
Conclusion 
The members of this presidential leadership team did fulfill some information and 
political management functions. However, their roles involved little intentional 
preparation for meetings – a form of search.  Team members did present a wide variety of  
information to the team at each meeting and engaged in some interpretation to help team 
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members engage with that information. They relied primarily on team meetings as 
opportunities to seek information from one another, rather than to guide their daily 
activities in support of the university’s goals. Furthermore, the team fulfilled a multi-
purpose representation function that emphasized promotion and protection, especially 
towards the external environment. However, the literature on boundary spanning suggests 
that many team members could have been doing more to use their capacity to address the 
organization’s goals, particularly by maintaining a focus on their strategic goals.  
Of particular interest in considering the boundary-spanning behavior of these 
team members is that certain individuals consistently engaged in what most of the 
existing literature suggests they should in terms of information management and political 
management. These individuals seemed to engage in a wider range of boundary-spanning 
activities and to focus on relevant, goal-related information. These findings suggest that 
there was a clear distinction among several subgroups in this team based both on the 
president’s expectations and individuals’ actions. 
Boundary-spanning efforts are intended to improve decision making, particularly 
related to team goals. Therefore, in order to better understand their efforts, it is important 
to explore whether the team created opportunities to debate and discuss information in 
support of decision making. In the next chapter, I discuss the extent to which team 
members’ activities resulted in opportunities to use information, as well as their success 
with achieving political management outcomes. 
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CHAPTER 6: TEAM OUTCOMES – UNFINISHED BRIDGES 
Effective presidential teams act in ways that allow problems or issues to be examined 
from multiple points of view and along more than one value dimension 
(Bensimon & Neumann, 1993, p. 42). 
 
According to my argument in Chapter 3, boundary spanners can help presidents to 
manage both information and politics in order to help teams to progress towards their 
goals. Theories of group effectiveness suggest that opportunities for the team to debate 
and discuss information can improve decision making. Boundary spanning can also help 
teams to acquire resources and political legitimacy and to improve organizational 
visibility. This chapter draws on my observations of team meetings to examine how well 
the presidential leadership team I studied accomplished these two goals of boundary-
spanning teams. I found that the team achieved few information management outcomes 
but had moderate success in achieving political outcomes, particularly relation to the 
university’s external environment. 
 
Information use 
The literature on leadership teams suggests that their promise lies in their ability 
not only to access information, but also to use that information. Examining how this team 
used information in its meetings, I found that while team members delivered a great deal 
of information each week, not all of the information was discussed and only a small 
fraction was actually used in decision making. In my observations of weekly team 
meetings, I noticed that team members did not regularly engage in discussion of, and 
never debated, the information that individuals delivered. This suggests that this was not 
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a real team, as defined by Bensimon and Neumann (1993), because they did not engage 
in cognitive activities, but rather served a utilitarian function. Most decisions were made 
by the president rather than by the team as a whole. Also, most discussion and decisions 
generated in the meeting were operational, rather than strategic, in nature. When team 
members did deliberate, discussions were sometimes goal related, but other issues 
engaged the team’s time as well.  
 
Information used 
As noted in Chapter 5, team members brought a great deal of information to 
weekly meetings. However, only a small part of that information generated discussion or 
decisions. Information that was in fact used in team meetings typically followed one of 
two routes.  
One route was when a team member explicitly invited others to participate in a 
discussion through linguistic prompts by asking for feedback, approval, or assistance on 
issues. Some of these intentional requests for feedback were directly related to the team’s 
primary goals. For example, one team member leading the management consulting 
project looked to the team for thoughts about how to start the process. He explained, “We 
were thinking about how we should launch – major kickoff, quietly start subgroups, or 
have a major meeting after some initial findings.  We’re leaning towards the latter.” He 
then asked for the team’s input. The same team member was also charged with the 
reorganization of the enrollment function and shortly thereafter presented a plan to the 
team. “We realized the collective wisdom of this group.  [The vice provost for 
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enrollment] is going to present to you a reorganization for enrollment and get your 
feedback.”  
At other times, team members used the meeting as an opportunity to ask for input 
on issues not related to the organization’s primary goals. For example, when one team 
member wanted to send a $1.5 million request for computer hardware to the university’s 
board, he asked the whole team to approve this request after presenting his rationale. In 
another example, a team member raised a question about FERPA1 that drew on the legal 
and technology expertise of certain team members.  
However, team members also prompted discussion on less complex topics. For 
example, the team discussed what to do about memorial fund for a board member, a 
potential location for a new boardroom, and who to nominate for a regional leadership 
program. While most of these questions were not related to the team’s primary goals, the 
team meeting was likely a convenient and expedient forum for raising these issues as they 
drew on the knowledge and experience of multiple team members. 
The second route to discussion was when the information presented relied on the 
input of a single team member. For example, one team member asked how to replace 
computers in a particular department: 
We’re doing our computer rollovers and we need to replace nine in the lab 
for athletics and that reports directly to you, sir.  We need some money for 
that; it doesn’t qualify for tech fees because it doesn’t serve all students. 
 
                                                 
1 The Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act (FERPA) (20 U.S.C. § 1232g; 34 CFR 
Part 99) is a Federal law that protects the privacy of student education records ("Family 
Educational Rights and Privacy Act (FERPA)," 2007). 
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Similarly, another team member asked about the specifics of the refreshment policy: 
TM1: One thing – the refreshment policy.  We are asking people to 
itemize receipt at restaurant.  Do we need that? 
TM2:   Yes. 
TM1:  To what extent do we need to enforce that? 
TM2:  You’ve got to have enough to prove how much and if there was 
alcohol, what business purpose was and who went.  So must have 
the receipt for potential audit.  The form has a block for it if you 
don’t. 
TM1:  What would you suggest?   
TM2:  It’s really the fiscal officers that need to control this and we told 
them at the last meeting in October. 
 
These examples neither addressed the team’s primary goals nor required the entire team 
to generate an answer, thereby using the team’s time in less efficient ways. These 
questions were almost always asked by members of the peripheral group, suggesting that 
they may have not have had or created other opportunities to address these questions to 
their colleagues on an individual basis outside of team meetings. 
I also observed that discussions occurred when a topic had what one individual 
referred to as “traction,” in other words when a topic generated interest among some team 
members. In contrast to the information that was not used at all, most of the information 
delivered to the team that generated discussion without the need for questions or requests 
was related to one of the four strategic goals or to ongoing systemic or environmental 
issues. However, when discussions did occur around these topics, participation was 
generally limited to conversations with the president and one or two other team members. 
This pattern was further enhanced by my observation that those who participated were 
part of the core or expert subgroups within the team. 
The team did use information related to some, but not all, primary goal areas. 
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Team members rarely discussed information related to the campus infrastructure or 
partnership goals. However, the goal of increasing enrollment was highlighted or 
mentioned more than any other topic as indicated by its regular appearance on the team’s 
weekly “agenda.” Over the course of nine months, the team discussed potential 
organizational problems behind both undergraduate and graduate recruiting, opportunities 
to market summer programs, potential student populations, the quality of admitted 
students, admissions standards, advising processes, midterm grades, available funding, 
and consulting projects—all connected to the larger goal of increasing enrollment. 
Furthermore, enrollment was the focus of two of three topics at the team retreat during 
this case. This consistent pattern throughout the case lends some support to the 
president’s assumption that “everybody knows what the agenda is anyway…because it’s 
enrollment…just in case anybody missed it.” Notably, the team engaged in more 
discussions about enrollment more frequently after the president had shifted 
responsibility for that unit from a member of the periphery to a member of the core 
subgroup. 
While the team engaged in several discussions that generated ideas about how to 
best represent the university to the press, the university’s overall image was rarely a topic 
of discussion. Throughout my observations, I identified very few instances when team 
members discussed how to improve the university’s image or current initiatives designed 
to accomplish this goal. In one example, a team member generated some discussion on 
this topic when he noted that he had been in a meeting about “why public higher 
education doesn’t have more support from public officials [at which] a long list of ways 
we’ve screwed up [was presented]…. I need you to help me think through a strategy.” 
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More frequently, when team members mentioned anything about the university’s image, 
it was generally limited to a comment about an external actors’ lack of recognition for the 
university, but was not followed by any discussion about how to address the issue. 
In addition to goal-related topics, I noticed that team members frequently 
discussed threats and opportunities, particularly with regard to state government and the 
university’s human resources. Throughout the case, members of the team discussed 
several pieces of legislation that would adversely impact the university, budget cuts, and 
legislators’ perceptions of higher education. For example, at one meeting a team member 
announced that he had learned about a piece of upcoming legislation that would 
negatively affect the university: 
[The bill] is saying that each public university ought to redirect 
funding…15% to support the promising area of your doctoral program.  
We are very small players compared to [other state universities].  It’s also 
open to independents and privates…. Problem for us is that you have to 
move money from one program to another. We have so few, moving from 
one to another at the doctoral level means moving colleges. Moving 
money might affect accreditation. Several provosts are talking about 
taking away from education. That’s why the coordination has to be done.  
House bill did not say you have to participate, but the spirit is that 
everyone participates. 
 
This announcement kicked off a discussion about the philosophical issues with the bill, 
how it would impact the university, and how to avoid participation.  
 Similarly, human resources also occupied the team’s time as they discussed the 
reasons for employee departures, strategies for intervening in the loss of talent, or 
impending retirements. For example, a vice president shared: 
At the strategic planning session we went to, one of the issues was the 
number of people retiring in the next few years because of the baby 
boomer bubble. There was a question about what we were doing to 
prepare our departments to not lose institutional history and issues of 
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succession, but our policies go against succession. The other issues – I’ve 
shared this with the president already – but I’ve got a printout for each of 
the VPs. It’s illegal to ask if someone is retiring, but you can probably 
figure out. Theoretically one-third of our workforce turning over. A lot of 
senior positions. The piece in the strategic plan that this is something we 
need to address is real. 
 
These examples highlight that, perhaps as much as the university’s goals, concerns with 
the legislature and human resources captured team members’ attention and generated 
discussion. 
Perhaps because much of the information team members presented was not used 
or because discussions occurred around particular topics, I noticed in my observations 
that only a small segment of the team regularly engaged in discussion. One vice president 
shared his view of this limited participation: 
I don’t think [the president] opens up a topic for discussion that he doesn’t 
know that one of us is going to take it someplace, and it’s generally going 
to be [a particular vice president or myself], I guess, who’s going to jump 
on the ball and go someplace with it. 
 
Members of the core and external experts subgroups would nearly always contribute 
ideas or opinions to discussions, regardless of the topic, while peripheral and task 
specialists would usually contribute only when the issue was related to their area of 
responsibility. As one core team member said: 
I think I’m willing to offer an observation or an insight without really 
maybe having a special knowledge-base, and can ask questions and have 
asked questions about: “Well, wait a minute. What’s the impact of that 
once we start to talk about it outside of the affected area? Is there a public 
relations opportunity or down-side--problem if we were to go one way or 
the other?” And I think those are my--I do try to contribute those. And I 
think, in general, I’m--of the things that--especially the ones that I’m a 
little more familiar with--I think everybody speaks from their comfort 
zone, typically. But I’d like to think that I bring some sense of critical 
thinking into some of the things.  
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My observations confirmed that the core and external expert subgroups were more likely 
to participate in nearly any topic presented at team meetings, but that the peripheral group 
in particular had notably limited participation in discussions and decisions about 
organizational issues.  
 
Information not used 
I observed during the team’s weekly meetings that team members presented a 
wide variety of information. While some of this information was discussed and some 
smaller portion used in decision making, much of that information went unused, meaning 
that the team did not engage in discussion or debate about it. In some cases, the team 
forum was an opportune time to share important information with everyone it affected, 
without a need for discussion. Sometimes information did not impact other team 
members or the team’s goals and therefore did not generate discussion. Finally, some 
information was related to the team’s primary goals, but the team still did not use that 
information for discussion or decisions. I also observed which team members were most 
likely to present information or engage in discussion. 
First, unused information about general organizational operations may have been 
important to share in the team environment because of its potential impact on individual 
team members and their staffs. Some of the information that individuals presented to the 
team each week was likely not intended to generate discussion, such as announcements 
about university-wide computer hardware or software upgrades, budget updates, and 
human resource policy and benefits changes. In addition to these broad-based 
announcements, other information pertained directly to individuals on the team, such as 
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reminders about upcoming board meeting and announcements of major event at which 
team members were expected to be present. While this type of information could have 
been discussed, the information that team members delivered implied that decisions had 
already been made. 
A second type of unused information was announcements that did not appear to 
affect team members, their units, or the team’s overall goals. This information typically 
included personnel departures or changes, notices or reviews of departmental programs, 
and other minor issues, but its relevance seemed to be limited to the presenter’s division. 
For example, at one meeting a vice president shared the following statement: 
Mural is in the lobby tonight. Hispanic Awareness Week is next week. 
We’ll work around the time conflict [with another event]. It’s not 
attracting the same people. [A member of the division] is going to be out 
for a month…we’re just juggling to cover. 
 
Another vice president shared that his office was “sending out Happy Thanksgiving cards 
to donors at certain level. It’s a good time of year to say ‘thank you.’ It’s not in place of a 
December card, but it’s meant to complement.” At another meeting, a team member 
informed the team that his division was “trying to revise our schedule to catch the March 
[board] meeting for tenure decisions. It’s not going to be easy, but we’ll handle it.” While 
this type of information could have been discussed, those who delivered the information 
did not indicate that they needed, and other team members did not initiate, discussion.  
Some portion of unused information was related to the team’s primary goals. This 
included items such as updates on enrollment numbers, potential partnerships, 
construction, and mentions of the university in the local media. Most noticeably, the team 
rarely used information related to two of its primary goals – improving the university’s 
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physical infrastructure and developing partnerships – in any substantial way during its 
meetings. Nearly all of the instances of the physical infrastructure being mentioned in 
team meetings consisted of the vice president responsible for that area—a member of the 
core subgroup—delivering updates. For example, at one meeting he informed the team 
that the board had approved “the document for the parking garage. They will go 
concurrently and be done [next summer]. It’s all a shell game to come under budget with 
two projects opening at the same time.” At another meeting, he shared that he had already 
taken action on items: 
We sent out the letter for the board resolution. We did get a report back 
about the science center site search. Consultants have come up with [an 
existing building] as the prime site for [the project]. That’s going to the 
board…. We also selected a development consultant, per the board’s 
request. 
 
In another example, his announcement clearly would impact a broad range of people, but 
did not include a discussion: 
We’ve asked units [such as student life and enrollment] to cut back [on 
space use].  Our goal is to get enrollment back out [into a more visible 
location]. We think that all of student life needs to be in the student center, 
not bifurcated. We’ve asked people to cooperate, and we understand the 
need for expansion for some offices. We’ve got one month to go to 
complete the design if we’re going to meet the goal of having it done in 
[next summer]. I didn’t go below the level of vice provost on this one – 
you guys work it out.  Eventually the buck stops at the president’ office.  
Right now, I’m the bad guy, but….  One of the memos I sent out said “the 
president’ says . . ..” 
 
This core team member seemed to manage building projects, city relations, and property 
acquisition without any input from the team.  
Similarly, the team often heard from members of the external experts subgroup 
about the status of various partnerships, another primary goal for the university. For 
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example, one of these team members announced that he had been talking with a potential 
partner: 
I spent some time with [a foundation’ who is going to handle [our area]. 
I’ve given [their representative] all of the information…. She’s going to be 
here two to three days a week for quite some time. They’ve got over $1 
million in the district that has not been spent. We’re dealing with issues of 
how to run the program [and the] transition to a new CEO…. 
 
At another meeting, the same team member shared information about a different project 
that also went unused: 
I’m slogging through a lot of details of [a partnership]. I’ve been working 
with [an individual] on how much money we need to do [the project]. I 
haven’t been able to get some of the things we need. Things are slowly 
falling in to place, but it’s just a lot of meetings. 
 
On yet another project, another vice president shared that “[a corporation] had 
approached [the university] about how they could support economic development here. 
We’re helping them out with their relationship with [another organization] so the quid 
pro quo is coming back.” This pattern of unused information related to these two 
organizational goals suggests that discussions and decisions about improving the 
university’s infrastructure and developing partnerships occurred outside of the team’s 
meeting. A comment by one team member lent support to my observation: 
I don’t think the important issues that the University takes on really come 
through that group. As I said, there’s not a discussion about an issue at 
those meetings. It’s more a matter of what you’re doing, and so I don’t 
think that’s a group that has all that much to say about what the priorities 
of the institution are or the directions that the institution’s going. 
 
These patterns and statements reflect the team’s perceptions that the meetings were for 
the benefit of keeping the president informed. 
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Nearly every team member contributed some information that was not discussed. 
When reflecting on a current meeting during an interview session, one team member 
summarized this as, “if I say I’ve got seven things, that means I don’t expect traction on 
these issues. This is just what I’m up and doing.” However, in my observations I 
discerned certain patterns to this behavior. In particular, members of the peripheral 
subgroup were more likely to deliver information related to only to their divisions. 
Members of the core and task specialist subgroups were more likely to deliver 
information that pertained to most team members or the university as a whole. Finally, 




In order to understand how team members contributed to decisions, I documented 
decisions made when the team met (see Table 4). I limited my view to decisions made 
during meetings because I could observe both the decision-making process and which 
participants contributed. I observed which decisions were strategic, rather than 
operational, and related to the four key goals, as well as which generated discussion. 
One of the first characteristics I noticed was that the president made the 
overwhelming majority of these decisions. This observation corresponded with the 
president’s view that decision making was not a part of this team’s role: 
I don’t really rely on them so much for decisions as I do for advice about 
how we ought to be doing things here. And I expect them to say, “You 
know, if I were you, Mr. President, I would do thus-and-such,” or, “I’ve 
decided to do thus-and-such. Does that check out okay with you’? 
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Table 4. Decisions in leadership team meetings 
Meeting Decision Strategic Discussion 
Vice president receives approval from team to go to board with 
proposal for computer program funding 
No Yes 
1 
Agreement that team members will decide who needs access to 
certain institutional information 
No No 




President decided that the university should pursue a fund or 
memorial for a deceased board member 
No Yes 
Decision to delay public and internal announcement of a new 




Decision to go ahead with an economic development project Yes No 
President affirmed that he wants to pursue a personnel opportunity No Yes 
President affirmed decision to consider moving the board room  No Yes 
4 
President decided that the team should have a focused discussion 
about nonacademic program review 
No No 
President decided that provost should pursue fellowship funding 
opportunity 
No Yes 
President decided that a team member can assume another team 
member’s responsibilities for a computer lab  
No Yes 




President decided that the university needs to benchmark summer 
programming  
No Yes 
President decided that a discussion about student quality needs to 
occur in conjunction with the enrollment office 
No No 
President decided on type of correspondence for a university 
publication  
No No 
President decided what slide show to present for a regent No No 
6 
President decided that a faculty member could not have a leave 
without pay 
No No 
President agrees with legal counsel that public affairs remain silent 
about a case  
No No 
7 
President states that provost can explore marketing out-of-state career 
opportunities to prospective students 
No Yes 
8 President made a variety of decisions regarding press release edits No Yes 
9 
President decided that a partnership agreement event needed to be 
rescheduled 
No No 
10 President decided that a VP should put out an RFP for a consultant  No Yes 




President decided that another institution cannot have an event banner 
on campus  
No No 




President announced decision about leadership of a consulting project No No 
13 
Team assisted a VP in a decision about an alert message regarding 
recent vandalism 
No Yes 
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14 
Vice president decided to give an external group free access after 
team members stated that it would not be problematic 
No No 
15 
President decided to give deans an abridged copy of a consultant’s 
report  
No Yes 
President decided that students can not waive an introductory course, 




President decided that a vice president could explore a joint program 
partnership  
No Yes 
17 No decisions n/a n/a 
Team made decisions about who to include in consulting subgroups Yes Yes 
President decided to alter reporting lines of an employee from a vice 
provost to a vice president 
No Yes 
President decided that he and a team member should visit the county 
commissioner about legislation  
No No 
18 




President decided that a team member should call the mayor’s office 
regarding a group’s planned protest 
No Yes 
20 




Team decided to send a president’s letter and a dean’s letter to 
admitted students 
Yes Yes 
President decided to address advising with the deans  No Yes 
22 President decided that classroom allocation would revert to the 
registrar 
No No 
21 President decided that common hour should be eliminated No Yes 
22 No decisions n/a n/a 
23 
President decided that naming opportunities should not go to the 
board without an identified donor 
No No 
24 
President decided that he would send a letter to faculty who don’t 
submit freshmen midterm grades 
No Yes 
 
Despite my observation that decisions were made at nearly every meeting, some team 
members perceived that decisions did not happen in that forum: 
Decisions get made outside of the meeting … by people with stronger 
opinions that then go to the president and say, “Hey, how about this?” And 
then he goes and brokers that or makes that decision, as opposed to 
making those decisions at and around the table. 
 
When I asked other individuals about decision making, another team member admitted 
that this group was not necessarily involved in decisions about the university’s goals, as 
the management literature suggests senior executives would be: 
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I can’t think of anything that I would--I think the University’s had some 
great accomplishments, but I can’t think of one that you could clearly 
identify with that group, that came out of that. There’s some great things 
happening here, but they don’t really come out of that group.  
 
I also noticed that none of these decisions were planned. In other words, they 
were all based on information that was brought to the meeting, rather than on a pre-
determined issue. For example, one team member brought an issue about a course 
requirement to a team meeting: 
TM1:  I have a question about waiving the “Introduction to the 
University” course.  Who can make decisions about waiving 
this course? This is a general ed requirement. If it goes to 
petitions committee, sometimes they act on it, other times they 
kickback to Deans. Some personnel changes and catalog 
changes have made it less clear.  It is beneficial for new 
students, for freshmen. If you haven’t taken it by junior year, it 
is not helpful.  The university Petitions committee is concerned 
that some of the deans are waiving it. We really need some 
protocol or some clarity. I don’t have an issue with deans 
waiving past a certain level, but there are no guidelines.  
Clearly we’re not going to hold up graduation. 
President: We’re not? 
TM1:  Why would you hold up graduation of an honors student? 
President:  Answer is because I don’t want to. 
TM1:  OK. 
President:  Telling them that they’ll look silly taking it as a senior. 
TM2: It’s got to back to petition committee and they have to come up 
with protocol; I’d be happy to remind them. 
President:  I think that’s right – let the senate wrestle with it; waiving these 
courses should be for a really extraordinary reason. 
TM1: In the old Bulletin individual colleges MAY offer an 
orientation course. 
President: And that says colleges are departments. 
TM1:  Yes. 
President: This is a University requirement. 
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TM1:  But it’s under gen ed; they need to look at the language; I’m 
trying to get a sense of how many students over the last few 
years. 
TM2: Send it to gen ed and petition committee; we don’t know what 
they’ll say; they may say get rid of it. 
President: That would be a mistake; let’s get this to admissions and 
standards. 
 
This situation exemplifies many of the decisions that occurred at team meetings. A team 
member would raise an issue or a question, sometimes a few people might interject 
comments, and then the president made a decision. There were few occasions when team 
members had advance notice of a decision point and could search for relevant 
information. This demonstrates that the president did not use this team in ways that 
optimized their boundary-spanning activities to improve decision making.  
Furthermore, the president did not typically bring issues to the table for the 
purpose of making a decision. Decisions always stemmed from information that another 
team member brought to the table, suggesting that the team meeting was an opportunity 
for individuals to get answers rather than as a mechanism to help the president with 
decision making. For example, at one meeting a team member raised a practical issue that 
pertained only to the president: 
TM1: Other items – we signed admissions agreement with [a 
community college]. They want a ceremony – but they want to 
have it at same time as ceremony with [another university]. 
President: No, I don’t want to get lost in the shuffle.  I’ll be sick that day. 
 
Similarly, in another example, the team member only needed a response from the 
president on a practical issue: 
TM1:  ACE came here for [a project] and went away with a good 
impression.  You may remember that we were part of an ACE 
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project two years ago, and we had a task force. Will try to tie it 
in more with general education. The committee could be 
terminated, but they are asking to continue until further 
decisions are made. 
President: Why don’t you reappoint for a year. 
 
In many instances, issues like these probably did not need everyone’s input and decisions 
were often made in bi-lateral conversations. This illustrates that the president did not use 
full potential of the team to contribute information in support of decisions. 
Throughout the case, I heard about only one example that any team member could 
recall when the team had challenged the president’s thinking on an issue and changed his 
mind about a decision. This example had occurred prior to my observation of the team. 
As the president described to me on two separate occasions: 
I had gone in there pretty much thinking that that was not the moment to 
do that, that financially we were a little shaky, and it might be a little 
risky. And it would be risky because we couldn’t put much in the way of 
graduate business courses in there. And they turned me around on it, 
saying, “This is not the time to be faint of heart, sir.” And they were right. 
As it turned out, they were right. 
 
When I asked a vice president whether the team had ever challenged the president, he 
mentioned this same example that the president had mentioned: 
We were going to postpone going to the [initiative] another year, and I 
adamantly disagreed with it. And we changed it at that table. That was 
kind of neat. It was an about-face after we revisited it again. 
 
I interpreted this repeated recollection of the same example to mean that this instance was 
particularly memorable because team members rarely shared divergent viewpoints or 
influenced the president's decision. 
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Nature of discussion and decisions 
While the discussions that occurred during team meetings sometimes focused on 
issues related to some of the primary goals, these were rarely of a strategic nature. 
Decisions were also overwhelmingly procedural or routing rather than strategic .In other 
words, the team’s interactions were seldom, if ever, characterized by issues that were 
non-routine, precedent-setting, interdependent, long-range, or involving a significant 
commitment of resources (Eisenhardt & Zbaracki, 1992; Mintzberg et al., 1976). Instead 
they spent much of their weekly meeting time talking about operational issues that were 
more reflective of routine or logistical issues.  
One team member’s perceptions concurred with this observation: 
I think that last year, in the last 12 months at least, I don’t think we really 
made any monumental decisions. Mostly it was pecking away at little 
annoying things that just didn’t get resolved and still haven’t resolved, like 
the retention issue problem and how we’re going to deal with that, and we 
still haven’t resolved. I mean we’ve been discussing for more than a year 
the e-learning initiative. Put it on the shelf, brought it back off the shelf…. 
 
There were two exceptions to this pattern of operational, rather than strategic, 
decisions. Notably, these discussions were some of the few that directly related to the 
team’s strategic goals. In one example, the team discussed whom from the team and other 
parts of the university to include in campus-based subgroups for a project with a 
management consultant. The entire team had an extended discussion about the skills and 
perspectives of a variety of individuals and where their talents might best serve the 
project. The second example was the team’s discussion about the use of a president’s and 
a provost’s letter to incoming students. Again, most of the team participated in a 
discussion of a process and timeline for these letters to be sent to admitted students. What 
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I noticed about these two examples was that they both involved a discussion among most 
of team members and that I could not clearly identify the president as the decision maker. 
However, I did not observe that these decisions were based on debate or the generation of 
alternatives.  
I also observed that strategic, rather than operational, discussions occurred at the 
team’s retreat. Specifically, the team discussed the upcoming retirement boom and the 
opportunities that presented for the university, as well as the existence of thousands of 
individuals in the region with “some college, no degree” and how the university might 
meet their needs. Finally, they heard and discussed two proposals for the structure of an 
e-learning initiative.  
However, at the retreat as throughout the 24 meetings I observed, I saw no 
examples of team members engaging in debate around issues. When two different 
proposals for the e-learning initiative were presented at the retreat, there was no debate 
about the strengths and weaknesses of each. Team members only asked some clarifying 
questions and offered some opinions. My observations at the retreat and in meetings 
suggested that team members were more likely to take an incremental or refining 
approach to topics, in which their participation was characterized by asking questions or 
providing suggestions about different aspects of an issue, rather than challenging ideas. 
Team members contributed to decision making only in an advisory capacity (Bensimon 
& Neumann, 1993). This pattern may suggest that the team meeting served to legitimate 
the president’s pre-determined or pre-approved choices. In other words, while this team 
had the potential to generate alternatives, they did not take advantage of that opportunity. 
Therefore, decisions that were made were likely not as innovative or inclusive as they 
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could have been.  
 
Political management 
Boundary spanners’ political management is intended to help the team to acquire 
resources, keep the organization visible to external actors, and maintain or improve the 
university’s position of power. (Aldrich & Herker, 1977). I expected to see evidence that 
the team’s promotion and protection activities helped them to achieve at least some of 
these intended outcomes, especially in relation to their four primary goals. I relied on 
team members’ statements about their success in these areas and examples that suggested 
that team members had influenced these outcomes. Throughout observations and 
interviews, I heard that team members’ representational activities had varying levels of 
success in gaining support for some of their goals. I found that they were able to acquire 
some resources, had some success protecting their political legitimacy, and kept the 
organization visible to particular constituents. However, I observed that most of this 
progress was due to individuals’ efforts in their positions in the university rather than to 
their participation in the presidential leadership team. While team members reported on 
their political accomplishments in team meetings, I found little evidence that their 
participation on the team influenced their political activities. 
  
Resource acquisition 
Team members had difficulty acquiring various types of resources that they 
sought. Despite their efforts to promote the university and protect current resources, the 
team experienced several setbacks. In particular, efforts to attract more students were less 
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successful than the team would have hoped. These difficulties were particularly notable 
because of the prominence of the university’s goal of increasing enrollment. During a 
team meeting, one individual shared an example of this struggle: 
We tried to attend an information session at [a local manufacturing plant], 
and they said they don’t want to open to just one university…[other 
universities and colleges were there]. A bit of a surprise. We thought we 
would recruit to graduate programs, but most people there were in their 
late 50s, they were looking for job skills, not certificates or degrees. We 
were disappointed. Something we did not expect. 
 
I regularly observed less than promising news about their enrollment efforts at team 
meetings. One team member reported, “We lost 500 students this past year.” Another 
shared, “We’re 3.4% behind from last year, 4.5% behind projected…on international 
students we have more applications and admissions, but we’re a little short on 
enrollments.” This situation was not helped by losses in their professional staff in the 
enrollment area. One team member described the difficulty he faced in trying to protect 
the university from these losses: “It’s a hard time of year… [a local community college] 
is raiding her staff.”  
I also observed that the team had varying success with its efforts to acquire 
financial resources. As a public institution, the university was at least partially dependent 
on the state for funding, making these efforts particularly valuable. During observations, I 
often heard how the state’s actions adversely impacted the university’s financial 
resources. “The legislature did some bad things to us. Less money after three go-
arounds…they just sent us an email telling us to lop off another $1.5 million.” This 
struggle seemed to be an ongoing issue, despite team members’ efforts to promote the 
university’s needs to legislators: 
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I’d like to have done better in the capital budget. Last year the state capital 
budget, we had some money we tried to get in there and couldn’t pull it 
off, but nobody else got any either so I didn’t feel quite so bad about it. 
But it would have been helpful to me and to the institution to have been 
able to produce some funding when nobody else got any. Couldn’t do it. 
 
However, team members were not entirely unsuccessful at acquiring resources to 
support university goals. Their boundary spanning efforts did result in the acquisition of 
consultants to assist the university with their enrollment efforts. For example, through the 
efforts of a particular team member, the team acquired pro bono consulting services to 
focus on the management and marketing of the enrollment function. As the team member 
described: 
Then the President says, “Well, so what would you do?” And I said, 
“Well, if I had been in my former role at the [a local organization], I’d 
have picked up the phone, I would go to a general consultant like [a firm] 
here in town.” The President said, “Yeah, but that would cost a couple 
hundred thousand dollars.” I said, “No, I think we could probably get it 
done for pro bono.” Essentially that’s what I arranged. Not that there was 
magic with them, but it’s an outside force which helps sort of shape and 
push things. I mean that is directly related to the fact that I’ve had this 
connection and have worked with them over a 30-year period, and I can do 
that.  
 
While this consulting relationship and project was still ongoing at the time I completed 
data collection, it had already resulted in the realignment and restructuring of the 
university’s enrollment function. 
Another common form of financial resources in higher education is donations and 
gifts from alumni and other philanthropic sources. While there were both successes and 
failures in this area, I observed that the team members shared the positive news. As one 
team member would regularly report at meetings, they had “continued good news on the 
fundraising front. The president was able to secure a gift from [a donor],” “We got a $2 
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million deferred gift,” or “We’ve gotten a couple of gifts in. $150,000 from [abroad] for a 
scholarship in [a college].” However, in an interview the same team member was more 
likely to admit that “we were asking somebody for $7.5 million, even though we were 
resoundly [sic] turned down” or “Our fundraising numbers were up…significantly over 
the previous year, but we acknowledge very quickly that that is basically in two big 
gifts.” Overall, these examples illustrate that team members’ boundary spanning resulted 
in limited success in promoting the university to donors.  
 
Organizational visibility 
As team members worked to promote the university and its goals, a second result 
of these efforts should be increased or improved organizational visibility for the 
university (Aldrich & Herker, 1977; Friedman & Podolny, 1992). This potential outcome 
of team members’ boundary-spanning activities is also reflective of their strategic goal of 
improving the university’s image (Aldrich & Herker, 1977; Jemison, 1984). My 
observations of this team suggested that they were particularly concerned with the 
university’s visibility among legislators, among prospective students, and with regional 
organizations. Based on my observations of the team, they had some success in their 
efforts to improve the visibility of the university. 
The team’s efforts at increasing the university’s visibility among legislators were 
primarily handled by one team member. During an interview, he shared that the 
university’s “visibility, down state, isn’t what it ought to be, and having people from 
those areas and regions come up and see what we’re doing gives them a real fresh look at 
this place.” Through his efforts to bring visitors to campus and sharing information about 
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the university’s accomplishments, he seemed to have had some success in changing that 
view.  For example, he told that team “we got some very nice mentions in [a state paper] 
last week . . . this kind of attention is helpful because these things are widely read.” In 
another example, “when we had that announcement here that led to a press conference, I 
had, I think, six legislators came over and sat in on that,” further suggesting that this 
individual was having success in drawing positive attention to the university. It must be 
noted, however, that this individual was fulfilling his duties as a university leader and that 
I saw no evidence that the team contributed to this result. 
Given the team’s goal of improving enrollment, I would expect that the team’s 
promotional efforts would have had a positive impact on the organizational visibility 
among prospective students (Aldrich & Herker, 1977; Friedman & Podolny, 1992). I 
heard that, despite their difficulties with acquiring new students at the moment, there was 
some evidence that they were seeing success in their efforts to make the organization 
visible to the next group of students. One significant example was the creation of a 
partnership with local school systems, which the team viewed as an opportunity to 
strategically create visibility among future prospective students. While other efforts were 
smaller in scope, they still suggested that the team was successfully reaching more 
potential applicants. For example, one team member shared that “we were at an 
information session at [a local company] and over 300 people came.” Another noted that 
in seven days on a Google-sponsored link, they had “2,340,000 pop ups [and] 1,200 
click-throughs.”  
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Political legitimacy 
Boundary spanners’ promotional and protective activities should also have 
resulted in the maintenance or improvement of their organization’s authority and power. 
As with their efforts to acquire resources, this team had success in some areas but not in 
others. I observed that the team was most concerned with their power in relation to state 
government. At several points during this case, team members mentioned proposed or 
actual legislation that would adversely impact the university. For example, when the state 
wanted to redirect funding for doctoral programs in a way that would harm the university, 
one team member worked to promote the university’s viewpoint on that issue and 
announced to the team that “we prevailed” on that issue. However, working to sway 
legislators did not always work, as when one team member reported that “[another team 
member] got nowhere with House members on [a transportation issue].” 
I observed that the team seemed to face an ongoing battle and onslaught of 
legislation that had the potential to derail their goals of improving their image, updating 
facilities, increasing enrollment, and developing partnerships. This environment might 
explain why the president felt that it was important to have someone in government 
relations on his team: 
[The government relations expert is] the single most respected higher ed 
lobbyist in [the state]. He had worked for the [a governing board] for a 
long time, [and another state university]…. He walks around the 
statehouse and everybody [knows him]. 
   
I expected that this individual’s boundary-spanning activity would result in improved 
legislative influence for the university. However, as one team member told me: 
We’ve not been successful in getting the legislature, lately, to react to any 
of the things that don’t make sense to us, like not having the ability to do 
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design-build. So we’ll do a work-around like, if I let [another state agency] 
build it for me, they don’t have the same rules as I do. They can do design-
build. I just have to lease them a piece of land, tell them to build me a 
parking garage and give it back to me when you’re done. So that’s a work-
around. So I have to call a bunch of attorneys to make sure you can do 
that, and it looks like we probably can. So you have to figure out a 
creative way to get around it. 
  
This example shows how team members helped to maintain the university’s autonomy to 
achieve its infrastructure goal by finding an alternative route. Once again, however, it is 
not clear that either the government relations expert or the team member who found the 
“work-around” drew from the expertise and input of the team as a whole; rather, they 
were acting in their respective university roles. 
While external actors are important constituents, organizational leaders must also 
achieve political legitimacy closer to home. In this case, I observed that only a few team 
members specifically worked to promote the primary goals within the university 
community. While I heard team members talk about improved morale on campus since 
the president’s arrival, when I spoke with other campus constituents, I heard that many 
constituents felt left out of the university’s decision making process. 
As I spoke with individuals across the university, I heard several comments from 
faculty, students, and staff members that suggested that these constituents did not respect 
the university leadership’s use of authority. While I heard reports from team members 
that the university community’s morale and optimism was higher than anytime in recent 
memory, I also heard from constituents that they did not feel included in or informed 
about important aspects of the university’s future.  
One faculty member noted, “I can’t think of a case in which an administrator took 
the initiative and said, ‘This issue is coming up. We should talk about it’.” A student  
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shared similar concerns that “we’re doing a lot of strategic planning, a lot of renovation, a 
lot of forward thinking in terms of 10, 15, 50 years from now. I don’t think students are 
aware of what we’re doing.” In particular, several people noted their exclusion from 
development of the vision statement, upon which many of the leadership team’s goals are 
based: 
[The president] came up with [the vision statement]. And it was top-down. 
No faculty were involved. No department chairs were involved. Nobody 
knew what was going on. Everybody came back in the fall. There was [the 
vision statement]…. And so people got real--their backs got up and they 
just went, “This is not right.” … I think the thing that people didn’t like 
about [the vision statement] is that they weren’t involved in planning it, as 
opposed to a specific piece. 
 
I heard that this lack of inclusion led to what one campus member referred to as “a 
distrust of how those kinds of decisions are made. You know, people really love [the 
president’s] ideas. He’s a visionary, and he’s done great things for this university. But 
they also go, “Well, how did that happen?” These sentiments may suggest that, while the 
team seemed to have a strong focus on managing relationships and power structures 
outside of the university, they were less successful internally. As one team member 
noted, “I think we’re doing better outside than we get credit for inside. I think we have a 
better perception outside than we do inside.” 
 
Conclusion 
This team’s boundary-spanning activity resulted in mixed outcomes. In this case, 
while the team participated in decision making, they typically focused on procedural 
issues. Furthermore, the team setting was not regularly used as forum for discussion, 
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suggesting that they were not a real team. In other words, the meeting was primarily a 
setting for individuals, rather than the group as a team, to act. This was an unexpected 
outcome, given the variety of expertise and background that could have been used to 
generate ideas and contribute to decision making. While the purpose of this study did not 
encompasses an evaluation of the quality of decisions, the lack of debate and discussion 
suggests that they could have made better decisions by incorporating different 
perspectives into their processes. 
The team was somewhat successful at fulfilling their political management 
functions. They acquired some human and financial resources, developed some political 
power, and kept the organization visible, particularly among external constituents. 
However, for the most part their political activities stemmed from their particular roles in 
the university rather than from their participation in the president’s team. Their focus in 
these activities was primarily external and they seemed to constantly struggle to 
successfully promote and protect the university from state interference.  
The team’s success or failure in achieving some of the expected outcomes can be 
at least partially understood by the choices they make and the conditions they face. Given 
these outcomes, what might explain what helped them to be effective in some areas? By 
viewing individual and team actions as an indication of what they consider to be 
appropriate, we can begin to understand how those choices either helped or hindered their 
boundary-spanning activities and outcomes.  
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CHAPTER 7: HELPS AND HINDRANCES – A SHAKY FOUNDATION 
To act appropriately is to proceed according to the institutionalized practices of a 
collectivity, based on mutual, and often tacit, understandings of what is true, reasonable, 
right, and good (March & Olsen, 2004, p. 4). 
 
Boundary spanners face certain conditions that can impact their information and 
political management activities. My conceptual framework suggested that uncertainty, 
ambiguity, multiple roles, diverse identities, and power all have the potential to help or 
hinder boundary-spanning members of a presidential leadership team, but did not indicate 
which of these factors were likely to be more or less prominent in this case. In this 
chapter, I draw primarily on my observations of team functioning, as well as team 
members’ perceptions, to show that uncertainty, differing perceptions, diverse identities, 
and power provided significant hindrances. These conditions also supported team 
members’ efforts at boundary spanning, particularly related to information management. I 
did not find evidence to suggest that ambiguity or multiple roles had particularly 
significant influences on this team; however, the president seemed to have a discernable 
and equivocal impact on team members’ abilities to fulfill a boundary-spanning function. 
When faced with these conditions, team members relied on their past experiences and 
their concern for legitimacy to guide their behaviors. 
 
Uncertainty 
Uncertainty is a condition that results from a lack of information that an 
individual needs in order to take action. This condition can hinder boundary spanners if 
information is inaccessible, or if the information gathered to combat uncertainty is 
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irrelevant (Leifer & Delbecq, 1978). However, if individuals do not access more 
information, uncertainty can lead to a dependence on unproductive routines, such as 
attending only to one’s familiar responsibilities rather than learning new skills. The 
presence of uncertainty in the environment can help boundary spanners to avoid a 
“commitment to the status quo” (Geletkanycz & Black, 2001) and an ineffective reliance 
on past knowledge and experience (Honig, 2006). 
The members of this presidential leadership team did face uncertainty. While they 
knew that weekly meeting occurred and the meeting’s typical routine, this information 
did not help them to determine what actions they should take, specifically to perform 
boundary-spanning functions. In particular, one of the first aspects I noticed about this 
team as I started observing their weekly meetings was the lack of a formal, written 
agenda. This information could have decreased uncertainty by providing additional 
information to guide team members’ boundary-spanning activities. When I asked the 
president about this aspect of the team’s functioning, he responded that everyone “should 
know” what the agenda is, “because it’s enrollment.” However, my observations of team 
meetings and interviews with team members suggested that many of them were not aware 
of this focus. The lack of an agenda instead increased uncertainty and likely hindered 
their ability to both search for and use information.  
In contrast to the weekly lack of an agenda, approximately halfway through the 
academic year, the entire leadership team went off-site for one day to discuss three pre-
determined, specific issues: retirements, prospective students, and e-learning. I noticed 
that, in addition to having a pre-planned agenda, the structure and process of this retreat 
was noticeably different from the team’s typical meeting. Specifically, I observed that 
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individuals presented more relevant information and that more team members 
participated in discussions. In other words, team members had information for which they 
had searched in preparation for this particular meeting. Furthermore, the meeting process 
in this instance appeared to help the team take action, or use information, because they 
were more certain of the agenda and focused on specific issues rather than individual 
reports. The lack of a regular meeting agenda appeared to create a situation in which team 
members lacked information to guide their behavior during and between meetings.  
Uncertainty about the agenda and purpose of the meeting was exacerbated by the 
existence of a second weekly meeting. In addition to meeting on Friday mornings, this 
same group of individuals also met every Monday afternoon with the addition of a few 
more senior staff members. When I asked the president about this schedule, he replied 
that the Monday meeting served as a means to access additional information, but that he 
relied on it only out of habit, having inherited the structure from his predecessor, and that 
he did not consider it that important: 
The Monday meeting has a number of people in there who are called 
members of the senior staff. Some of them are direct reports. That’s the 
way I inherited the structure. I don’t care about it that much. It’s a place 
where the vice-presidents then get to hear from some other people about 
other issues, and so do I. The athletic director is in there, my assistant’s in 
there . . . some other people. But the idea is to get more voices heard about 
other things. It’s really a less-important meeting than the Friday meeting.  
 
When I asked team members about the different purposes of these meetings, at least half 
of the team indicated that there was “not a whole lot [of difference] . . . Monday can be a 
recap of Friday.” Team members indicated that they had “difficulty distinguishing 
between the two of them,” that it was “basically the same group of people meeting twice 
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a week for the same purpose” and that the meetings seemed “to be redundant.” During an 
interview, one team member tried make sense of the two meetings:  
Well, in many respects there’s not a lot of difference. I think we probably 
hold a little more of the detail back a little bit on Monday. And we don’t 
get into--the issues are a little bit more on the--I won’t say surface, but 
they’re not as deep down in at times, I guess. We might talk a little bit 
more strategy on Fridays, as opposed to on Mondays it’s more round-robin 
sort of reporting on things. And I’ve been thinking about--and I don’t 
know what [the president’s] view is on these two meetings, but I wonder 
what the effect would be of skipping one of them. 
 
Team members did not know how to respond to the existence of two similar meetings on 
their weekly schedules. 
The uncertainty that this team faced about the content of their weekly meetings 
hindered their ability to fulfill their boundary-spanning functions. They were missing 
information that could have helped them to understand how to behave between and 
during team meetings, specifically the types of information to search for and deliver. 
Through my observations of team meetings, I found that team members presented a 
multitude of information, on a variety of topics, much of which was not used by the team. 
The team did not necessarily hear information related to the university’s goals, and 
therefore could not discuss or make decisions about these goals. Instead, team members 
acted on the information that they did have, which tended to be divisional or short-term in 
nature and related to their weekly responsibilities rather than focused on long-term, 
strategic goals. 
The lack of an agenda may have also contributed to a lack of focus during 
meetings, therefore hindering information use through discussion. The lack of a focus on 
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specific agenda items also did not support a team process in which specific, goal-related 
information needed to be accessed or discussed. As one vice president articulated: 
The interesting weakness [about the meeting structure] is you don’t have a 
strategic focus that’s consistent throughout the year. The strength is the 
fact that it’s pretty fluid, and anything can come up, and that’s the best 
way of giving the President a wide range of intelligence, both internal and 
external. So that form in the meeting really works, and it acts as a 
personality. 
 
Consistent with my conceptual framework, in order to manage this uncertainty, 
team members relied on information management routines with which they had 
experience. In particular, because team members lacked focus and intentionality to their 
search activities prior to meetings, they relied instead on recent, rather than goal-related, 
information to deliver to the team as evidenced by the lack of effort they expended to 
prepare for meetings. Most team members also relied heavily on routine and familiar 
sources of information, such as their typical meetings, even though they were ineffective 
from a boundary-spanning perspective. Most importantly, no authorities or role models 
indicated that their behavior was not legitimate, so team members had no impetus to 
change their approach to meetings. Team members did not appear to receive either 
incentives or sanctions that would prompt them to take more time to prepare for their 
weekly meetings, which further legitimized team members’ behaviors. 
Despite the uncertainty, to some extent group norms for discussion seemed to 
help focus attention on relevant information. My observation of meeting themes and 
discussions suggested that team members attempted to overcome the hindrance of 
uncertainty by filtering and attending to information related to the university’s goals. 
Specifically, I noticed that information presented to the team that was also relevant to 
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team goals was more likely to lead to discussion among some members. What they chose 
– or to what they attended to as a team – was an indicator of what they considered to be 
important topics. Team members may have interpreted these topics as appropriate to 
pursue. This pattern suggests that information had legitimacy in terms of the topic, its 
urgency, and its relevance to the team.  
Consistent with arguments that rationality is “bounded” by prior experience and 
knowledge, decision makers are likely to remain committed to existing policies and 
practices (Hambrick et al., 1993). In other words, individuals are unlikely to change their 
meeting practices because they lack any information that would indicate that they should 
behave differently. The conceptual framework suggests that when team members 
recognized the situation as a team meeting they exhibited certain behaviors based on the 
information they had. In this case, the members of this team provided examples of many 
different behaviors in their weekly meeting, ranging from making announcements to 
presenting goal-related information, suggesting that there were multiple interpretations of 
what constituted appropriate and legitimate behavior.  
 
Differing perceptions 
As I described in Chapter 3, ambiguity is the existence of multiple alternatives 
which are imprecisely defined or that have opposing interpretations (March, 1994). 
Ambiguity can help organizational decision makers by creating choices about how to 
interpret information or situations. As with other conditions that individuals face in 
organizations, ambiguity can also hinder the ability to fulfill their roles by leading to 
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information overload or by creating conflict among decision makers who hold differing 
interpretations.  
While I did not find clear evidence of ambiguity, I did detect a related condition 
in this case. Specifically, as I talked with individual team members, I noticed different 
perceptions among them about the purpose of team meetings and about what type of 
information was appropriate to deliver to the team.  
Not all team members perceived the purpose of the meeting in the same way that 
the president did. The president’s description of the team meeting focused on team 
members sharing information with one another. Many team members, however, 
expressed their understanding with an emphasis on “keeping the president informed” 
rather sharing information and engaging in discussion with their colleagues. Only a few 
individuals viewed the team’s weekly meetings as an opportunity to raise issues for 
discussion.  
Team members also presented different interpretations about the type of 
information that should be shared at the meeting. For example, one core subgroup 
member said: 
Any kind of a decision that impacts priorities, as we talked about before, 
should come to that table…. I think anything that we couldn’t resolve on 
our own should come to that table… I mean, sometimes you’ve just got to 
get a third party in to look at it from a broader perspective. 
 
Similarly, another team member stated that he viewed the purpose of the team meeting 
this way: 
I think to be able to sift up to the presidential level problems that need to 
be dealt with in a basis broader than just my division. I would assume that 
in most cases, I should be in a position where I can solve my problems 
within my division, but sometimes I want to solve them in coordination 
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with other people's needs, which is the smart thing to do, so that you 
would throw it up for their discussion.... I mean if somebody’s got 
problems in their department, fix them. But if it doesn’t affect me, I don’t 
need to know what all the events were that are happening. There’s a 
calendar to do that. I would like, I guess, the meeting were productive, if 
more of the issues that came up at these meetings were things where, “I 
got some problems in my division and I’m stumped about how to solve 
them.” 
 
While these two interpretations closely reflected the president’s intentions for the 
meeting, another team member expressed what I had observed in meetings: 
I mean, people often times bring a problem to the table that really isn’t 
very well thought through. . . . In my point of view, I think a lot of detail 
comes to the table that shouldn’t. I think there’s a lot of stuff brought to 
that table that doesn’t deserve time with all us. I think anything related to 
keeping the president and the other staff members informed with major 
issues deserves to come to that table. 
 
Another team member observation echoed this sentiment, as he commented that some 
information was not an appropriate use of the team’s time, particularly because it lacked 
a broad focus on the university and its goals: 
We sort of self prioritize what we think is important for the rest of the 
group to know, and some people, I think, don’t. They just tell you 
everything that they have on their mind. I guess if I were the President, I 
would have a more entire agenda, in terms of, “I don’t want to hear about 
how you discipline[d] somebody last week. I want to hear about what it is 
that we need to know that enters into the overall major decisions of the 
University. If you want to tell me about your problems in your own 
division, schedule a half hour with me.” 
 
As another team member stated during an interview: 
So you’re just sitting around listening [to] discussion about the quality 
they’re finding in the student newspaper. I’m sitting here saying, ‘What 
the hell is the hourly rate being devoted [to]? How much cost is being 
devoted to this really bizarre little subject?’  
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These comments and my observations suggested that team members held different 
views about what type of information was appropriate to deliver at the weekly meeting, 
and also provided clues to the presence of affective conflict within the team.  
While these examples cannot clearly be defined as ambiguity, the effects of 
differing perceptions were comparable. The dissimilarity among team members regarding 
the purpose of the meeting and the types of information they should deliver hindered their 
boundary-spanning activities by creating a situation in which the team was overloaded 
with information and also by creating affective conflict. Specifically, team members 
brought a great deal of information that varied in terms of its relevance to goals and the 
need for the team forum. However, very little of this information was used by the team 
for a discussion or a decision. While more information can improve the quality of 
decisions, when the amount of information available exceeds the ability to process that 
information, information overload occurs and information goes unused (Eppler & 
Mengis, 2004; Galbraith, 1974; O'Reilly, 1980; Tushman & Nadler, 1978). In this case, 
the amount of information that was expected each week appeared to reduce the team’s 
ability to actually use any. 
The team’s ability to process or use information was further hindered by their 
differing perceptions of their roles and team meetings. These differences formed a basis 
for affective conflict as team members personalized approaches to the meeting that were 
different than their own. Furthermore, while affective conflict was not overt in my 
observations of this team, the lack of interaction among certain individuals outside of 
meetings suggests that this was one strategy for coping with their differences (Jehn, 1995; 
Pelled et al., 1999). This avoidance likely further inhibited team members’ abilities to 
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search for information outside of their own areas of responsibility, as well as to engage in 
positive, cognitive conflict during the team’s meetings. 
Team members dealt with their differences in two ways that support decision-
making theory. First, team members did what they thought they were supposed to do and 
what they considered to be legitimate behavior. Second, they viewed others who held 
similar perceptions to theirs as being legitimate, and considered other team members’ 
behaviors as inappropriate. They viewed individuals who deviated from this model as 
engaging improper behavior. Many team members managed differences by interacting 
with team members who they saw either as similar to them or as legitimate role models. 
In other words, they only trusted and liked others who were most like themselves, and 
distrusted and disliked those who were dissimilar (Jackson, 1992; Pelled, 1996). These 
differences did not help the team to engage in productive boundary-spanning activities. 
 
Diverse identities 
Presidential leadership teams contain a diverse mix of individuals representing a 
“dynamic distribution of information and interests” (Edmondson et al., 2003). This 
diversity can help boundary spanning by creating access to a wide variety of information 
and actors both within and outside of the organization. This heterogeneity can also 
provide an opportunity for interaction among individuals’ diverse perspectives, or 
cognitive conflict, which the literature suggests is useful in decision-making processes. 
However, this same diversity can also hinder efforts at boundary spanning by creating 
communication difficulties and affective conflict. 
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In this case, the team was composed of a wide variety of individuals with diverse 
functional backgrounds and experiences in higher education, business, government, 
media relations, community relations, law, fundraising, and economic development. This 
composition of this leadership team seemed to help the team to have access to a wider 
variety and more information, as well as provide formal legitimacy that the breadth of the 
organization was represented in the president’s cabinet. I did not find evidence of 
cognitive conflict on this team, but I did find evidence of affective conflict, which 
seemed to stem from the diverse team composition. As outlined by the conceptual 
framework for this study, my interviews suggested that there was affective, or relational, 
conflict among groups of team members that hindered their ability to engage in 
productive cognitive conflict. This affective conflict hindered team members’ ability to 
engage in both information and political management activities through a lack of 
interaction both in and out of meetings. This lack of interaction reduced opportunities for 
team members to access information outside of team meetings and for cognitive conflict 
to develop in team meetings. 
Differences among individuals led them to interact with a limited number of other 
team members outside of the team meetings, an indication of an illusory team (Bensimon 
& Neumann, 1993). Specifically, I heard and observed that the members of the peripheral 
subgroup did not interact with each other or with other team members, either in or out of 
the meeting, while other team members seemed to engage in regular interactions. The 
core group in particular was a focal point for interaction as they were likely to consult 
with one another, or be consulted by others, outside of the team meeting. As one member 
of the core subgroup said, “I think if I had an overall management problem, I would talk 
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to either the President or [the other core member] are probably the only two other [team 
members] I would go and say, ‘How would you do this’?" Other team members also 
viewed the core individuals as role models: 
If you’re asking me more of vice-president who I connect with more it’s 
probably [a core team member], because I probably like him the most on a 
personal level. I think we think somewhat alike. I feel like I can learn 
some things from him in terms of his business approach versus the more 
academic approach.… I have the strongest relationship and the most 
regular contact with [a core team member] . . . we kind of do a regular 
breakfast-type meeting or so. And we work together pretty well on some 
other things and have some common interests, and so we’re talking about 
those things…. 
 
While there were clear indications of informal interactions outside the meeting, these 
seemed to occur mostly among the core group, whose statements in interviews indicated 
that they had positive relationships with one another and shared similar perspectives on 
issues. As one core advisor stated: 
I think probably [the other core advisor’s perspective] was [most closely 
aligned with mine on a certain issue], because he understands, I think, the 
difference between a mindset that says we have to deliver a degree online, 
versus some of the more traditionalists who look at e-learning as the 
professor is going to deliver a PowerPoint in his class, which will then go 
up on the web. 
 
The core group in particular emphasized their differences with the periphery and their 
similarities with one another: 
We’re in different worlds. It doesn’t mean that our interests are opposed to 
each other. We’re just in different worlds….  It’s just a whole different 
culture and makeup, and stuff like that…. Some of them, like [the 
peripheral subgroup] and [a task specialist], are, I think, completely out of 
the academic field. [The other core group member] and I . . . [our] 
experiences are all in the private sector before we came here. 
Similarly, the other core subgroup member noted: 
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[The other core member] and I, I think, have a huge amount of respect for 
each other. Both of us--I would probably align our work ethics close or the 
same. We’re kind of like workaholics . . . time is valuable, and when 
we’re both invited to the same dinner meeting that’s kind of dull, at least 
we have something to talk about. We can catch up, okay? So we save 
those times for that kind of stuff, for the chit-chat stuff. 
 
These comments suggest that these interactions were primarily based on perceived 
personal similarities, shared professional goals, and common programmatic initiatives.  
In contrast, team members repeatedly cited a lack of interaction with the 
peripheral team members: 
I spend hardly any time with [one peripheral member], and I probably 
have not met [the other peripheral member] twice in my four years here . . 
. I can count on one hand the number of times I--I’ve never been to [one’s] 
office, and [that individual] has never been to mine…. I’ve been to [the 
other’s] office a handful of times; he’s never been to mine…. I think it’s 
not good form that I’ve never been to [one’s] office. I mean, I know where 
it is, but I’ve never had a meeting with [that individual]. I’ve never sat 
down with [that individual]. That’s terrible. 
 
Another individual shared this attitude: 
[I] don’t have much relationship [with one peripheral member] at all. No 
problems. [That individual] needs something, come there and deliver. If I 
would need something, [that individual] would give me equal treatment. . . 
. You know, our personal makeups are like black and white kind of thing, 
but there’s a common bond in terms of [the university]. So it’s not a 
negative, not a positive. It’s not near the other ones. 
 
In addition to hindering team members’ abilities to access information from within the 
university, this lack of interaction also likely increased the state of uncertainty for 
peripheral individuals. Those team members on the periphery would not have had a high 
level of awareness regarding what was happening in other parts of the university other 
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than what they heard in meetings and therefore may not have known how best to use their 
boundary-spanning roles in support of the university’s goals. 
I noticed another form of diversity based on the extent to which their identities 
reflected a focus either in the organization as a whole or primarily in their particular 
division. As members of a presidential leadership team, particularly the vice presidents 
with divisional responsibilities, their roles were inherently ambiguous because they 
served both as a member of the presidential leadership team and as a leader of another 
organizational unit. Within this ambiguity, some team members interpreted their roles as 
university leaders, while others emphasized their roles as divisional leaders.  
In interviews, I heard comments that suggested that members of different 
subgroups subscribed to different identities. For example, one peripheral team member 
described his role as one of advocating for students to the team, while the other described 
his role on the team as “advocating for the academic side of the house…to make sure that 
no other policy procedures [have] a negative effect on the academic side.” As one 
peripheral member stated: 
[I don’t bring these issues to the table] because there's nothing to be 
discussed. What they going to say? And besides, a lot of things [have] to 
do with the Faculty Senate, you see, because it's already gone through 
Faculty Senate. There is nothing to say the VPs group has to approve 
it...there's nothing [to] say discuss it in the VPs meeting. That's almost 
automatic, just keep going. So there is nothing saying, “Oh, this one has to 
be discussed or approved by the VP's group.” 
 
The peripheral group’s descriptions reflected an emphasis on their divisional identities 
that focused on advocacy for their part of the university, rather than the university as a 
whole. 
  167  
In contrast, members of the other subgroups frequently spoke in terms of the 
whole institution and its goals. For example, a member of the core subgroup had a clear 
outward focus when he talked about his role in terms of providing a service for the whole 
institution, as opposed for advocating for his division. In his words: 
I got a huge service function, in the sense that I can assist and help them 
make their missions, in almost all cases. I can improve their mission by 
utilizing what we do best. On the other hand, we also wear a hat that 
we’ve got to be smart enough and knowledgeable enough about the 
university that, if we understand the technology and we understand what 
the university’s doing and trying to accomplish its strategies and 
directions, we have to also identify opportunities for those others, in the 
organization, that they might not see themselves. So it's a shared 
responsibility.  
 
Other non-peripheral members were able to distinguish between both types of roles, 
clearly highlighting the importance of the institutional identity for the team. As one team 
member explained: 
[Team meetings are] times when [we are] supposed to be thinking about 
institutional-level issues …. Those are points in time when I’m expected 
to be, you know, not really thinking about what’s going on in my unit, but 
I’m [supposed] to be thinking about the university. 
 
These differences in organizational versus divisional identity continued to support the 
subgroup differentiations I had identified earlier, based on expectations and behavior. 
Especially for the peripheral group, these different views hindered their abilities to fulfill 
a productive boundary-spanning role. Not only did their perspectives lead them to 
overlook boundary spanning in support of the university as an important activity, but this 
approach also isolated them from other team members. 
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Overall, the differences among team members, their lack of interaction, and their 
different levels of attention to the organization as a whole did not encourage the 
development of trust, which likely hindered individuals’ willingness to share different 
perspectives or raise questions during meetings. In other words, this condition hindered 
the team’s ability to engage in information use. Structurally, the diverse composition of 
this leadership team and its team processes did give the team access to a great deal of 
information, though the information was not necessarily useful to the team. The diversity 
of representation also provided legitimacy to the team, but it did not create cognitive 
conflict through interaction of diverse perspectives. While interpersonal difficulties were 
not overt in my observations of meetings, team members’ statements during interviews 
indicated that affective conflict was indeed a hindrance for this team. One vice president, 
who was particularly reflective about the group’s dynamics, indicated that team members 
were generally unwilling to engage in cognitive conflict during meetings: 
I don’t think we trust each other. I mean, I don’t think we know each 
other. And I think because we don’t know each other, maybe we don’t 
trust each other. I think we’re, as a group, perhaps not as open to the idea 
of being criticized. … [The team is] somewhat closed. We really aren’t 
very open with each other. And it’s a little dysfunctional in that regard. I 
mean, we’re all very pleasant, and we all more or less get along. Some of 
us pretend to get along. But we really aren’t very open with each other…. 
As a group, we aren’t openly critical of that, but we roll our eyes. ... If we 
were a more open group, we would flat-out be raising our voices more and 
saying, “Well, why would you want to do that?” And people would be 
saying that to me or to [other vice presidents] or this or that. We get a little 
bit of that. But there’s a value to kind of feeling like you can--not duke it 
out, certainly not in a physical sense. But in a mental sense of being able 
to kind of lay some stuff out there. There’s a value in kind of having your 
feelings known about things and taking a position. And we never--we 
don’t go there. 
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The lack of cognitive conflict likely hindered the development of options/alternatives, 
especially around major, strategic issues, which should improve decision making. This 
team did not appear to be taking full advantage of the opportunities that existed by 
working in a team context. The impact of the team’s diverse identities is easily 
understood when considered through the lens of appropriateness. When faced with 
diverse identities, team members chose to interact with those who they saw as similar to 
themselves and/or whom they considered to be legitimate.  
These choices primarily hindered boundary spanning. The interaction among 
some individuals helped boundary spanning by increasing their access to information 
outside of the team meeting. However, these differences also prevented other team 
members from having the same access to information and also discouraged cognitive 
conflict during team meetings. Those team members who were less likely to interact may 
have felt that they were not legitimate participants, or did not view certain topics as a part 
of their identity. Their lack of involvement in initiatives and connections to information 
and actors might also have made them less able to participate. This limited, fragmented 
participation likely hindered the team’s and the president’s ability to gain different 
perspectives and thereby generate alternatives that would have improved decision 
making. While differences can create positive cognitive conflict, individuals are more 
likely to trust and interact with those more like themselves. The affective conflict based 
on differences within the team, however covert, seemed to hinder their ability to interact 
in ways that could positively impact information management. 
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Power  
Power is a resource that allows individuals or organizations to influence others or 
to access resources that others value. I tracked three sources of power in the presidential 
leadership team: formal power based on one’s position within an organization, network 
power, and expert power. These sources of power can help boundary spanners by 
creating avenues of access to information and actors, developing the ability to translate 
information across boundaries, and providing legitimacy with several constituencies. 
However, formal power in particular can also hinder access to honest or candid 
information power within the organization. 
In this case, power helped boundary spanning primarily by providing access to 
information and actors. However, power differentials within the team may have hindered 
certain individuals’ ability to carry out information and political management functions. 
My observational and interview data suggested that the same subgroups I identified in 
Chapter 5 based on team members’ expectations and behaviors continued to appear as I 
considered power as an organizational condition faced by boundary spanners (see Table 
5). Core advisors possessed a wider variety of power than any other group. Peripheral 
team members, by contrast, held only formal power in their roles as vice presidents 
responsible divisions of the university. The other two subgroups, external experts and 
task specialists, did not have such formal power but did have sources of network and 
expert power.  
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Table 5. Leadership team subgroups’ sources of power 






















Organizational Organizational Organizational Divisional 










Two of the four subgroups had formal power based on their roles within the 
organization based on their roles as vice presidents with responsibility for major divisions 
of the university. Structurally, team members with operational leadership responsibilities 
had potential access to information and actors within their units, but a member of the core 
subgroup noted that he was “one of the few people who probably touch the campus from 
end to end, both vertically and horizontally. So I have an opportunity to get involved in 
other stuff” that helped to promote the team’s goals. The other core group member was 
responsible for financial and human resource matters, and therefore was also very central 
from a structural perspective. He commented on the value of knowing where the money 
is in an organization: 
If you understand the finances, you run the operation whether you do or 
not…you do. So early on in my career I learned that if I knew where all 
the money pieces fit together, I knew how it all worked, that I could have 
the maximum influence because no one else care about that, but that really 
was what they should care about. 
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Peripheral team members had only formal power based on their roles in the university. 
The other two subgroups, external experts and task specialists, did not have clear formal 
power, as only one individual in these groups had responsibility for a minor division of 
the university.  
 
Network power 
A second form of power evident in this team was network centrality, or 
individuals’ varying positions in a network of information and actors. Network centrality 
is a form of power particularly relevant to boundary spanners because it draws on an 
individual’s formal membership in subunits that control highly valued resources or on the 
individual’s informal network of relationships (Astley & Sachdeva, 1984). Boundary-
spanning members of leadership teams typically must manage multiple roles as a result of 
their involvement in multiple activities and multiple subsystems (Katz & Kahn, 1978). 
For example, individuals are members of the leadership team as well as leaders of 
subunits in many cases. Others are also involved in other activities, such as committees 
both on and off campus. These multiple roles can help boundary spanners by creating 
multiple links to information and actors (Tushman, 1977). For some members of this 
leadership team, I saw evidence that their involvement in multiple subsystems or 
activities helped boundary spanning because their role accumulation placed them within a 
valuable network of information and actors (Sieber, 1974; Tushman, 1977). 
In interviews and in my observations of team meetings, I interpreted that network 
power was present in three of the four subgroups primarily because this team’s concern 
with particular issues seemed to direct power to certain actors. How critical one’s role 
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and resources are to the organization (Astley & Sachdeva, 1984) and the ability to 
leverage that centrality with access provided an advantage to the core, external expert, 
and task specialist subgroups because of their centrality to the team’s main goals. 
Furthermore, the multiple roles held by some team members, another condition I 
described in the framework for this study, appeared to contribute to certain individuals’ 
network power.  
Members of the non-peripheral subgroups had valuable access to information and 
actors critical to the university’s role in the community, financial health, infrastructure, 
and human resources, as well as the media and local and regional partners. For example, 
the president noted that one core subgroup member was “so central to the way the place 
operates in all the divisions that he’s got to be at the table.” With some restructuring by 
the president, a core subgroup member also gained control of the enrollment function. 
The task specialist subgroup was comprised of team members whose organizational roles 
also provided power and discretion over particular resources of value to the organization, 
such as the board of trustees, the media, and alumni. The external experts in particular 
also had more influence related to organizational goals, perhaps due to the emphasis on 
the external environment. For the external experts, representing the team and the 
university to external actors was an explicit part of their role and areas in which they had 
substantial experience.  
Holding multiple roles particularly helped the external experts to represent the 
university to external actors. The external experts were a group of three individuals – one 
vice president and two senior advisors – whose primary constituents (alumni, 
government, legal, and the media) were outside the university, making them a valuable 
  174  
group based on the team’s primary goals. For example, one team member shared how his 
multiple roles outside of the university allowed him to provide protection. “I’m the 
person who’s on [two regional committees] and sort of look out for the university’s well-
being.” Yet another highlighted how an additional role as a board member of a local 
organization helped him to identify potential resources because “there’s a high 
probability they can get grant funding to support us [in a partnership initiative].” 
 
Expert power 
My observations and interviews also suggested that three of the four subgroups 
held some sort of power based on their experiences or expertise. For example, both 
individuals in the core subgroup had significant business experience. One of these 
individuals also had extensive experience with the university in a variety of senior 
executive roles and the other had experience in a variety of industries outside of the 
higher education sector. Similarly, members of the external expert and task specialist 
subgroups had particular types of experiences or expertise in community and press 
relations, economic development, law, and fundraising that were highly valued by the 
president and relevant to the organization’s goals. For example, the president noted that 
he needed one individual “at the table to help us understand what’s going on in the 
economic development communities around here, and see where we can match up with 
that.” Of the other core member, the president said:  
He's very good at his work…. And he is first class at organization of 
management. Just terrific…. His capacity for work is huge, but you’ve got 
to give him the right work. Give him a project and he’s just happy as a 
clam. So if I’ve got … any organizational issue, I know I can hand it to 
him and it’s going to get done. And that’s one of the reasons I gave him 
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this enrollment issue because it’s a huge project. It’s complex in its 
organization, and I knew he could do it. 
 
While the president did not spend much time talking about the core advisors in his 
interviews, the time he did spend was exceptionally positive in comparison to his less-
complimentary comments about the peripheral group. In other words, the peripheral 
group drew his attention for different, less positive reasons. My interviews suggested that 
members of the peripheral group lacked both a variety of experiences and expert power 
upon which they could draw. They had both followed very traditional and limited 
academic or administrative paths in higher education. For example, the president 
described one of the peripheral members as “very traditional in their understanding of 
that role. It won’t work here.” The president also noted that peripheral members 
specifically lacked expert power related to organizational goals. Specifically, he stated 
that they either had not taken initiative or did not care about enrollment, or that they 
lacked the skills to address this particular goal, one he valued highly. The president stated 
in an interview that one peripheral member “didn’t make my job easier, he made it 
harder.” While he noted the valuable contributions of the core group, he was more likely 
to note a lack of contributions from peripheral members whom he did not see as “making 
any contribution to either retention or enrollment in any way.”  
 
Power and legitimacy 
Overall, the diverse sources of power within this team helped them to fulfill 
important information management and political management functions because they 
created avenues to access information and actors. The formal power of some individuals 
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helped them to access a wide variety of information to deliver to the team. Many team 
members were also ensconced in networks that helped boundary spanning by providing 
access to information and actors that were particularly valuable to achieving the 
university’s primary goals. Finally, the expert power held by several individuals helped 
boundary spanning by providing both access to information and the ability to translate 
that information. However, the lack of expert and network power in the periphery also 
likely hindered boundary spanning by decreasing access to valuable information and 
actors within those areas of the university, as well as opportunities to promote 
organizational goals. Furthermore, the periphery’s lack of connection to the external 
environment further limited their power by decreasing their ability to participate in the 
primarily externally-focused team discussions. The other subgroups also had a variety of 
experiences and expertise from which they could draw, while the periphery had very 
limited experiences and seemed unwilling to consider other perspectives or alternatives.  
The conceptual framework for this study suggests that these power differences 
can be explained by considering the importance of past experience and legitimacy in 
decision-making processes. Many individuals in this team had access to information and 
actors that had legitimacy in terms of the university’s goals, particularly through network 
or expert power. While the two peripheral members could have been critical to the 
university’s major issue of enrollment based on their formal roles, they were not 
successful seemingly because they lacked expert or network power in relationship to the 
external environment. The president, and other team members, appeared to value those 
team members who attended to enrollment as an important issue. The lack of power, 
familiarity, and involvement hindered the peripheral subgroup’s ability to participate in 
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and promote organizational goals. While the contributions of the periphery were 
marginal, in order to have legitimacy as a leadership team, they needed to be included on 
the team. Given the importance of the university’s external environment to organizational 
goals, those individuals who lacked network centrality were unable to participate and 
gain legitimacy within the team.  
 
The president’s role 
The president’s role as team leader and meeting convener had a distinct impact on 
the team in ways that both helped and hindered their boundary-spanning activity. The 
president spoke of his intentions for the team in ways that suggested that he intended for 
them to engage in boundary spanning. However, his espoused views were not enacted 
into the key supports the team needed. Using his formal power, the president created or 
sustained many of the conditions discussed above, whether by design or by default 
(Smircich & Morgan, 1982). My observations suggested that the president helped the 
boundary-spanning functions of the team by creating connections and by centralizing 
power, but that he hindered boundary spanning by relying on unilateral formal power and 
by inhibiting team processes. As the team leader, the president’s leadership orientation 
and use of power stood as a barrier to the team’s functioning, but also helped to facilitate 
some boundary-spanning activities in limited ways (Bensimon & Neumann, 1993).  
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Helps 
Creating connections 
The president’s power as the organization’s leader did help boundary spanning 
through his ability to make changes that could create or improve access to information 
and actors. Specifically, the president’s ability to place individuals on the team, as well as 
to restructure responsibilities, helped boundary spanning by increasing the team’s access 
to information and the promotion of organizational goals. For example, when it appeared 
that the team’s enrollment goals were not being addressed to his satisfaction, the 
president used his authority to shift responsibility for the enrollment function from the 
academic division to a less-conventional unit where another vice president provided 
stronger management. This use of power to shift or award responsibility in order to 
improve the promotion of team goals was evident in several other situations as well. For 
example, the president delegated responsibility for the e-learning initiative to information 
technology rather than the academic division, and moved responsibility for retention from 
student affairs to another team member. In other words, the president changed the rules 
by using an alternative script to eliminate an inferior routine (March, 1994) and improved 
boundary spanning in that area. 
The president’s power to make hiring decisions also helped the team to gain 
access to information and actors. While many team members, or their predecessors, sat 
around the table under previous administrations, the president had added particular 
components and shifted responsibilities in order to gain access to areas of information 
need and representation. Prior to this case, he had added a team member by elevating the 
senior information technology role to the team “because [that individual] becomes so 
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central to the way the place operates in all the divisions that he’s got to be at the table 
with them as an equal.” The president’s ability to add this person to the team helped to 
bring expert information and an additional perspective to the table. In addition, the 
president stated that he had hired other team members for very specific information and 
representation needs. For example, he noted that he asked one member to join the team 
because this individual was “more in touch with this town than you can imagine. And 
that’s why I want him as close by as I can get him” while another was “at the table to 
help us understand what’s going on in the economic development communities around 
here, and see where we can match up with that.” In all, the president had placed seven 
team members around the table, several of whom specifically reflected his attention to the 
external environment. The inclusion of these external experts emphasized the importance 
of university’s external environment and helped to focus attention on the team’s goal 
areas by creating intentional ties with areas of information and influence need 
(Geletkanycz & Hambrick, 1997).  
 
Centralizing power 
The president further used his power to concentrate responsibility and 
representation in a few key people, leading him to depend on a small group of individuals 
whom he trusted (Roberto, 2003). In particular, I noticed that the changes in structure and 
leadership described above were always a move away from the periphery towards the 
core or external experts on the team. The president’s decisions to shift several 
responsibilities meant that several major initiatives were concentrated in a handful of 
individuals. In fact, when I asked him which team members he relied on, he mentioned 
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only the two core subgroup members. When I asked team members about how the team 
prioritized or made decisions, one comment made it clear that the core subgroup was 
tapped for organization-wide projects: 
[The president] does from time to time [just meet with myself and the 
other core subgroup member] and figure out how we’re going to make 
something work. Sometimes it doesn’t even get brought to the big group 
level. I think that’s how he got the e-learning back on the forefront again. 
 
The president used his structural power to further centralize power within the team by 
repeatedly looking to those who he viewed as model team members.  
The president's use of his power suggests that he relied on well-respected, known 
quantities when he delegated responsibilities. For example, even though many of these 
individuals had already been committed to other major projects, the president followed a 
consultant’s advice to “find one of your senior officers to drive [an initiative].  Don’t 
worry about how busy that person is.  Who is it you have confidence in to make this 
happen?” In other words, his actions emphasized the legitimacy of certain team members.  
Depending on others who are similar to oneself is a means to reduce uncertainty 
(Kanter, 1977). The president’s patterns of reliance suggest that, when faced with 
uncertainty, he repeatedly turned to the same group of individuals that he identified as 
legitimate and from whom he had received positive results in the past, as suggested by 
the conceptual framework. In this case, the president filled positions that face more 
uncertainty with individuals who were more like him. The ability to make these changes 
may have improved access to information in certain areas, but it may also have led to a 
dependence on the core group in a way that limited broader access to information and 
representation.  
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While the president’s restructuring decisions created access to information and 
actors, it also hindered boundary spanning by centralizing power in a few individuals. 
This scarcity of power hindered team members’ abilities to search for information and 
engage in information use. Team members who lost responsibility could no longer 
deliver information about these areas. 
 
Hindrances 
Relying on unilateral formal power 
The team’s meeting schedule and certain patterns of information delivery further 
highlighted the president’s formal power and how it hindered some aspects of boundary 
spanning. First, the team only met when the president was available. While the 
president’s statements about the team meeting indicated that the forum was intended to 
be useful for team members, not just for him, the team only met when he was available to 
attend. When I asked one team member in an interview if the team ever met without the 
president, he replied that “the purpose of the meeting is for the president to meet with his 
vice-presidents and legal advisor, and he wasn’t available. He had another meeting to 
attend.” Another member agreed that he “would never meet with all the vice presidents 
without the president knowing about it. I would not be a part of that regardless of the 
situation. I wouldn’t. I’d like to think I wouldn’t do that.” Throughout my interviews with 
individual team members, I heard about a single instance of a time when a portion of the 
team met at the regular time in the president’s absence, but only after asking his 
permission. While meetings were not frequently cancelled, the centrality of the president 
further emphasized the perception that information delivery was for his benefit rather 
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than for the team to focus on goals and engage in strategic discussions as a group. This 
narrow definition of the team meeting hindered team members’ abilities to help with 
information management outside of the president’s availability. 
Team members’ responses to the president’s legitimate power hindered boundary 
spanning by removing some information from the team forum. During interviews, several 
team members commented about information that they would discuss with the president 
ahead of the meeting before sharing with the team. For example, one vice president stated 
“I’m not going to spring something at the table that I haven’t…I mean, something major 
like that I wouldn’t spring at the table without having had a conversation with the 
President first.” Another stated: 
If I’ve not briefed him on a big solicitation that we’re going to be making, 
I would not bring it up in front of the group without letting him know 
about it first. Typically, I would not present really good news of a larger 
gift, or this or that, without letting him know ahead of time. 
 
I also heard in interviews that members of the core and external expert subgroups seemed 
to have more access to the president than others. For example, one team member 
suggested that “[a core member] probably also talks to the President almost every day, 
and so some of the structure, by the way, is these people talk to the President. He knows 
what’s going on.” Another team member said:  
I go with him to [the state capital] once a month, and it’s a three-hour trip 
down and three-hour trip back. I drive. In fact, I come up here expressly so 
I can go down there with him and come back with him. I mean there’s six 
unencumbered hours to just talk so I use that time too. 
 
While this type of access helped the president to hear information, it also removed 
information from the team environment, thereby hindering opportunities for others to 
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participate in discussion and deliberation. The rule that some information is for the 
president inhibited information sharing among all team members by making information 
a resource to control rather than to share (Bensimon & Neumann, 1993). Furthermore, if 
team members did not have as much access to the president, by design or by choice, they 
were likely to lack information, be unsure about goals, and understand how they could 
contribute, thereby hindering their ability to effectively engage in information and 
political management activities. 
 
Inhibiting team process 
Despite his role as the meeting convener, the president did not exercise his formal 
power to positively impact the team’s processes during meetings. Both the meeting 
format and the lack of facilitated dialogue hindered the team’s ability to focus on 
strategic issues in substantial ways. Each meeting proceeded in a “round robin” format 
directed by the president who would turn to each team member and ask, “What have you 
got?” While this format helped boundary spanning by ensuring that team members would 
deliver information, it likely also hindered the team’s ability to spend time on goal-
related issues as some team members described feeling compelled to deliver any 
information in this context. The expectation that everyone should always have something 
to report seemed to ensure that nearly everyone provided some kind of information at 
every meeting.  
The conceptual framework suggests that individuals’ sense of obligation, in 
conjunction with the lack of an agenda, led to the delivery of a plethora of less relevant 
information, much of which was not used by the team. The lack of certainty regarding the 
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routine meeting format and the perceived expectations of the president for information 
delivery created a “commitment to the status quo” (Geletkanycz & Black, 2001) and an 
ineffective reliance on past knowledge and experience (Honig, 2006). In order to do what 
was expected by a legitimate authority, team members likely relied on information that 
would reflect that they were doing something each week. Acting “appropriately” in this 
team meant having something to say, so team members were guided by this rule. This 
suggests that gathering and possessing any type of information to report indicated 
competence or “acting properly” (March, 1994, p. 216), in other words, it served as a sign 
of legitimacy (March, 1994). Team members had gained a sense of competence by 
repeating the same behaviors on a weekly basis, and had come to understand it as the 
accepted meaning of their roles (March, 1994).  
The president also did not facilitate the team’s ability to engage in productive 
cognitive conflict because he did not encourage discussion and debate during meetings, 
nor did he direct discussion towards organizational goals. The focus of the meeting was 
on individuals rather than issues. In interviews, team members themselves did not talk 
about the team forum as an opportunity to engage with others around information. The 
meeting was not necessarily an opportunity to raise opposing or differing views, as one 
vice president noted “Obviously you're going to say something which is not [going to go 
in a] different direction as the President's.”  Another team member reflected: 
I can't think of an example of conflicting perspectives. Not the way the 
conversation’s structured so much. I mean it’s because it’s more reporting 
of what I’m doing or what I’m going to do or what I did. It’s not any kind 
of a debating society, and so somebody might report on something, and I 
may sit there and think, “Yeah, that’s stupid.” But I wouldn’t say it. That’s 
not the format of the meeting. 
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While a great deal of information was made available to the team, and some was 
discussed, these discussions provided few examples of debate or the generation of 
alternatives to help with the decision making process. 
Instead, I observed that most conversations were bilateral in nature between an 
individual team member and the president, or else a small group of team members, and 
that the president continuously relied on the same individuals for advice. For example, 
the president would sometimes ask the opinion of core or expert individuals, but would 
rarely encourage others to speak up. This may suggest that he viewed any discussions as 
an opportunity for team members to confirm his decisions, rather than to generate 
alternatives. Perhaps he had learned to “like what he gets” (March, 1994, p. 88) so he was 
not compelled to change the rules of team process. My observations suggest that the 
president may have had little incentive to change because he got what he needed from the 
core and external expert subgroups. In this way, the president’s power to manage 
meetings hindered the team’s ability to add information or otherwise productively 
interact around an issue. The meeting was viewed mostly an opportunity to deliver 
information on a variety of topics and there were few incentives or alternative scripts 
available to promote discussion or debate.  
 
Conclusion 
My observations and interviews with team members indicated that the formal 
structures and informal dynamics of the team both helped and hindered boundary 
spanning. Individuals were faced with uncertainty and differing perceptions about the 
weekly meeting, were unable to manage diverse identities, and were influenced by 
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several sources of power, including the president’s. While some individuals did have 
significant sources of power to assist them in achieving boundary spanning, as a whole 
the team was hindered by formal structures and informal dynamics. Team members dealt 
with the organizational conditions they faced by means that adhered to the concepts 
presented by the new institutionalism in sociology. When faced with uncertainty, 
individuals held fast to familiar routines, for better or worse. In many cases, these 
routines did not help the team to fulfill its potential for boundary spanning and legitimate 
authorities did not prompt them to change their behaviors. These structures largely, but 
not entirely, hindered individuals’ efforts to access and process information in support of 
team goals. 
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CHAPTER 8: AT THE BASE OF THE BRIDGE 
Good teamwork depends, not only on the individuals who compose the team, but also on 
innumerable institutional factors . . . (Bensimon & Neumann, 1993, p. 4-5). 
 
Multifaceted issues such as diversity, technology, and accountability can push the 
boundaries of a president’s knowledge and extend beyond the training and experience of 
a single decision maker. As the issues facing colleges and universities become 
increasingly complex, scholars have acknowledged the value of leadership teams in 
higher education (Eisenstat & Cohen, 1990; Green, 1994). A team approach to leadership 
should improve the presidential-level decision making of a college or university by 
assembling people from across the organization as a way to capitalize on the different 
knowledge and multiple perspectives that these individuals can bring to the table 
(Bensimon & Neumann, 1993). Using a leadership team promises to help presidents 
manage complexity, master new knowledge, and improve problem solving because it 
encompasses more information and more expertise than an individual leader could attain 
alone. However, research about leadership teams in higher education has not fully 
addressed this promise. While literature from the corporate context highlights the 
importance of the environment for team functioning, previous empirical work in higher 
education has taken a primarily internal perspective on leadership teams (Bensimon & 
Neumann, 1993; Dee, 2001; Dewey, 1998; Knudson, 1997).  
This study suggests that members of presidential leadership teams can be viewed 
as boundary spanners who help to manage information and the political environment in 
support of team goals. Specifically, presidential leadership team members have the 
potential to operate as boundary spanners who connect the president and other team 
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members to the organizational environment through information management and 
political management functions. Information management involves searching for, 
selecting, and interpreting information needed by the organization from sources across 
team boundaries (Aldrich & Herker, 1977; Friedman & Podolny, 1992; Jemison, 1984). 
Political management includes promoting and protecting the organization in order to 
garner resources, to provide legitimacy for the organization, and to increase the 
organization’s visibility. Boundary-spanning behavior can be beneficial to a team’s 
ability to achieve its goals because it can help them to access information and to provide 
promotion and protection in support of organizational goals. However, the organizational 
behavior and boundary spanning literature suggests that leadership team members are 
likely to face significant challenges in implementing such activities, including 
uncertainty, ambiguity, multiple roles, diverse identities, and sources of power. 
Decision-making theory explains that the limitations of bounded rationality 
influence decision making by constraining the information that individuals will use, as 
well as their ability to interpret that information (March, 1994). As boundary spanners 
face a multitude of information, multiple interpretations, and multiple roles, they are 
limited in their ability to access all of the information that may be available to them in 
order to act rationally in the process of decision making (March, 1994). This research 
applied concepts from the new institutionalism in sociology and decision-making theory 
to show how team members will deal with uncertainty, ambiguity, role conflict, and the 
social context through the use of rules or routines (Morgan, 1997) based on normative 
influences from authorities, rather than creating novel or innovative approaches. These 
strategies can help individuals to manage uncertainty by helping them to determine what 
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information is needed, to lessen ambiguity by highlighting appropriate interpretations, 
and to manage role conflict by helping the decision maker to choose an identity 
appropriate to the situation. In doing so, decision makers will make choices based on 
what has worked for them in the past and what they consider to be legitimate. This 
framework called my attention to the variety of influences that these individuals and 
teams face in their roles as boundary spanners, aspects that had not previously been 
explored in the study of presidential leadership teams. 
The design of this study focused on boundary spanning in a presidential 
leadership team in a single university. Given the nascent stage of research on presidential 
leadership teams in higher education, I addressed my research questions using a 
qualitative, single case study design that incorporated observations, interviews, and 
document analysis. I chose to conduct this research using a case study approach because 
of the importance of understanding the organizational context when studying 
organizational teams (Creswell, 1998). Based on my literature review, I aimed to answer 
four research questions:  
1. To what extent did the president intend for team members to help manage the 
team’s environment? 
2. What is the actual role of the presidential leadership team? 
3. What were the impacts of the team? 
4. What helps or hinders leadership team members in fulfilling their roles? 
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Summary of Findings 
Based on my observations and interviews, I found that the university president, as 
the team leader, primarily expected this team to fulfill an information management 
function. Specifically, the president expected team members to share information with 
him and the team as it related to the university’s major goals of increasing enrollment, 
improving the campus infrastructure, developing partnerships, and improving the 
university’s image. Furthermore, he expected team members to fulfill a political 
management function by serving as his representatives. Team members had a similar 
understanding of these expectations, but notably, most individuals viewed the team as an 
opportunity to deliver information to the president, rather than share with their 
colleagues. As Bensimon and Neumann (1993) suggested, information sharing, rather 
than information delivery, is characteristic of a real team. This team was also composed 
of a wide variety of individuals representing all of the major university constituencies, 
suggesting that they were structured to attend to relevant aspects of the environment. As a 
result, I concluded that this team was set up to fulfill both information management and 
political management functions. The expectations and composition of this team suggested 
that these individuals were well situated to serve as boundary spanners. 
Despite these intentions, I found that these team members did not always serve as 
boundary spanners, based on evidence that individuals fulfilled some political 
management functions but were lacking many information management roles. 
Specifically, their activities included little intentional scanning or preparation for team 
meetings, even though team members did present a wide variety of information to the 
team at each meeting. Most individuals relied primarily on the team meeting as an 
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opportunity to seek information from one another, rather than to guide their activities in 
support of goals between meetings. Team members could have searched more 
intentionally for information focusing on the strategic goals of increasing enrollment, 
improving the campus infrastructure, developing partnerships, and improving the 
university’s image. While I did find some evidence of boundary spanning in this case, the 
literature in that area suggests that many team members did not use their capacity to 
address the organization’s goals.  
Individual team members varied in the extent to which they focused on goal-
related information and facilitated the use of information by the team, as well as 
participated in political management activities. I found that some, but not all, team 
members consistently engaged in activities that the literature on boundary spanning 
suggests they should in terms of information management and political management. 
Furthermore, some team members failed to focus on the university’s primary goal of 
enrollment, which relegated these individuals to the periphery of the team. These findings 
regarding individuals’ content and process behaviors suggested that there was a clear 
distinction among several groups of individuals in this team. I ultimately identified four 
distinct subgroups that were characterized by team members’ role expectations and 
boundary-spanning behaviors.  
Ultimately, boundary spanning should help with decision making, particularly 
related to organizational goals, based on the discussion and debate of information and 
ideas among team members. Team members’ boundary-spanning activity resulted in 
mixed outcomes regarding the extent to which they helped with decision making. These 
team members typically focused on procedural decisions, rather than the strategic issues 
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of increasing enrollment, improving infrastructure, developing partnerships, and 
improving the university’s image. I found that the team was not regularly used as a forum 
for discussion; rather, the meeting was used as a setting for individuals, rather than the 
team, to act. This was an unexpected outcome, given the variety of expertise and 
background that could have been used in the team. 
Based on their political management roles, I did find that this team had some 
success garnering certain types of resources, developing some political power, and 
keeping the organization visible, particularly among external constituents. However, 
there appeared to be little intentional effort to manage politics within the organization, 
particularly within the divisions led by peripheral team members. Furthermore, the team 
seemed to constantly struggle to successfully promote and protect the university from 
external influences, particularly state interference and media lenses.  
My analysis of these findings through an appropriateness lens highlighted several 
conditions that helped and hindered individuals in accomplishing their roles as boundary 
spanners. By viewing individual and team actions as an indication of what they 
considered to be appropriate, I was able to gain some understanding of how those choices 
influenced their boundary-spanning activities and outcomes. Specifically, I found that 
team members were faced with uncertainty and differing perceptions about the weekly 
meeting, were unable to manage diverse identities, and were influenced by several 
sources of power, including the president’s. When faced with uncertainty, team members 
retained familiar routines, for better or worse. In many cases, these routines did not help 
the team to fulfill its potential for boundary spanning and meetings did not prompt them 
to change their behaviors. Furthermore, underlying conflict and a lack of interaction 
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among groups of team members who were viewed as dissimilar or unfamiliar hindered 
the quality of both boundary spanning and decision making. Some, but not all, team 
members had significant sources of power to help them manage these hindrances, 
including access to information, actors, experience, and other resources. Overall, the 
conditions faced by members of this leadership team hindered their ability to achieve the 
potential of their boundary-spanning roles.  
In conclusion, despite the president’s intentions, this team was not comprised of 
boundary spanners. Specifically, individuals fulfilled some political management roles 
but were lacking many information management functions such as accessing and 
processing. In particular, the meeting was primarily a setting for individuals, rather than 
the group as a team, to act. However, those individuals who focused on the university’s 
primary goal were more successful at these activities, while those who failed to maintain 
this focus were relegated to the periphery of the team. While some team members were 
somewhat successful at fulfilling limited information and political management 
functions, the formal structures and informal dynamics of the team largely hindered 
boundary-spanning activities.  
 
Contributions 
The contributions of this study are first and foremost that it extends the research 
on the use leadership teams in higher education, methodologically and conceptually. This 
study contributes a to the literature on leadership team in higher education by 
conceptualizing team members as boundary spanners, as well as to the boundary-
spanning literature by using a qualitative case study methodology to study a single team 
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in its organizational context over an extended period of time. This is a significant 
departure from previous work on leadership teams in higher education because it locates 
them in an institutional context and sheds light on dimensions not previously explored by 
other scholars. In particular, this study acknowledged that team members exist in an 
environment that influences them and that they face conditions that help and hinder their 
activities where others have focused on internal matters. While this study ultimately 
concluded that internal dimensions provide an important foundation for team members’ 
boundary-spanning activities, it also adds to our understanding of team members’ 
external functions. Specifically, this study contributes evidence that these activities can 
serve to promote and protect organizational goals, a dimension that has not previously 
been included in models of understanding presidential leadership teams in higher 
education. 
This study also provides support for the ideas and concepts that Bensimon and 
Neumann (1993) first put forth in their seminal work on leadership teams in higher 
education. First, this study contributes further evidence that many presidents do not 
consider their teams useful for decision making (Bensimon & Neumann, 1993). In this 
case, the president did not intend for his team to engage in decision making, despite my 
observations that they regularly made decisions in team meetings. Second, this case 
reiterates Bensimon and Neumann’s (1993) findings that internal issues of power and 
diversity hinder teams from working well. This study also provides additional support for 
the literature that emphasizes the importance of the team leader in managing group 
process and lends support to the suggestion that real teams are less likely to be found in 
the top levels of larger, more complex organizations. In Bensimon and Neumann’s terms, 
  195  
this case provides an example of an illusory team and dimensions that contribute to that 
characterization. While my findings concluded that the president had the power to create 
structures and processes to improve his team’s ability to effectively contribute to 
decisions, the team did not engage in “real” team behaviors such as sharing information 
and taking advantage of the multiple perspectives around the table. Finally, this case 
provides an example of the role of conflict in a higher education leadership team setting. 
As suggested by the literature on group effectiveness, this leadership team did not engage 
in cognitive conflict, at least in part due to the presence of affective conflict (Amason, 
1996; Amason & Sapienza, 1997; Jehn, 1995; Jehn et al., 1999; Pelled et al., 1999), 
providing additional support for the need to attend to these two important dimensions of 
team interaction. 
 
Implications for research 
The conclusions in this study suggest several implications for research in terms of 
frameworks and study design that might further develop the literature on boundary 
spanning and leadership teams.  
Theoretical frameworks. First, while I intended to better illuminate 
appropriateness as a lens for understanding boundary spanning in a leadership team, I 
realized that this particular setting would require different data collection and analytic 
strategies. However, the evidence of conflicts in this case only reinforces the importance 
of considering how this lens might matter in future studies to address leadership teams in 
higher education.  
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Future studies should also consider the value of knowledge management as a 
framework that which could help to isolate dimensions of boundary spanning in the 
higher education environment. Knowledge management is a process of transforming 
information into enduring value, it is a means to connect individuals with the knowledge 
that they need in order to act in a timely manner (Kidwell, Vander Linde, & Johnson, 
2000). The application of a knowledge management framework to future studies could 
further explore processes of knowledge creation, organization, access, and use throughout 
the organization. The finding in this study that only a limited number of core individuals 
were truly involved in strategic decision making suggests that a consideration of 
knowledge management would benefit the study of presidential leadership teams. Rather 
than relying on the knowledge of unique individuals throughout our organizations, a 
focus on knowledge management would help to explain how that information can and 
does become more widely available (Kidwell et al., 2000) as well as illuminate the 
political implications of broader participation and access to information. 
A second direction for future research is to specifically explore the political 
management function of leadership teams. This case suggests that many of the political 
functions of leadership teams involve information, whether they were transmitting 
information to external actors, or otherwise relying on information to promote and protect 
the university and its goals. This may indicate that, in a higher education setting, 
information management and political management activities are not easily 
distinguished.  One of the limitations in this case was the focus on the team and its 
members as the primary source of data. Expanding data collection to include observations 
of team members’ interactions with other actors as well as more extensive interviews 
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with constituents would further add to our understanding leadership team members’ 
political management functions. Future studies should aim to construct a clearer picture 
of these activities. 
Study design. In charting future directions, scholars should also consider the 
limitations of this study, particularly in terms of design. I learned that the many 
dimensions of presidential leadership teams and their individual members are difficult to 
capture through a reliance on observations and interviews. While a design that focused 
almost exclusively on team members and the team setting yielded valuable information, it 
also limited my ability to create a clearer picture of their boundary-spanning activity. 
Different approaches to data collection should include access to a broader set of 
institutional stakeholders, including divisional staff members, and observation of other 
meetings in which team members are involved. To build on the finding that some team 
members were part of the core and others were on the periphery of the team, social 
network analysis should be considered as a means of mapping and measuring 
relationships and information flows (Krackhardt, 1990). This approach would help to 
create a better understanding of the location of actors in a given network and the 
centrality of actors, particularly within informal organizational structures. Such design 
changes could yield a richer set of data around team members’ interactions with the 
environment and with each other.  
Subsequent research should consider using other methods to better isolate 
boundary spanning and identity. For example, I would recommend that future researchers 
design studies that could better capture this information by utilizing different interview 
questions. In terms of gathering improved data related to boundary spanning, future 
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interviews should more explicitly probe participants’ experiences in information search 
and use, and promotion and protection. One productive strategy might be to select a 
single organizational issue, such as enrollment, as explore the team’s boundary-spanning 
behaviors in more depth related to this topic. This approach should include observing and 
interviewing a broader range of individuals and forums related to the selected issue. 
Regardless of a topical focus, modified interview questions should ask about the team’s 
environment and focus more on the external work of the team. Future research should 
also focus on capturing rich narratives and probing the identities of team members by 
allocating more time to uncovering participants personal and professional histories to 
better understand individual perspectives.  
Finally, future researchers should explore alternatives for selecting a team for 
study. In particular, I found that it is difficult to know if a team is “real” or “illusory” 
team from the start. While I relied on non-team members both within and outside the 
institution in order to understand this prior to site selection, not until I began preliminary 
analyses did uncover patterns to suggest that the participating team tended toward the 
illusory end of the team continuum. Future researchers might utilize a self-designed or 
existing instrument (e.g., Bell, 2001) that could more reliably identify team 
characteristics. Also, given the suggestion that real teams are more likely to exist at 
smaller institutions, another approach to sampling should consider other institutional 
types (Bensimon & Neumann, 1993). 
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Implications for practice 
While this research sought to extend our understanding of presidential leadership 
teams’ activities beyond their borders, in the end the findings suggest that the internal 
dynamics and structures of teams require attention before successful boundary spanning 
can occur. These findings have considerable implications for professional practice, both 
for presidents and for their teams. The literature on learning organizations, the 
practitioner-oriented writing related to organizational learning, as well as writing directed 
towards improving executive teamwork, provides useful concepts that can be used to 
address the hindrances identified in this case. 
A learning organization is one that is able to acquire knowledge and use it to 
modify behavior (Garvin, 1994). Several authors who have written on the topic of 
learning organizations have suggested several practices that could help presidents and 
their teams to improve learning, in other words their ability to identify, access, and use 
information (Garvin, 1993; Senge, 1990). This case suggests that presidents may need to 
intentionally structure their teams and employ particular practices to participate fully in 
information search and use.  
Foster team learning. Team learning is about group interaction that occurs over 
and above team building. Presidents need to develop the capacity of their teams to engage 
in dialogue, building on individuals talents and personal mastery (Senge, 1990). In this 
case, I found that the team did not engage in vital processing activities of discussion and 
debate. Furthermore, I found no evidence to suggest that the president had taken steps to 
develop this capacity within his team. In order to foster learning, presidents must create a 
conducive environment that allows for analysis and reflection, strategic thinking, and 
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innovation (Garvin, 1993). Such an environment requires dialogue and the ability to 
suspend assumptions in order to explore issues and information deeply rather than 
superficially (Senge, 1990). The goal is to transmit knowledge and to put the creativity of 
different perspectives to use. This capacity is reflective of what Bensimon and Neumann 
(1993) refer to as a real team. One that works and thinks together, relying on the use of 
multiple perspectives to improve decision making. 
One of the most important steps that presidents can take as the meeting convener 
is to make time for team meetings. It is important to hold regularly scheduled meetings 
that are considered to be a sacred part of everyone’s role. These meetings should have a 
clearly stated purpose that is geared towards intentional learning. Use tools that can help 
team member to prepare for meetings, such as providing an agenda and assigning pre-
work (Nadler & Spencer, 1998). While the team is meeting, it is important to develop the 
capacity to dig deep into information and issues. Presidents, or a delegate, can 
accomplish this by using tools to generate cognitive conflict, such as encouraging team 
members to question, disagree with, and challenge one another, and pushing the team to 
identify alternatives. Inject a sense of uncertainty as a means to develop new ideas and 
approaches. Teams should also regularly review both their successes and failures as 
opportunities to reflect on and learn from past experience (Garvin, 1993; Senge, 1990). 
Finally, presidents should allow and embrace experimentation within the bounds of the 
organization’s strategic goals. Team members should be encouraged to take risks and 
explore alternatives in ways that can increase their own and the organization’s knowledge 
about issues of importance.  
Engaging in learning also means questioning assumptions, both as individuals and 
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as a team. Within a learning organization, everyone must understand their own mental 
models and question them before information use can be a productive team endeavor 
(Senge, 1990). Individuals need to examine their own roles influence the information to 
which they are exposed and how they interpret that information (Bensimon & Neumann, 
1993). Team members must be aware of their own perspectives in order to be able to hear 
and appreciate others’ models. 
Presidents can encourage team members to think differently about their work and 
the work of the organization by questioning the assumptions that arise at the table. As the 
meeting convener, and the individual most responsible for team processes, the president 
can play a devil’s advocate role in order to illuminate competing perspectives. Presidents 
should also develop a habit of drawing out team members to voice their perspectives, if 
they are not readily being shared. Teams can also work to avoid “win-lose” situations, by 
taking time to integrate various views in an effort to avoid alienating a particular part of 
the system in order to reach quick decisions (Katzenbach, 1998). Other useful 
mechanisms include inviting guests with unconventional or opposing views to speak, or 
holding brainstorming sessions to get at creative thinking. The team might also 
incorporate the role of a critic who can re-define and re-interpret issues and information 
(Bensimon & Neumann, 1993). Team members, and presidents, need to learn how to be 
critical of themselves and of others, and to view questioning as an opportunity for 
learning (Argyris, 1991). 
Each of these tools may help teams address the need to question whether current 
norms are appropriate for achieving their goals in order to avoid traditional control 
systems and defensive routines that exist to protect the status quo (Morgan, 1997). For 
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example, presidents and their teams consider maintaining a focus on outcomes, and avoid 
the conventional fixation on image and prestige. By turning the spotlight so brightly on 
inputs rather than illuminating intended outcomes, teams adhere to habitual measures of 
success and be waylaid in their efforts to base their decisions on data and information 
(Astin, 1993). Questioning assumptions and reflecting on past experience can help teams 
to view learning as integral to change (Kezar, 2001). The goal is for team to examine the 
status quo and use information to consider alternatives, to consider new options rather 
than relying on the old. Team meeting should be an opportunity to really get at an issue, 
to dig deep, rather than to skim over administrative minutiae. 
Generate cognitive conflict. Presidents must encourage certain behaviors in team 
meetings in order to achieve the benefit of teams as a strategy, rather than just as a 
meeting. The literature on groups and teams suggests that such forums can potentially 
provide an opportunity for the generation of positive, cognitive conflict. In describing 
real teams, Bensimon and Neumann (1993) emphasized the need for a team culture that 
supports the sharing of multiple perspectives, of questioning, arguing, and debating. The 
team leader must attend to the informal dynamics of the team by actively encouraging 
these behaviors in order to stimulate information use. 
In this case, I found that the president continuously relied on the same individuals 
– the core subgroup – and did not engage other team members in conversation. As the 
meeting convener, presidents can intentionally foster debate by intentionally asking for 
different perspectives and drawing individuals who have not shared their views, rather 
than repeatedly relying on the same individuals to share their perspectives. Over time, 
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these actions will teach team members that disagreeing and debating, within an 
environment of respect, are legitimate behaviors. 
Develop a shared vision. In order to benefit from the search for information and 
to engage in systemic thinking, team must have a shared vision that include mutual 
purposes and shared images (Senge, 1990). I found in this case that there were some 
relatively clear goals. However, these goals had been developed almost unilaterally by 
the president and were not effectively communicated as a guiding framework for team 
discussions. While a president can and should share his or her vision for the organization, 
this activity should be a prelude that encourages others to voice their visions, rather than 
a unilateral statement. Goals need to be points of reference that are a shared vision and 
value to the organization, not mandates from above that are strictly defined. Instead, 
allowing the best ideas to emerge from throughout the organization creates a fertile 
ground for innovation. In other words, the organizational or team vision should be 
created and implemented in interaction with other individuals.  
In addition to developing the broader organization vision in conjunction with 
team members and their divisions, presidents can encourage shared vision within the 
team through several means. First, develop your team’s commitment to a vision by 
engaging team members in dialogue about goals and setting priorities as a group 
(Katzenbach, 1998). If team members are encouraged to contribute to a vision, rather 
than applying a unilateral template to their work, they are likely to be more engaged in 
the process to achieve those goals. Second, neutralize politics by fostering a team identity 
and reducing reliance on a limited number of team members (Katzenbach, 1998). This 
includes moderating the amount of information that is unnecessarily shared with the 
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president outside of the team, as well as taking steps to include all team members in 
decision-making processes. While some information is extremely sensitive and perhaps 
confidential, in order to be effectively used information should be shared as broadly as 
possible within the team. Reinforce the team’s identity by spending time together both in 
and out of meetings (Nadler & Spencer, 1998). Finally, use an agenda to communicate 
the shared purpose of the team meeting and to help keep the team focused on common 
goals. While uncertainty with regard to agenda items is not uncommon in executive 
teams (Nadler & Spencer, 1998), presidents should not overlook the value of formal 
structures to provide a solid foundation for team members’ boundary-spanning activities. 
An issue-driven agenda can help to direct the focus of meetings from individual reports to 
a focus on the discussion of shared goals.  
While a strategy as simple as a pre-determined agenda might seem mundane, 
given the complexity of team members’ roles this increased information can improve 
their ability to intentionally search for information. A well-defined agenda can explicitly 
inform team members about the topics for the upcoming meeting and can help team 
members to focus on particular issues and information needs both during and in 
preparation for team meetings. This notification would provide team members with time 
to collect relevant information, learn more about the issue if necessary, and consider what 
resources they might contribute. Having a clear agenda for each team meeting can 
provide a legitimate guide for members to follow and can therefore increase their ability 
to search for and provide information related to the shared vision, rather than individual 
interests. 
Be systematic and intentional. One of the building blocks of a learning 
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organization is the ability to engage in systematic problem solving (Garvin, 1993). As a 
part of problem solving, both search and use must be intentional and both are necessary 
to learning (Garvin, 1993; Lave, 1993; Wenger, 1998). Teams need mechanisms to 
ensure that both search and use occur. In this case, I found that the lack of an agenda 
hindered the team’s ability to engage in such important information management 
activities. Presidents must send a clear message to their teams that information is an 
important foundation for team meetings. Clarify the point of meetings, whether the goal 
is to engage in information sharing, problem solving, or decision making, and clearly 
communicate your expectations for information and participation (Nadler & Spencer, 
1998). I suggest that more information about the meeting’s purpose and goals would have 
helped the team in this case to search for and deliver information related to the 
organization’s goals. 
There are several means that leaders might use to increase the amount of data and 
information available to their teams. First, insist that team members use data rather than 
assumptions to contribute to discussions and to support decision making (Garvin, 1993). 
Such a stance indicates that individuals must “do their homework” before each team 
meeting. Presidents might also identify specific information needed from team members 
and request that this be brought to the meeting. If needed, call special meetings to address 
urgent or particularly complex issues and give team members the time they need to 
prepare and engage in such forums. 
Colleges and universities should also ensure that certain information-gathering 
structures are in place throughout the organization in support of organizational learning 
and decision making. Assigning individuals or units within organizations the 
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responsibility to engage in search functions increases the likelihood of search and 
organizational learning occurring (Gladstein & Caldwell, 1985; Kanter, 1988; March & 
Olsen, 1975; Scott, 1995). For example, presidents should assess the strength of their 
institutional research structure and take steps to improve or expand this function. This 
might include re-structuring to highlight its importance within the university, 
familiarizing team members with the institutional research function, and adding a 
representative at the team to both share information and understand data needs. However, 
depending on the organization, the research function might also be more dispersed. 
Increasingly, outside of the academic function, student affairs divisions are adding their 
own assessment functions and enrollment operations track a multitude of data and 
indicators. Presidents should encourage team members to consider how they have 
incorporated research structures within their divisions to search for relevant information 
and to support their roles on the leadership team. 
Encourage systems thinking. Teams must also acknowledge the 
interdependency of team members and their parts of the organization, as well as their 
relationship to the larger systems outside of the organization (Senge, 1990). It is 
important that teams recognize that each individual has particular, but limited, knowledge 
that must be combined with others’ perspectives and experiences in order to understand 
the whole (Bensimon & Neumann, 1993). Team meetings are the most obvious means to 
share information. However, as this case showed, merely holding a meeting does not 
ensure that information is shared. From a learning organization perspective, it is 
important to ensure that knowledge is transferred among individuals. Presidents must 
develop mechanisms to ensure that information from across the system is shared. 
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One means of accomplishing cross-systems thinking is to open boundaries, both 
horizontally and vertically. Presidents should consider the skill mix in their teams and 
take steps to ensure that the right individuals and talents are at the table based on 
organizational needs (Katzenbach, 1998). Above and beyond contributing knowledge and 
skills to organizational goals, individual team members must have an “enterprise” 
perspective and be able to make decisions for the greater good of the university rather 
than just for their own interests (Nadler & Spencer, 1998). 
Team conveners should invite in non-team members into the to share data, 
information, and advice to the team. These might be other organizational members or 
external experts who can expose team members to new ideas. Such information can be 
used not only to improve decision making, but also to educate team members on vital 
issues. Team members should also be compelled to look for, evaluate, and share good 
practices both from within and outside of the organization. Presidents and their team 
should also consider developing intentional partnerships within the team to address 
specific issues. For example, rather than asking one team member to lead an initiative, 
include two or more members who can both learn from one another and address a 
complex issue from a variety of perspective. Such assignments or activities can provide 
explicit mechanisms for team members to engage with the environment in search of 
specific information needed for decision making. Presidents might request that team 
members conduct benchmarking studies and reviews of best practices both within and 
outside of the university in order to better understand how the university is situated in the 
environment with regard to specific dimensions. By engaging with, rather than merely 
monitoring the environment from a distance, team can develop their scanning capacity. 
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Even within the course of regular meetings, presidents can encourage systems 
thinking by asking questions about how information, events, and decisions affects 
individual units. Individual team members might experiment with taking on an interpreter 
role that can translate how others outside the team might view an issue (Bensimon & 
Neumann, 1993). Spend time on topics in order to allow team members to look beyond 
discrete events and get at their underlying causes (Senge, 1990). Focus team meetings on 
issues, rather than on individuals, and work to encourage the different perspectives and 
lenses that are present around the table. Meetings should stimulate the exchange of ideas. 
The goal should be to get the team engaged with information so that it is used, as well as 
encourages the search for additional information for their next interaction. 
Develop power and personal mastery. Presidents and team members must work 
to develop the sources of power that are available within the team. This case highlighted 
the discrepancy of power within the team and suggested that these differences were 
indicative of team members’ abilities to contribute to team goals. A broader base of both 
informal and formal power at the individual level may help team members to be more 
engaged and successful in their boundary-spanning activities. Creating a wider diversity 
of power within the team may also help to prevent the centralization of power in a few 
individuals. By doing so, a president can avoid relying on a few key people and risking a 
void in the team’s access to information and actors if a particularly central individual 
leaves the team. Power should be fluid and regenerative, rather than isolated in a minority 
of team members (Bensimon & Neumann, 1993). 
Presidents can play a role in developing team members’ power, and hence their 
teams’, in several ways. First, work to increase the network centrality of team members. 
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Take advantage of opportunities for individuals to serve on committees both within and 
outside of the university, on external boards, or in professional organizations, especially 
in areas that are related to strategic goals. Furthermore, as described above, presidents 
can help to ensure that their teams have sufficient knowledge regarding the organization’s 
goals by inviting presenters to address these issues at team meetings or by strategically 
sending team members to conferences.  Finally, make assignments and delegate tasks 
based on skills or skill development needs, rather than relying purely on organizational 
roles (Katzenbach, 1998). These measures can foster access to information and 
individuals that can help the team to understand and influence the environment. 
Individual team members must also take responsibility for developing their 
sources of power. In addition to support from the president and others, individuals should 
seek to increase their personal mastery by seeking new experiences, building their access 
to information and actors through networks, and developing relationships both inside and 
outside of the team in ways that foster expert and network power (Senge, 1990). 
Individual team members must also take responsibility for educating themselves about 
the university’s core issues and strategies by reading professional and academic literature, 
attending conferences and workshops, and seeking the advice of colleagues with 
expertise in these areas. Developing access to individuals and information, and 
committing to learning about the core goals of the team, will create opportunities for 
team members to participate more fully in information and political management 
functions, making every individual part of the core rather than leaving some on the 
periphery.  
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Address affective conflict. In order for many of these strategies to success, 
presidents must also be attentive to processes and issues of team building. In particular, 
the ability, team leaders must recognize that the ability to use information will be sorely 
diminished if affective conflict is allowed to weaken a team’s capacity. This case 
highlighted what several others have concluded is important in a team or group 
environment, specifically that building trust and relationships among team members is a 
vital team activity (Bensimon & Neumann, 1993; Dee, 2001; Knudson, 1997). The clear 
presence of affective conflict among team members hindered their ability and willingness 
to interact with one another both within and outside of meetings. Presidents and team 
members must take steps to avoid the isolation and alienation of any team member. This 
means paying attention to the quality of relationships on the team because these 
connections, or lack thereof, can impact the quality of a team’s work. Inclusiveness is an 
obligation of the whole team, as evidenced by the group norms and individual practices 
(Bensimon & Neumann, 1993). Alienating or isolating members ignores the benefits of 
creative problem solving that each individuals’ unique contributions and different 
perspectives can provide (Bensimon & Neumann, 1993). 
Presidents, and individual team members, must take steps to manage relationships 
address affective conflict within teams by addressing instances as soon as they become 
recognizable. Which means that all team members must be attentive to the source of 
conflict (Katzenbach, 1998). Personal conflict can be destructive and unproductive, while 
constructive, task- or issue-based conflict can generate alternatives and improve 
decisions. Presidents should model respect for and curiosity about differing perspectives 
in order to emphasize that such differences are valued. Be intentional in your effort to 
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make each member’s value evident in order to increase appreciation for the value of each 
individual and be clear that everyone has a voice at the table (Katzenbach, 1998; Nadler 
& Spencer, 1998). 
Teams can work to develop or improve their interpersonal relationships by 
increasing their familiarity with one another both in social and professional settings. For 
example, in addition to creating social opportunities to foster informal interaction, 
presidents should also intentionally partner team members with one another on 
collaborative organizational projects in order to build trust and familiarity (Garvin, 1993). 
This would be especially helpful for team members who would not normally spend time 
with one another outside of structured meetings (Nadler & Spencer, 1998). Creating 
additional occasions for interaction can help to build relationships, but can also create 
opportunities for diffusion that may have help team members to gain information and to 
learn from the experience of others (March, 1994). Increasing familiarity and gaining 
trust through increased interaction then creates a foundation for positive cognitive 
conflict to emerge in the team. 
In order to improve organizational learning, presidents must develop the capacity 
of their teams to scan and anticipate change in the wider environment in order to detect 
variations; develop the ability to question, challenge, and change norms; and allow 
strategic directions to emerge (Morgan, 1997). Furthermore, presidents themselves, as 
team leaders, must monitor team discipline and attend to issues of conflict (Katzenbach, 
1998). It is vital to spend time on both relationships and issues in order to build trust and 
develop the capacity for learning. The logic of appropriateness suggests that once these 
structures and processes become routine, team members will rely on their experience 
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with these productive habits and accept them as legitimate behaviors. Presidential 
leadership teams have promise for addressing complex issues by engaging in boundary 
spanning, but they must find ways to build their capacity for information and political 
management in support of organizational goals. These strategies for addressing both team 
building and team learning can help presidents and their teams to construct a solid base 
so that they can bridge those boundaries with intentionality and purpose.  
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APPENDIX A. TEAM MEMBER INTERVIEW PROTOCOL 
 
• This protocol was used to conduct semi-structured interviews across several sessions 
with each team member. 
• Prior to start of protocol: Review consent form.  Ask for and answer any questions 
about the project. 
 
I.  Influences – Background  
1. What is your current professional position? 
 How did you come to be in this position? 
 What would you say your professional training is in? 
 Particular disciplinary background? 
2. How long have you been here? 
 What were you doing immediately prior to this position? 
 What about before that? 
 
II.  Influences, Identity and Rules –What does the division do? 
3. Does your office/division have a mission statement?   
 If not, how would you describe the mission of your office/division? 
 What was the process by which this mission was decided? 
 On a scale of 1-5, how effective is your office/division in fulfilling this mission? 
 If so, is there anything you’d change about what the mission statement says or 
assumes about your office/division? 
4. What are the office/division’s specific goals for the current year to help it meet this 
mission?  
 Which 2-3 goals are currently your top priorities? 
 What was the process for determining these goals? Who participated? 
 If I asked your top staff which 2-3 goals are currently the top priority, how would 
their list compare to yours? 
5. What activities does your office/division undertake to meet those goals? For instance, 
what are some of your regular, ongoing activities? 
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 What new activities or projects have you initiated in the past year? 
 If your office published a newsletter about your activities, what would be today’s top 
three headlines? 
6. What resources do you and your office/division control? 
 Financial, human, information, other 
 What resources or factors don’t you control that affect your job? 
7. What were your 1-2 big successes this past year? 
 What made it a success? 
 What was one of your biggest challenges this past year?   
 Would you say that situation is resolved? If so, how did you tackle it? If not, what are 
you doing to resolve it? 
8. Who else, besides you and your staff, influences the goals or day-to-day activities of 
this office? 
 [for each constituency mentioned:] How do they communicate their expectations to 
you? 
 Taking all of the outside influences as a group, to what extent to their expectations 
coincide with your own, on a scale of 1 to 5? 
 
III.  Influences, Identity and Rules – What does the individual do?  
9. Think about your activities in a typical week. Out of all the responsibilities in your 
job description, which 2-3 responsibilities do you spend the most time on in a typical 
week? 
 Do you think those 2-3 responsibilities are in fact the most important? If not, which 
responsibilities do you think you should devote more time to? 
 How often do you meet with others in your division in a typical week?   
 With whom?   
 For what purpose? 
 Examples. 
10. What have been your most significant accomplishments during your tenure in this 
position? 
 If you knew today that you would be leaving this position in one year, what one thing 
would you most like to accomplish between now and then? Why is this important to you? 
 When you can’t accomplish a goal you set for yourself as TITLE, what kinds of 
things typically stand in your way? How do you deal with these barriers? 
11. If I asked your staff to give you a grade on you as a leader, what grade do you think 
they would give you and why?  
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 What are their 2 or 3 greatest expectations of you as a leader? 
 How do they communicate those expectations to you? 
 What grade would you give yourself as a leader? If it’s different from the grade your 
staff would give you, what are the reasons? 
12. Is there anyone, inside or outside the university, whom you regularly use as a 
sounding board or advisor when you have a problem?  
 What are the characteristics that make this person a good person to talk to? 
13. Of all your skills, knowledge, and abilities, which 2 or 3 do you think are the most 
vital contributions you bring to this office/division? 
 
If continuing with interview at this time: I’d like to shift the focus of our conversation 
from your office/division to the leadership team.  
 
If picking up at next visit: Recap first sections and then shift the focus of conversation 
from office/division to the leadership team.  
 
IV.  Influences, Identity and Rules – What does the Leadership Team do? 
14. How long have you been on the team?  
 How did you come to be on the team? 
 Were you one of the original members, or did you join an existing team? 
15. How would you summarize the team’s function(s)? 
 Has that always been the case?  Has it changed? 
16. What three words would you use to describe the culture of this team?  
 In follow up interview, use continua of each element (e.g., congenial to contentious, 
political to not political).  
17. If there were a rulebook for team members regarding team operations, what would be 
the top three dos and don’ts? 
18. Describe your relationship with other team members, including the president.   
 What other team members do you frequently work with? 
19. Think of some of the major issues the team has tackled over the past year. 
 How does the team prioritize which issues are most important?   
 Get examples of a time they prioritized something. 
 Which do you think are the 3 most important issues? 
 Does your analysis of the 3 most important issues correspond to the team’s priorities? 
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20. Choose one of those major issues and think of the process by which the team 
addressed it. 
 As each team member represented the interests of their own offices/divisions, which 
members’ interests seemed most closely aligned with those of your office/division, and in 
what ways? 
 Which members’ interests seemed farthest from those of your office/division, and in 
what ways? 
 What was the outcome? How were conflicts among the various interests of team 
members resolved? 
21. What was the team’s greatest accomplishment last year?  
 Can you identify any areas in which the team failed to live up to your expectations?  
22. What should I know about this team that I’ve not asked you about? 
 
V.  Influences, Identity and Rules, Interpretation – Role on Leadership Team 
23. How would you describe your unique role as a member of the leadership team? What 
can you do or contribute that other members cannot?  
 To what extent does your perception of your role match what you perceive to be the 
president’s expectations of your role?  
24. Think of a recent leadership team meeting you would characterize as typical.  
 How much time did you spend preparing for this team meeting? 
 Did you consult with people outside the team in preparation for the meeting? Who? 
About what? 
 What information did you seek, and how did you gather it? 
 Of the information that you gathered, were there any parts that you decided not to 
bring to the meeting? What led you to decide not to include it? 
25. Still thinking of that typical meeting, how much time did you spend afterward 
following up on the meeting? 
 Did you have particular tasks to accomplish as a result of the meeting? Did you do 
them? Why or why not? 
 Did you share information from the meeting with your staff?  Someone else? 
 How much of the information discussed at the meeting did you share?  
 How did you decide what to share and what not to share with your staff?  
 Example? 
26. In team meetings, what kinds of issues or activities immediately get your attention as 
being relevant to your office/division? Give me one or two examples.  
 Why are these issues or activities important to you? 
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 What kinds of issues or activities seem less relevant to you and your office/division? 
Are there issues or activities that seem to you to be outside your area of responsibility? 
Why? 
27. How would you describe the perspectives held by other members of the team? 
 Whose perspective do you share?  Why? 
 Whose perspective do you not share?  Why not? 
 How are different perspectives managed in the team?  Example? 
28. Has there ever been a time when you felt the leadership team was not taking the needs 
of your office/division as seriously as you do, when you felt you had to advocate for 
your office/division to the team? Can you give me an example? 
 What did you do about this situation? What was the outcome? 
 What about the reverse – a time when your office/division was not taking the needs of 
the University seriously? 
29. When you take leadership team decisions back to your staff, what kinds of reactions 
do you usually get?  
 Can you give me an example of a time when your staff responded with what you 
would consider wholehearted support? 
 Can you give an example of a time when your staff resisted the decision of the 
leadership team?  
 What did you do in that case? 
 What was the outcome? 
30. How would you summarize the way you negotiate the balance between being the 
head of your office/division and being a member of the leadership team? 
 How would you complete the sentence “ I sit between the President and _____”? 
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APPENDIX B. PRESIDENT INTERVIEW PROTOCOL 
 
• This protocol was used to conduct semi-structured interviews across several sessions 
with the president. 
• Prior to start of protocol: Review consent form.  Ask for and answer any questions 
about the project. 
 
I.  Influences – Background  
1. What is your current professional position? 
 How did you come to be in this position? 
 How long have you been here? 
 
II.  Influences, Identity and Rules – Leadership team 
2. How did you form your leadership team? 
3. What is the goal of your team meeting? 
4. What would you say are the major problems that the team’s dealing with right now? 
5. What do you expect of the members of that team? 
6. What was the team’s greatest accomplishment last year?  
 Can you identify any areas in which the team failed to live up to your expectations? 
7. What are the top three issues or challenges the team currently faces?  
 What do you expect the team as a whole to do to address those issues or challenges? 
8. Do you meet with team members individually? 
9. What kind of decisions do you rely on them for? 
10. How are issues prioritized within the team?  
11. If you were to write a job description for a vice-president, what would be the top 
three characteristics that you would look for? 
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12. How does this team help connect you to all of your constituents?  
13. How do you know what’s going on in the rest of the institution?  
14. Each team member has his or her unique strengths and abilities, and each represents a 
different part of the university. Can you give me some examples of ways that you 
drew on individual member’s unique strengths or knowledge? 
 Are there some team members you rely on more than others to make substantive 
contributions?  
 If so: What makes those members more useful to you and the team than others? 
 
IV.  Influences, Identity and Rules, Interpretation – Role on Leadership Team 
15. What is your role on the team? 
16. What do you team members expect of you?  
 How do they communicate their expectations to you? 
17. Are there people outside the team, inside the university or outside the university, that 
you rely on for advice? 
 
V.  Influences and Rules 
2. In your routine management of the day-to-day operations of the university, say, last 
week, did you ever turn to others for information or advice? 
 If any: What people or organizations did you turn to?  
 Are these the ones you rely on most often? What are the 2 or 3 people or 
organizations you most often turn to for information or advice in managing day-to-day 
operations? Are they members of your leadership team, other people within the 
university, board members, outsiders? 
3. Can you give me an example of when you simply made a decision without consulting 
anyone? 
4. What opportunities do you have to communicate with the campus as a whole? 
 How do you decide what messages to communicate in these forums? 
 What avenues does the campus as a whole have for communicating with you? 
  220  
 How well do you think people on campus understand what your vision is or what the 
goals of the university are? 
 
APPENDIX C. KEY CAMPUS INDIVIDUALS INTERVIEW PROTOCOL 
 
Prior to start of protocol: Review consent form.  Ask for and answer any questions about 
the project. 
 
1. What is your role on campus? 
a. Responsibilities 
b. To whom do you report? 
c. How long have you been here? 
d. In any other capacity? 
e. What is your role in campus decision making? 
 
2. How would you characterize interaction with members of the leadership team? 
 
3. What are the current issues on campus? 
a. History 
b. What is important to know about this issue?  What are the facts? 
 
4.  Where should I go for more information on [ISSUE]? 
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APPENDIX D. DOCUMENTS 
 
1. University vision statement 
2. President’s inaugural address 
3. President’s message 
4. Campus master plan 
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APPENDIX E. ROSTER OF TEAM MEMBERS 
 
President 
Provost and Senior Vice President for Academic Affairs 
Vice President for Business Affairs and Finance 
Vice President for Economic Development 
Vice President for Information Services and Technology 
Vice President for Student Affairs 
Vice President for University Advancement 
University Legal Counsel 
Executive-in-Residence 
Senior Advisor for Government Relations 
Director of Marketing and Public Affairs 
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